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ABSTRACT
United States nonprofits are governed by boards of directors who have legal
responsibilities based on the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Boards,
along with the chief executive, are held responsible to fulfill these standards which are
designed to hold nonprofits legally accountable to carry out their tax exempt purpose by
using organizational resources for the intended purpose, avoid conflict of interest, and
ensure compliance. However, despite this weighty responsibility and the voluntary nature
of nonprofits, no standardized process exists to educate nonprofit leaders about their legal
responsibilities.
While governance is a key area of nonprofit research, there is limited empirical
evidence about how nonprofit leaders satisfy legal accountability demands. Using
quantitative methods, this three paper dissertation establishes baseline data about
nonprofit leader fiduciary knowledge, source of knowledge, and application of
knowledge in their governance activities. A survey tool developed for this study yielded
186 responses from San Diego County nonprofit leaders. Using role and board service as
the primary demographics, the results show that most nonprofit leaders believe they have
enough knowledge of the fiduciary duties and frequently use their knowledge in the
performance of their governance duties. However, when tested for actual knowledge,
only 41% of board members and 70% of executives passed. When analyzed by board
service, 56% of those who served on one to four boards in the past 15 years and 31% of
those who have served on five or more boards passed. Further results show that nonprofit
leaders were more likely to rely on informal sources of knowledge, such as conversations

with their colleagues and other board members and less on more formalized sources, such
as board orientations or a board manual, regardless of role or board service.
Implications of this study point to the need for increased fiduciary duty
knowledge amongst nonprofit leaders. Furthermore, this study can inform regulators,
funders, and practitioners to develop standards and fund training to strengthen nonprofit
accountability. As nonprofit leaders understand their fiduciary duties more fully, they are
empowered to make decisions about organizational resources that uphold their legal
responsibilities to carry out the mission.

Keywords: Nonprofit Governance, Accountability, Legal Accountability, Fiduciary
Duties, Nonprofit Board Member, Nonprofit Executive Director, Nonprofit Leader
Knowledge
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Nonprofits are woven into the very fabric of American life. On any given day, in
nearly every community across the United States, people interact with the more than 1.5
million charitable organizations that provide a variety of programs and services (National
Center for Charitable Statistics, 2019). Nonprofits enrich our lives socially as well as
provide critical services that many people depend on. Nonprofits also significantly
contribute to the national economy by generating more than $1.74 trillion in revenues and
by employing more than 12.3 million people (United States Department of Labor, 2018;
National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2018).
Many stakeholders rely on nonprofits and as such, hold nonprofits accountable to
carry out their respective missions. As the governance body, boards of directors and the
chief executive are legally responsible to uphold federal and state mandated fiduciary
duties designed to ensure that organizational resources (financial, human, physical, and
intellectual) are used in a manner that fulfills the charitable mission. However, over the
years we have seen many cases of resources used for purposes other than to fulfill the
mission. Cases of excessive compensation, conflict of interest, lack of oversight, and
intentional wrongdoing have been reported in nonprofits of all sizes and that carry out a
variety of missions. For the cases that are reported, findings often point to boards of
directors and executives not fulfilling their oversight and management duties either
because of ignorance, lack of engagement, or conflict of interest.
Nonprofit leaders are held to high standard of conduct. When stories of nonprofit
mismanagement and negligence come to light nonprofits are impacted in a variety of
ways: The public becomes wary of nonprofits, donations decline, reputations suffer and

2
ultimately the mission goes unfulfilled. Yet, the high profile cases highlight what goes
unreported: the countless nonprofit boards and executives, across the nation, leading and
managing nonprofits of all shapes and sizes, failing to fulfill their oversight management
and role. Weak board oversight is an endemic issue that ultimately negatively affects
those who rely on the goods and services when resources are wasted and the mission goes
unfulfilled.
The Challenges of Studying Nonprofit Governance
Studying nonprofit governance, in terms of legal accountability, is actually more
challenging than one may think. Nonprofit leaders are expected to fulfill their fiduciary
duties and are held legally responsible by federal and state agencies. Yet, reports from
regulators lag by several years, because of privacy rights and lack of resources.
Furthermore, when information is made available, it is difficult to tease out the specifics
of the instances or identify penalties or outcomes of the investigations and inquiries. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) releases annual reports about nonprofits that have had
their tax-exempt status revoked, but no information is made available about how many
nonprofits were investigated or the basis for the investigation.
When nonprofits are found to have failed in upholding their fiduciary duties, they
are fined and asked to institute recommendations to support good governance. The
ultimate penalty nonprofits face for failure to uphold their fiduciary duties is tax exempt
revocation, however, when the IRS releases how many tax exempt organizations were
revoked, there is no indication as to what caused the revocation. Was it simple negligence
such as failing to file required reports? Was it intentional criminal activity? Or, was it
because of the zone of insolvency–when the organization is no longer financially stable?
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Although the public is aware of the cases that receive media attention, this type of
negligence is more common throughout the nonprofit sector. Anecdotally, as a
practitioner for the past 20 years with experience in all levels of nonprofit organizations
as an executive, program staff, board member, and consultant, I have interacted with
countless organizations who struggle with governance issues. What seems to be a
common thread is that they do not understand, or in some cases are aware of, their basic
fiduciary duties. For these organizations, their lack of knowledge may not end up in the
news, but rather is the basis for potentially negative consequences related to poor
decision-making and lack of engagement.
Furthermore, in my work as a nonprofit consultant, I have helped many
organizations regain their tax exempt status due to their lack of legal compliance which
for some, resulted in their tax status revocation. In all cases, the board expressed that they
did not know about the reporting requirements and if they knew, they would have done
what was required. I have often thought that this issue is ripe for research in order to
better understand where, how, and why governance failures may be happening.
The Importance of Studying Nonprofit Governance Legal Accountability
Leading and managing a nonprofit organization has become increasingly more
complex with the increased demand for services and competition for resources. And, as
more and more cases of nonprofit mismanagement and wrongdoing are reported,
important questions about legal accountability are raised for the nonprofit sector and for
academics. Do nonprofit leaders understand their fiduciary duties? Do nonprofit leaders
have access to appropriate trainings and tools to learn about their fiduciary duties? Are
the pressures for performance creating a culture that is more susceptible to negligence

4
and ignorance because nonprofit leaders are focused more on financial sustainability than
their mission?
To answer these important and urgent questions, this study explores the
governance of nonprofits as a major factor driving accountability. While there is
significant research on nonprofit governance, much of it prescribes that nonprofit leaders
fulfill a variety of roles (Carver, 1997; Chait, Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Herman & Renz,
2000; Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Houle, 1997; Renz, 2010). However, there are very few
studies focused on what nonprofit leaders know about their basic legal fiduciary
responsibilities, specifically, 1) nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties, 2) the
sources of their fiduciary knowledge, and 3) the application of such knowledge. This
dissertation provides insights into these issues by collecting baseline data about nonprofit
leader (board members and executive) knowledge of fiduciary duties, the sources they
access in learning about their fiduciary duties, and application of fiduciary knowledge in
the performance of their governance responsibilities.
As an academic, my goal is to research these issues empirically by developing an
assessment tool, that others can build upon, that focuses on the basic responsibilities of
nonprofit leaders as outlined in the fiduciary duties. As a practitioner, my goal is to
strengthen nonprofit governance by identifying gaps in leader knowledge of fiduciary
duties. As a pracademic (academic and practitioner), I believe that research in this
particular area of nonprofit governance will help nonprofit leaders better understand their
basic fiduciary duties, creating a solid foundation that supports sustainability and success
for their organizations.
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Ignorance or Negligence?
There is limited empirical evidence about how boards actually function (Jackson
& Holland, 1998). Some of the literature on nonprofit governance tends to be theoretical
and conceptual (Cornforth, 2012) while other literature is based on for-profit contexts and
does not necessarily translate to the nonprofit sector. The literature can be prescriptive in
describing how a nonprofit board should function based on a variety of factors (Miller,
2002; Ostrower & Stone, 2006). For example, some studies have focused on overall
leadership (Chait, et al, 2005), relationships between executive management and the
board (Brown, 2005), and predictors of performance based on board configurations and
composition (Bradshaw, 2009) while others are related to the characteristics of leaders
(Riggio & Orr, 2004) and management practices (Helmig, Jegers, & Lapsley, 2004).
Furthermore, there is a vast body of practitioner literature that provides “how to” advice
for nonprofits who want to strengthen their boards, but it is usually based on what works
for a select group of organizations or sub-sector.
Are nonprofit leaders acting out of ignorance or negligence? I offer that ignorance
is more likely the root of the lack of fiduciary awareness amongst nonprofit leaders,
based on my experience in the nonprofit sector. However, there is also an aspect of
complacency that occurs in boardrooms across the country. Boards are relied upon for
oversight of the organization, not involvement in the day-to-day. However, because many
nonprofits are small, their board members take an active role in the daily operations of
the organization. Larger organizations rely on their boards for more strategy, but as
organizations grow so does their staff. As organizations recruit professional staff, the
board becomes overly reliant on the executive and board members become complacent.
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Boards become complacent when they are not engaged (Chait, et al., 2005).
Engagement is a key component to the fiduciary duty of care, but based on the results of
this study, many nonprofit leaders are not aware that showing up to meetings and
reviewing organizational documents prior to the meeting are legal responsibilities. Chait,
et al. (2005) identifies this tension by differentiating between a board problem and a
problem with the board. Board problems are things that are relatively easy to pinpoint
such as lack of attendance at board meetings. Problems with the board are more subtle
that typically include lack of purpose. In looking through a legal accountability lens,
lacking the appropriate knowledge of fiduciary duties is both a board problem for the
individual board members and a problem with the board given that the individual board
members collectively make up the governance body and are the ones making decisions
on behalf of the organization.
Tensions of Nonprofit Governance
Looking at the historical roots of how the U.S. nonprofit sector developed, several
tensions exist today that create challenges in governing nonprofit organizations. Over
time, the responsibilities for board members and executives have expanded that go above
and beyond the basic fiduciary duties. Nonprofit leaders of the 21st Century are expected
to develop strategy, be community advocates, and raise awareness of their organization’s
mission while overseeing the organization as a whole. Additional roles create additional
distractions, specifically in the expectation to be accountable to a variety of stakeholders,
not just regulators. With more responsibilities and more stakeholders to appease, the legal
responsibilities are often eclipsed.
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Another factor is the lack of a standardized process to ensure that nonprofit
leaders understand their basic responsibilities. Without a standardized assessment,
nonprofit leaders can be ignorant about their roles and responsibilities, specifically their
fiduciary duties, and serve without consequence. Another factor is the voluntary nature of
service. Because they are volunteers, nonprofit leaders are given a great deal of leeway
for negligence. Combined, these issues have caused challenges in holding nonprofits
accountable for governance and oversight.
The Voluntary Nature of Nonprofits
How nonprofits have evolved over time has impacted the evolution of nonprofit
governance. Some have suggested that as the essential services became more privatized,
Americans began to rely more heavily on nonprofits, creating “problematic gaps” that
have become “more glaringly evident” in terms of accountability (Dobkin-Hall, 2003, p.
26). I offer that these gaps are a result of the convergence of the voluntary nature of
nonprofits and the regulations concerning the use of public money for a public purpose.
The U.S. Tax Code requires that all corporate entities tax exempt or not, have a
governance structure in place to make decisions on behalf of the corporation (Legal
Information Institute, 2017). For private corporations this is often the shareholders, board
of directors, or owner(s) who typically have a financial stake in the corporation and are
given voting power and control of the firm. However, because nonprofit organizations
resources cannot personally benefit individuals, nonprofits must be governed by
disinterested parties who typically are volunteers. These individuals are tasked with the
responsibility to ensure that nonprofit organization resources are available for and
allocated to fulfill its charitable mission (IRS, 2017a & 2017b).
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Referred to as boards of directors or trustees, these volunteers have either a
connection to, or an alignment with, an organization’s mission. As volunteers, board
members bring with them a variety of skills and backgrounds to the organizations they
serve. Collectively, these boards are held legally responsible, along with the chief
executive who is typically paid staff, to ensure that organizational resources are used in a
manner that fulfills a charitable purpose and to make decisions on behalf of, and to act in
the best interest of, the organization. Furthermore, given the amount of responsibility that
board members and executives have, one might assume that nonprofit leaders are
adequately prepared to fulfill their roles and responsibilities. However, no standardized
system exists to ensure that board members have the understanding of what they are
legally responsible for or what their duties entail. And, although nonprofit board
members are responsible for the financial and moral oversight, many boards lack
awareness of what those responsibilities actually are (Wright & Millesen 2008).
Given that board members are volunteers, they go about their roles in a different
manner than paid employees (Miller & Jablin 1991). Employees typically have some
training and prior knowledge about their duties when they are hired. In fact, the prior
knowledge and level of expertise may be the deciding factor for their employment. Yet,
for board volunteers, there is no expectation of any prior experience (in this case, serving
on a board), adequate knowledge, or the requirement of a specific skill set (unless sought
after for financial, legal, or other expertise). Although the voluntary nature of nonprofits
encourages participation for all, without any criteria for service, the old saying goes, “you
get what you pay for”. This leniency is reflected in a letter to the editor of the Chronicle
of Philanthropy that raises red flags about the lack of standards for board service when
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they stated that, “the tendency is to ‘make allowances’ where non-profits are concerned,
to give them ‘the benefit of the doubt’”, which “always breeds trouble” (Gibelman &
Gelman, 2001, p. 62).
A national survey of nonprofit leaders reported that board chairs gave themselves an
A- in understanding the organization’s mission and a B in understanding their roles and
responsibilities (BoardSource, 2017, p. 28 and 47). This dissertation is similar in that
both board members and executives indicated that they were very familiar with the
fiduciary duties, understood their organization’s mission, and had enough knowledge to
carry out their duties. Yet, the results of this dissertation highlight a gap between what
nonprofit leaders believe they know about their fiduciary duties and what they actually
know.
Legal Framework of Nonprofit Governance
As creations of United States federal and state legislation, nonprofits are corporate
entities and must abide by federal and state laws and statutes. Nonprofits are
differentiated from other types of corporate entities by how they are taxed and how
profits are distributed. Nonprofits are tax exempt entities, which allow for public support,
such as tax free revenues, government contracts, and charitable donations in exchange for
providing a charitable, scientific, religious, or educational purpose that benefits the
public. Because tax exempt entities are private corporate entities designed to generate a
public benefit, they are prohibited from distributing profits (or any other organizational
resource) to a select group of individuals, whereas for profit corporations are designed to
generate wealth for individuals. However, all corporations, regardless of their corporate
form, must have a governance body in place that ensures compliance with federal and
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state requirements and that acts as the decision-making body for the corporation. The
governing body is referred to as a board of directors and for nonprofits, the governance
body is responsible to ensure that resources are directed to fulfill a public, charitable
purpose, not benefit a few individuals.
The Fiduciary Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience
The duties of loyalty, care, and obedience are the legal fiduciary responsibilities
of nonprofit leaders that board of directors and executives must adhere to. These
responsibilities are tied to resources (physical, financial, human, and intellectual) and
outline expectations of how nonprofit leaders will direct and use its resources to fulfill a
tax exempt mission. The duties of loyalty, care, and obedience work together, however
individually, they comprise specific aspects of nonprofit leader fiduciary responsibilities.
The duty of care relates to how much a nonprofit leader engages in the
organization they are responsible for governing (Hopkins, 2009). Specific activities that
fall under this duty include: attending board and other relevant governance meetings,
reviewing information in advance of meetings, considering all information before voting
(including executive staff performance, finances, and internal policies), and exercising
independent judgment. The duty of loyalty requires nonprofit leaders to put the interests
of the organization above their own personal interests (Hopkins, 2009). Specific activities
that fall under this duty include: disclosing conflict of interest, maintaining
confidentiality of organizational information, and ensuring that organizational resources
are not used for personal gain. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance (Hopkins,
2009). Nonprofit leaders that are fulfilling their fiduciary duty of obedience adhere to all
laws, at all levels (e.g. federal, state, county, city). Specific activities that fall under this
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duty include: abiding by organizational bylaws, submitting required documentation as
needed such as an annual tax return and, ensuring that all decisions fall within
organizational policies and fulfill the tax exempt mission.
Accountability
Nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of stakeholders: clients, donors, staff,
and regulators all are invested in the work of nonprofits. Given the many faces of
accountability, this study focuses on one aspect, legal accountability, which is bounded
by what nonprofit leaders are legally accountable for. As such, the fiduciary duties of
care, loyalty, and obedience serve as the foundation for this research.
Ebrahim (2010) provides a useful accountability framework that is used in this
study. He offers that organizations can better meet accountability demands when they
decide what they are accountable for, how they are accountable, and to whom they are
accountable. Because legal accountability is the focus of this study, each facet of
accountability is addressed. Nonprofit leaders are legally accountable to know what their
fiduciary duties are. How they meet legal accountability is through accessing the
appropriate sources of knowledge to learn about their fiduciary duties. And, finally, to
whom nonprofit leaders are accountable to are regulators by meeting legal accountability
in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities.
Accountability For What? - Knowledge
In order to satisfy legal accountability, nonprofit leaders must know what their
fiduciary responsibilities are, which in turn, serves as a foundation for their governance
activities. In today’s nonprofit, leaders are asked to do more than just oversee. It seems
that in the past few decades, board governance has expanded from basic fiduciary duties
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to expectations that a super hero would have difficulty meeting. Boards are asked to plan
for the future by setting strategy and casting vision for the organization; be informed
about external shifts, legislation, and local impacts on their mission; build relationships
with a variety of stakeholders; and to assess effectiveness while promoting accountability
(Carver, 1997; Chait, Ryan, and Taylor, 2005; Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Kearns, 1996;
Renz, 2010). At first glance, these responsibilities would seem feasible given that most
boards are often made up of accomplished professionals in their fields. Yet, there is
evidence that, regardless of their professional acumen, many board members have little to
no experience in the governance aspects of running a nonprofit (Preston & Brown, 2004).
The lack of understanding and experience is a wide spread issue. Two wellregarded national studies on board governance, Leading with Intent (BoardSource, 2017)
and the Stanford Survey on Leadership and Management in the Nonprofit Sector
(Stanford, 2017) provide evidence about the absence of governance knowledge among
nonprofit leaders. Leading with Intent reports that board members and executives give
themselves a ‘B’ when asked to assess their own understanding of board roles and
responsibilities. When asked about the top challenges facing the nonprofit sector as a
whole today, nonprofit board members and executives ranked “weak or ineffective board
governance” in the top three (Stanford, 2017, p. 13).
Accountable How? – Appropriate Sources of Knowledge
In order to satisfy legal accountability, nonprofit leaders must access the
appropriate sources of fiduciary knowledge in order to carry out their governance duties.
Institutionalism (Scott, 2008) suggests that organizations primarily respond to their
external environments in order to gain and maintain legitimacy. Processes of coercive,
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mimetic, and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) explain how
organizations adopt new practices. Nonprofits may be directly pressured by donors
(coercive) to change course, they may seek out new answers under conditions of
uncertainty (mimetic), or they may change as a result of the professionalization of their
staff (normative).
Best practices are often a means for nonprofit leaders to satisfy legal
accountability. Best practices are widely accepted standards developed by nonprofit
practitioners, scholars, and academics to support various aspects of leading and managing
nonprofit organizations. For many organizations, best practices fill the void of a missing
standardized assessment process and become a substitute in efforts to meet demands for
legal accountability.
Accountable To Whom? – Performance of Fiduciary Duties
In order to satisfy legal accountability, nonprofit leaders must apply their
fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties. Following the rules is
the first step in meeting demands and expectations of the various stakeholders that
nonprofits interact with. Since nonprofit leaders are held legally responsible for their
decisions, knowing what the fiduciary responsibilities are is critical for any nonprofit
leader. But reality is far from this ideal, as “boards make decisions based on incomplete
information, rushed circumstances, gut feelings and experiences rather than the
formalized method of decision making that the legal model suggests” (Fishman, Schwartz
& Mayer, 2015, p. 114). Board complacency “appears to be the norm, and action the
exception” (Holland, 2002, p. 422). These problems suggest a need to “move the
measurement of board member performance from one that has typically focused on
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quantity to one that focuses on the quality of individual contributions to the board”
(Doherty & Hoye, 2011 p. 110).
Contributions of the Study
If nonprofit leaders have limited or inaccurate knowledge of their basic fiduciary
responsibilities, how are they expected to govern, let alone fulfill many of the other
expectations placed on them for the sustainability of their organizations? Given that the
literature is scarce concerning what nonprofit leaders actually know about their basic
fiduciary responsibilities further exploration of this important aspect of management and
governance is needed. More specifically, research about nonprofit leader knowledge of
their fiduciary duties.
As such, this study contributes to both the scholarly and practitioner fields. In
terms of scholarly contributions, the study is the first of its kind. It pilots an assessment
tool designed to establish baseline data about the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience that tax exempt boards of directors and executives must fulfill in order to
satisfy legal accountability. Furthermore, the study is focused on individual nonprofit
leaders: what they know, sources of their knowledge, and the application of knowledge in
the performance of their fiduciary duties.
In terms of practitioner contributions, the results of this study identify gaps in
nonprofit leader knowledge of their fiduciary duties that can be used to educate nonprofit
leaders, funders, and regulators. The education would focus on how best to address
specific areas of governance through trainings and other means in order to strengthen
nonprofit governance. Furthermore, the assessment tool developed for this study fills a
gap that exists in currently available assessment tools, because it focuses on the legal
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aspects of nonprofit oversight, specifically the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience.
Design and Methodology
Based on the purpose of this study, quantitative methods were utilized. Inductive
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and hypothesis testing were performed using
the individual (board member and executive) as the unit of analysis. From this point on,
nonprofit leader is the term that will be used to describe board members and executives.
An online survey, developed for this study, was the primary means of data collection.
Legal accountability in governance is the overarching focus of this study that
utilizes the three facets of accountability: 1) for what nonprofit leaders are legally
accountable, 2) how nonprofit leaders meet legal accountability, and 3) to whom
nonprofit leaders are legally accountable. The purpose for using this framework is to
operationalize how accountability is expressed as legal accountability via the fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties, the
source of their fiduciary knowledge, and the application of their fiduciary knowledge in
the performance of their governance duties are the constructs based on specific aspects of
the fiduciary duties. Although each duty represents a specific aspect of oversight, they are
connected and work together.
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Organization of the Study
The aim of this study is to provide empirical research that is useful to practitioners
and academics and that is applied and theoretical. Ultimately, as a practitioner, I am
particularly interested in exploring the gaps in governance that I experience regularly in
the sector. As an academic, I am interested in developing an assessment tool that can be
tested further to provide insight into the gaps nonprofit leaders have related to their
fiduciary responsibilities.
The premise of this study is that nonprofit leaders who understand their basic
legal fiduciary duties can perform their fiduciary duties and consequently satisfy legal
accountability demands. This dissertation is organized around three separate studies,
preceded by an extensive background and methodology chapter (chapter two) that applies
to each of the three articles, to avoid redundancies across the articles. The chapters are
designed to be stand-alone scholarly pieces to submit to academic journals and
practitioner publications.
Chapter two provides context in order to lay the groundwork for the purpose of
this study. Accountability is explored in greater detail along with how the study addresses
the three facets of accountability: for what, how, and to whom. In addition, details about
the methodology, limitations, and definitions are included.
Chapter three focuses on nonprofit leader self reported and actual knowledge as a
means to satisfy legal accountability for what. The focus is on the first strand of research,
nonprofit leader (board members and executives) knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities
as a means to meet legal accountability. The chapter also discusses the nature of the
nonprofit sector that includes its characteristics, the legal roots of nonprofit governance,
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and the evolving nature of board expectations. The findings presented in chapter three
suggest that nonprofit leaders believe they have enough knowledge to govern, but in
reality, may not have correct knowledge of what their fiduciary duties entail. When tested
for their actual knowledge of legal responsibilities, only 41% of the board members and
70% of the executives received a passing score.
Chapter four focuses on sources nonprofit leader access to learn about their
fiduciary responsibilities as a means to satisfy the legal accountability how. The chapter
explores the importance of isomorphic pressures as an explanation as to why nonprofit
leaders learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. The idea of best practices is presented
along with the study results which point to nonprofit leaders’ use of informal means, such
as relying on their professional and personal networks and other board members to learn
about their responsibilities, more so than formalized best practices such as board manuals
and orientations.
Chapter five focuses on the frequency with which nonprofit leaders apply their
fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties as a means to satisfy
legal accountability for whom. The chapter focuses on competencies, the ability to
perform an activity based on knowledge. Chapter five focuses on performance of
fiduciary duties to satisfy legal accountability with some discussion about ownership and
role ambiguity. The results of this chapter indicate that although nonprofit leaders
respond that they are engaged in their governance duties, their performance is based on
lack of knowledge of what their actual fiduciary responsibilities are.
Chapter six summarizes the results of each chapter by drawing out the critical
issues and gaps in nonprofit governance that this study reveals. With a discussion about
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how to bridge the divide between research and practice, chapter six highlights the need
for the two to work in tandem. The chapter also acknowledges the governance challenges
and opportunities that many nonprofit leaders face. By offering specific ideas and
pathways for how this research can be applied and studied further in both academic and
practitioner environments, the study concludes with additional research questions yet to
be answered.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
The United States is fortunate to have a vibrant nonprofit sector, from coast to
coast, meeting a variety of societal needs. From small grassroots community gardens to
world-famous art institutions, nonprofit organizations intersect with every walk of life at
every stage of life. Nonprofits are also a financial force for the country. As of 2015, it is
estimated that nonprofits contributed $1.74 trillion in revenues to the U.S. economy
accounting for 5.4 percent of the domestic product (National Center for Charitable
Statistics, 2018). Given that the U.S. nonprofit sector plays an important role in the
economy, nonprofits are faced with increased demands for accountability as they are
relied upon to provide goods and services that benefit society.
For nonprofit organizations, accountability demands come from various
stakeholders including funders who want assurances that donations go directly to the
mission, clients who want safe, reliable services, and governments who expect nonprofits
to use organizational resources to fulfill a charitable purpose. Given the many facets of
accountability, this study defines accountability in terms of the legal standards that
nonprofit boards and executives are responsible to fulfill in their oversight and
management role as nonprofit leaders. As such, this study is focused on the fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience set forth by state and federal legislation and
expectations.
Nonprofit organizations are governed by a board of directors, whose primary
function is to make decisions about resources (financial, physical, human, and
intellectual) so that the organization can fulfill its mission. Boards are either beloved or
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belittled. They are the first ones to receive praise for a job well done and the first ones to
blame when something goes awry.
What makes nonprofit board service unique is its voluntary nature. An individual
agrees to serve in a position that entails a great deal of legal responsibility regardless of
their qualifications. Some board members bring a great deal of knowledge about their
role, while others may not fully understand what a board member does. The lack of skill
combined with a lack of standardized process to ensure that board members are properly
trained is a recipe for disaster. In a study that explored the socialization of nonprofit
board members, Castor and Jiter (2013) found that while some board members received
trainings related to their board service others were completely unaware and woefully
prepared for board service.
Boards of directors work in partnership with the chief executive, who makes
decisions about the day-to-day management of the organization. The executive is bound
by many of the same legal requirements as boards are, because they are in a position of
influence and have access to resources. Because of the management function that
nonprofit executives have, accredited degree and certification programs have been
developed over the past few decades to provide nonprofit executives with more
formalized training in management and leadership. These professionalized skills can
support greater demands for services, navigate increased competition for funding, and
fulfill the public’s trust (Young, 1999). Although these programs are an important step,
they still do not provide a standardized system with which to hold nonprofit leaders
accountable for knowing their legal responsibilities.
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Nonprofits in the News
When news of a nonprofit scandal breaks, accountability is typically called into
question. Examples of well-known nonprofit organizations exposed because of financial
misappropriations and oversight failures such as the United Way, Wounded Warriors
Project, and Central Asia Institute suggest that nonprofit leaders, board members, and
executive staff may be asleep at the wheel. Each case highlights how the lack of oversight
and accountability, specifically by those who were entrusted with organization resources,
resulted in negative immediate and long-term impacts.
The United Way
The United Way provides a lesson in nonprofit accountability and inadequate
board oversight when details of excessive executive compensation and benefits went
public (Kearns, 1996). Prompted by an article in the Washington Post in 1992, the
Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Internal Revenue Service began an investigation
of the United Way of America’s national office (Shapiro, 2011). The article reported that
William Aramony, the chief executive officer, was receiving $460,000 in benefits and
compensation, which at the time seemed excessive (Shapiro, 2011). After the
investigation that culminated in a federal trial, Aramony was convicted on 23 counts of
felony charges that included fraud, conspiracy, and filing false tax returns. He was
sentenced to seven years in a federal prison (Shapiro, 2011).
The investigation revealed that Aramony, the United Way’s chief executive
officer of nearly 20 years, was spending lavishly on entertainment, travel, and women
throughout his tenure. But, where was the board? According to Shapiro (2011) the board
gave Aramony a unanimous vote of confidence a few weeks before Aramony left the
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United Way amidst the allegations. However, during Aramony’s trial no witnesses from
the United Way were called either by the defense or the prosecution (Shapiro, 2011). The
board’s absence at the trial may have been an indication of their absence in the
boardroom or their desire to not be associated with the scandal.
Wounded Warriors Project
Another example of a lack of governance and oversight can be found in the case
of the Wounded Warriors Project (WWP). What started off as a small program providing
essential hygiene and personal items to recently returned wounded United States military
veterans, blossomed into an organization with more than $20 million in revenues in less
than a decade’s time (Phillips, 2016). Outwardly, WWP was considered the premiere
veteran’s organizations in the United States garnering the support of celebrities,
politicians, and well known personalities. However, an internal perspective tells a
different story with reports of employees being fired or leaving under suspicious
circumstances, a toxic organizational culture, and an overbearing chief executive with a
“business-like” mindset that focused solely on raising money (Phillips, 2016).
In 2016, CBS News reported that WWP’s spending on programs and services was
much less than similar veterans organizations (Reid & Janisch, 2016). The report alleged
that rather than spending on its mission, WWP was spending on first class travel and
extravagant conference experiences for its employees (Reid & Janisch, 2016). Coupled
with reports of excessive executive compensation, a congressional investigation
commissioned by U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Chair of the Senate Finance and
Judiciary Committee, was tasked with looking into WWP’s spending (Hegeseth, 2016).
The report found inaccurate reporting, misuse of donor funds, and a lack of appropriate
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management policies and procedures. Although the committee found executive
compensation to be reasonable, it did highlight the excessive use of donor funds on
employee travel (Grassley, 2017).
Central Asia Institute
Finally, the case of Central Asia Institute (CAI) tells a similar story of an
executive left to his own and a lack of board oversight. CAI grew out of founder Greg
Mortensen’s desire to help children receive education in remote areas of Pakistan. What
began in 1996 as a personal mission to build a few schools, transformed into an
internationally acclaimed organization generating more than $72 million in donations and
revenues by 2011 (Gose, 2012). As the founder, executive director, and a board member
of CAI, Mortensen won international fame as the author of Three Cups of Tea and Stones
Into Schools, both New York Times bestsellers, and was a recipient of $100,000 Nobel
Prize winnings from U.S. President Barack Obama (Bullock, 2012; Sieff, 2014). While
CAI was basking in the glory of public fame and success, under the surface the
organization was falling apart. Mortensen’s lack of skills to be an effective executive was
compounded by a handful of board members who provided little to no oversight.
A 60 Minutes news segment (Volz, 2012) opened a Pandora’s Box when it
reported that Mortensen misrepresented facts in his books, prompting an investigation
into CAI by the State of Montana Attorney General’s office (where CAI was
headquartered). The investigation was intended to “determine whether Mortenson and the
leadership of his organization had violated the law governing nonprofit corporations” and
“centered on whether CAI’s officers and directors satisfied their legal duties” (Bullock,
2012, p. 2). What the report revealed was that “the board of directors failed to fulfill
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some of its important responsibilities in governing the nonprofit charity and that
“Mortenson failed to fulfill his responsibilities as executive director and as a member of
the board” (Bullock, 2012, p. 2). These responsibilities centered around excessive
compensation for book sales, travel and personal expenses, and a lack of oversight
around internal policies and procedures including conflict of interest, contracts, and
reimbursements. Ultimately, Mortensen was ordered to pay CAI $1 million dollars and
was barred from any future financial oversight, either as a board member or executive,
and requirements for CAI to institute internal controls and management policies and
procedures to prevent future mismanagement were established.
The Need for Accountability
What the United Way, Wounded Warrior Project, and Central Asia Institute cases
have in common is a lack of oversight at both the board and executive levels. Nonprofit
leaders are legally required to ensure that all resources (human, financial, physical, and
intellectual) are used to fulfill the mission. However, as seen in these cases, the board was
negligent in their oversight of the executive, the executives failed in their management
responsibility, and little evidence of suitable internal policies and procedures to ensure
that resources were used appropriately. What these cases provide is a spotlight not only
on mismanagement, but point to a larger issue: Did these boards know, and understand,
what they were legally responsible for and if so, would they have acted differently?
These cases highlight the need for greater accountability and a standardized
process to ensure that board members and executives are held accountable to understand
their legal responsibilities. The following explains the legal environment that nonprofits
must operate within including the requirements for which nonprofit leaders are held
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accountable, specifically the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Following
the discussion related to legal responsibilities, the framework for the study is presented
which focuses on the three facets of accountability – Accountability for What;
Accountability How; and Accountability to Whom. Following the discussion on
accountability, the rationale for the research design of the study is discussed and
concludes with the methods used.
Nonprofit Structure and Legal Requirements for Governance
Nonprofit organizations are governed by volunteers who serve as board members,
along with senior executive staff, who are typically paid employees. For the purposes of
this study, the term governance will be used as Cornforth (2012) describes it as the
“systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control, and
accountability of the organization” (p. 1121). It is the governance of nonprofit
organizations that nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) are legally
responsible for carrying out as regulated by state and federal authorities. The following
provides background about the nonprofit structure that is based on state and federal
legislation, tax codes, and requirements for tax exempt organizations.
Nonprofit Structure
In all fifty states in the United States, corporations are considered private;
meaning they are separate from government. The same is true for nonprofit organizations
as they are private corporate entities distinct from government1. Although most
nonprofits are considered private corporations, what separates a private nonprofit from a
private for-profit corporation is how the profits are distributed and tax exempt status. The
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In some cases nonprofits are public corporate entities if they are established by governmental legislation,
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tax exempt status allows for tax free revenues as well as the ability to receive charitable
donations. According to Hansmann (1980) the non-distribution constraint prohibits
resources from benefitting an individual or select group of individuals. Therefore, the
non-distribution constraint suggests that rather than generating wealth for a few,
nonprofits are designed to benefit the public by meeting a broader societal need.
The term nonprofit is relatively modern in that it gained traction after World War
II (Dobkin Hall, 2006). Referenced by lawyers, economists, and legislators it is used
mainly for tax law purposes in order to classify corporate entities that are not taxed.
Although the term nonprofit organization is a widely accepted label for charitable
organizations according to Overton and Frey (2002), the term nonprofit corporation is an
“artificial creation of a government” (p. xviii) that in reality is used to describe what it is
not rather than what it is. The technical, legal term that the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) uses to identify a private corporate entity that is excluded from paying taxes on its
revenues is a tax-exempt organization.
Tax-exempt status is only obtained if the private corporate entity serves a
charitable, scientific, educational, or religious purpose as outlined by the IRS, thereby
aligning with the non-distribution constraint (Fishman, Schwarz, & Mayer, 2015). As
such, tax exemption allows public support (i.e. charitable donations and tax free revenue)
to support a public need. The term charitable refers to any activity that “uplifts mankind”
or that “aims to improve the world” (p. 3), while the term charity refers to the entity
carrying out the charitable work (Freemont-Smith, 2004). Although nonprofit
organizations are technically charitable organizations, the term nonprofit has become the
widely accepted term used to refer to a charitable organization. Other terms used when
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discussing nonprofit organizations include charity, tax exempt organization, and exempt
organization. To summarize, nonprofit organizations are private entities that are exempt
from paying taxes on revenues in order to provide a charitable service to society. For this
study, the terms nonprofit organization, nonprofit, and tax-exempt organization are used
interchangeably.
Legal Standards and Regulations
Over the years, several federal and state legislative acts have been adopted to
outline governing expectations for nonprofit organizations. The Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (MNCA) is a comprehensive set of statutes developed by the American
Bar Association in 1964 that outlines the general responsibilities of nonprofit boards of
directors and trustees (Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, 2015). Based on the Model
Corporation Act of 1952, the MNCA provides guidance for a wide variety of nonprofit
governance functions including filing documents, nominating board members, financial
provisions, voting procedures, indemnification, and dissolution. It has become a widely
adopted standard that many states use in their own statutes and laws. Yet even with this
guidance, many high profile examples of both private and nonprofit mismanagement
have resulted in the breakdown of public trust and more demands for transparency,
accountability, and performance. In response, federal and state legislators have enacted
additional legislation to strengthen the accountability and transparency demands.
In reaction to the for-profit scandals of the 1990’s such as Enron, Tyco, and
WorldCom, the U.S. government adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 that
established new requirements for financial transparency and accountability (Renz, 2010,
p. 60). Seeing this as the “writing on the wall”, the nonprofit community came together to
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develop their own set of standards. The first to formalize a set of standards was
California. Signed into legislation in 2004 the California Nonprofit Integrity Act was
legislation designed to ensure financial transparency and accountability amongst
nonprofits (Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, 2015).
At the federal level, the U.S. Congress responded to the mismanagement of
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in 2007 by its federally chartered charitable agency, the
American Red Cross (Hopkins, 2009). After a thorough review of the agency, Congress
made several recommendations in order to strengthen governance that focused on board
operations, roles, and responsibilities that many nonprofits use today as best practices
(Hopkins, 2009). More recently, New York enacted the Nonprofit Revitalization act in
2013 to “reduce unnecessary and expensive regulatory burdens on nonprofits and to
strengthen nonprofit governance and accountability” (Kelch, 2014, p. 1). What these
regulations have in common is the expectation that nonprofit governing boards and
management be held accountable to fulfill their fiduciary duties or legal responsibilities.
Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty, Care, and Obedience
The legal requirements that nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) are
held accountable for are referred to as their fiduciary duties. Fiduciary is based on the
Latin term fiducia, which means trust and describes persons who are “obliged to act
unselfishly and to give other persons or institutions the advantage of their knowledge and
skill” (Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015, p. 120). It is interesting to note that the
majority of nonprofit practitioners do not use the formal term fiduciary, but rather refer to
their oversight role as governance.
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The basis for all nonprofit legal responsibilities lies in the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience. Combined, these duties focus on the use of resources and outline
what nonprofit leaders are responsible for in their oversight role as presented in Table
2.1. The duties of care, loyalty, and obedience work together, however, individually they
define specific aspects of governance. For example, the duty of care requires that
nonprofit leaders be engaged in their role and act in good faith when making decisions.
The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and requires nonprofit leaders to act in
a manner that puts the organization’s interests above their own. Finally, the duty of
obedience focuses on compliance and requires nonprofit leaders to fulfill all state and
federal laws that govern the organization.
Table 2.1
Nonprofit Leader Fiduciary Duty Responsibilities
Duty of Care: Engagement,
Attention, Informed Process of
Decision-Making
 Attends board meetings
 Reviews information in
advance in preparation for
board meetings and to
inform voting
 Exercises independent
judgment
 Regularly reviews
finances, policies, and
executive performance

Duty of Loyalty: Procedural
Aspects of Transactions and
Self Interest
 Discloses conflict of
interests and potential
self-benefit
 Avoids organization
resources for personal use
 Maintains confidentiality

Duty of obedience: Legal
Compliance





Ensures compliance with
state and federal
requirements
Reviews and
understands corporate
governance documents
including bylaws
Makes decisions that
align with tax exempt
mission

Source. Hopkins, 2008
Nonprofit Leaders: Board Members and Executives
Using a legal perspective, nonprofit leaders are the individuals who are held
legally responsible for how organizational resources are used. These leaders include
board members and executives who make decisions about how best to use organizational
resources in order to fulfill a tax exempt mission. Together, they work to accomplish
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goals and fulfill the mission of the organization in complementary ways; board members
meet broader governance needs by ensuring that the organization has the appropriate
resources in place that executives then use in the management of the day-to-day
operations.
Board members. Board members are volunteers, although there are some
organizations that compensate board members, and come from all walks of life. Some
board members are recruited because they have a specialized skill such as finance, legal,
or marketing while others are recruited because of their connections in the community,
which could bring in additional donors. An ideal board member is one who believes in
the mission of the organization and is willing to give of their time, talent, and treasure.
Boards are made up of individuals who fill executive positions of president, vice
president, treasurer, secretary, and as general board members. As of a national survey of
more than 4,000 nonprofit organizations across the United States in 2017, the average
board size was 15 members (BoardSource, 2017). In California, private corporations
must have at least one board member. However, tax-exempt organizations must fill the
president, secretary, and treasurer offices thus requiring nonprofits to have a minimum of
three board members.
Boards meet to provide oversight, make decisions about resources, and approve
organizational policies and procedures. Renz (2010) sums up the scholarly and
practitioner literature related to what board members are responsible for with regards to
governance and oversight functions as presented in Table 2.2. However, it is important to
note that not all of the recommended functions are tied to the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience. For example, although it may be helpful for boards to assess
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board effectiveness, engage with constituents, and lead the organization, technically they
are not legally responsible for these activities. However, the literature does tell us that if a
board engages in all of these functions by default they will be fulfilling their roles and
responsibilities. The duties that are not legal ones have been identified by the researcher
and are italicized and presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Prescribed Board Responsibilities Related to Fiduciary Duties
Prescribed Board Responsibility
To lead the organization
Establish policy
Secure essential resources
Ensure effective resource use
Lead and manage the chief executive
Engage with constituents
Ensure and enable accountability
Assess board effectiveness

Addressed in Fiduciary Duties
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

Note. Prescribed board responsibilities reprinted from Nonprofit Leadership and
Management, Renz (2010) p. 131-134.
Embedded within the fiduciary duties is the expectation that boards abide by
corporate documents including the articles of incorporation, bylaws, and any formally
adopted internal policies and procedures. The articles of incorporation detail how the
organization was formed and its purpose. Bylaws are guidelines, as set forth by the
organization itself, as to how it will conduct the business of the organization and are not
legally binding until the board adopts and/or amends them. Policies and procedures, once
formally adopted by the board, detail how decisions about resources are to be made. As
with policies and procedures, once formally adopted by the board bylaws become a legal
document that nonprofit leaders must abide by. There have been cases where boards have
been penalized for not abiding by federal and state laws, bylaws, policies, and procedures
such as failure to pay taxes, violation of employment laws, conflict of interest, personal
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benefit, and lack of oversight in general (Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015; Herman,
2006; Kearns, 1996).
According to Renz (2010), individual board member conduct affects the board as
a whole, because board members are held liable for their individual actions and
corporately the board is held liable for its actions as an entity. For example, if an
individual board member has knowledge of a potential conflict of interest regarding a
contract for services, the board member must inform the board of the conflict in order to
fulfill their duty of loyalty. If they do not divulge the conflict and the contract is
approved, they would be held liable for breaching their duty of loyalty. Duty of loyalty
requires that individuals put the best interests of the organization above their own.
Conversely, if the board moves forward with the said contract and an individual board
member financially benefits, thus the conflict of interest, the board would be held liable
for a breach in their duty of care. The duty of care requires informed decision making and
if the board asked about finer details of the contract they most likely would have
discovered the conflict of interest.
Executives. The most senior executive is usually referred to as the executive
director (ED) or chief operating officer (CEO). As the most senior executive, they are
responsible for managing and implementing the day-to-day operations. Typically,
executives are hired by the board to implement board approved policies and procedures,
to provide staff and operational oversight, and to serve as the liaison between the board
and the organization. The executive is relied upon by the board to ensure that the
organization is using its resources to fulfill its mission. Although board members and the
executive fulfill distinct roles, many of their functions and duties overlap. For example,
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board members review organizational reports such as financial statements, programrelated activities, donor relations, and public awareness efforts that are prepared by in
advance by the executive. Given this overlap, they are both legally held accountable for
their actions because they are both involved in acquiring, managing, and allocating
organizational resources.
Although executives are held to the same legal standards as board members, many
executives are hired because of their professional experience in management, operations
and fundraising, not because of their knowledge of fiduciary duties. During my nearly 20
years as a nonprofit practitioner and consultant, I have yet to attend an interview (either
as the candidate or as the employer or search consultant) where the legal duties are even
discussed. Furthermore, many boards do not fulfill their fiduciary duty of care by
regularly evaluating the performance of the executive. BoardSource (2017) reported that
the executives themselves graded the evaluation process with a B- (p. 28).
The traditional hiring process is that candidates are expected to have some prior
knowledge and experience as a condition for being hired (Miller & Jablin, 1991) and the
need for experience increases as the level of specialization increases. For example, a
cashier job has vastly different requirements than a civil or electrical engineer. Yet, for
many nonprofits, leadership and oversight responsibilities are bestowed upon executives
without any confirmation that the appropriate knowledge is in place. What is in the best
interest of the organization (i.e. duty of loyalty) is that the board hires an executive who
has both professional skills and an explicit understanding of the legal responsibilities
related to governing and managing a nonprofit.
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Accountability
What is Accountability?
Accountability has become a frequent topic in all aspects of society. From
political scandals, to corporate malfeasance, to national and international tragedies,
people want to know who to hold accountable. Given its prevalence in the world around
us, the scholarly literature is still searching for a clear definition of accountability since it
means different things to different people. In terms of nonprofits, some scholars focus on
the economic, political, or legal aspects of accountability while others point to the need to
include the public and other stakeholders such as clients and donors (Ebrahim, 2010;
Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Kearns, 1996; Renz, 2010; Smith, 2014). Koppell (2005) offers
that where someone is situated, such as the CEO, line staff, or customer, impacts how
accountability is defined for that particular context. He furthers that accountability should
be based on the expectations of the relationship itself, such as between the executive and
the board for example (Koppell, 2005). For the public, accountability focuses on the
expectations of “organizational performance, responsiveness, and even morality”
(Kearns, 1996, p. 9). However, Koppell (2005) cautions that “layering every imagined
meaning of accountability into a single definition would render the concept meaningless”
(p. 95).
The variety of perspectives and stakeholders is important to highlight when trying
to understand accountability for nonprofits. Given that there are nearly two million
nonprofits in the United States (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2018) different
stakeholders rely on the wide variety of programs and services in different ways for
different reasons. For example, someone without medical insurance depends on a
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community nonprofit clinic for critical healthcare while a wealthy art patron relies on a
nonprofit museum to view their favorite masterpieces. Because of this contextual nature
of accountability, Slim (2002) offers that, “a key part of the process of tailoring the right
accountability mechanism to the right stakeholders is recognition of context” (p. 11).
An element of accountability involves answering to a “higher authority” (Kearns,
1996, p. 7). This type of accountability can be viewed as compliance, which is a reactive
response to requirements or obligations (Ebrahim, 2010; Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Kearns,
1996). If legal enforcement entities such as the IRS and a state’s charity oversight agency
such as an Attorney General are called in to investigate potential breaches of public trust
and accountability, they refer to the fiduciary duties as the basis for their investigation.
Therefore, the duties provide a framework for the investigation that focuses on how board
members and executives made decisions and if those decisions were made in a manner
that upholds the fiduciary duties. What this means for nonprofits is that legally, they must
respond and answer to the regulators who hold them accountable to convey their
effectiveness in their roles and responsibilities. So, the fiduciary duties become the legal
standard for what the organization is held accountable.
Accountability can also be described as proactively responding to the needs of its
constituents (Ebrahim, 2010) as well as how it performs or fulfills its legal
responsibilities. The duties of care, loyalty, and obedience based in U.S. case law are the
“legal standards by which all actions taken by directors are judged” (Hopkins, 2009, p.
13). Many instances where the fiduciary standards have been applied to cases of
nonprofit mismanagement and negligence are examples of how nonprofit leaders are
judged (see chapter three). What this means for nonprofits is that they must be both
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responsive in meeting the demands of the public and responsible for following the
expectations (i.e. fiduciary duties). Therefore, in looking at legal accountability through a
fiduciary, legal lens, nonprofits are required to take responsibility for using of
organizational resources in a manner that fulfill the mission.
Because accountability has such a wide range of contexts, meanings, and
mechanisms, knowledge of the basic legal fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience
is critical in order to meet legal accountability demands. For the purposes of this study,
accountability is explored through the legal accountability lens: the federal and state
expectations for nonprofit leader oversight which is the standard by which all nonprofit
leaders are evaluated against. As such, nonprofit leaders who understand their basic legal
fiduciary duties can perform their fiduciary duties and consequently satisfy legal
accountability demands as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Understand
Basic Fiduciary
Duties

Perform
Fiduciary
Duties

Satisfy Legal
Accountability
Demands

Figure 2.1. Legal Accountability Process
Research Design
Accountability Framework
The study focuses on nonprofit leader knowledge, source of knowledge, and
application of knowledge related to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience as
a means to fulfill legal accountability. In looking at the overall design of the study, a
framework used by several scholars (Ebrahim, 2010; Kearns, 1996; Slim, 2002) is
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applied that categorizes accountability into three areas: Accountability for what;
Accountability how; and; Accountability to whom as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The
purpose for using this framework is to operationalize how accountability is expressed as
legal accountability using the framework of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience.

For What?
Knowledge

For How?
Source of
Knowledge

For Whom?
Application of
Knowledge

Legal
Accountability

Figure 2.2. Framework for Legal Accountability adapted by Ebrahim (2010) The many
faces of nonprofit accountability.
In terms of legal accountability, the fiduciary duties provide guidance for
nonprofit leaders to understand what they are legally responsible for in fulfilling their
governance roles. These duties also provide a standardized measure to assess nonprofit
governance performance and effectiveness. If nonprofit leaders understand their legal
duties, roles, and responsibilities, they will make more informed decisions that fulfill the
tax-exempt mission, leading to better performance and effectiveness.
Without much research to build that includes data about individual nonprofit
leader knowledge of their fiduciary duties, this study fills a gap in the literature about
what board members and executives know about their legal responsibilities
(accountability for what), the sources they access to learn about their responsibilities
(accountability how), and how they apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance
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of their governance activities (accountability for whom). The following section explains
how the study is embedded in each area of the accountability framework and how the key
terms are defined including knowledge, source of knowledge, and application of
knowledge. The rationale is important to lay out up front as it applies to the following
three chapters that correspond to each of the accountability categories and research
constructs as presented in Figure 2.2.
What is Knowledge?
The study primarily centers on knowledge that has its roots in epistemology: the
way in which we know or learn. Epistemology considers many complex and dynamic
concepts of knowledge that can be defined cognitively, practically, theoretically, socially,
and even spiritually (Greco & Sosa, 1999). For example, a practical definition of
knowledge would be useful in order to “know” what something may cost in financial
terms while a socially oriented definition focuses more on how people interpret their own
experiences that result in “knowledge” (Zagzebeski, 1996).
This study is utilizing a framework for knowledge originally intended for
medicine. Although it is based in medicine, it provides utility for the study because
medical professionals are relied to uphold their Hippocratic Oath, an allegiance to do no
harm. Nonprofit leaders are also relied upon to do no harm in that they are entrusted with
public resources for public good. In an effort to measure how cognitive recognition
translates into behavior, Miller (1990) developed a model intended for clinical
assessment of medical professionals as illustrated in Figure 2.3. As a means to better
understand how well medical professionals take what they have learned and apply it in a
clinical setting, Miller (1990) offers that knowing something does not necessarily mean
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that someone is able to carry out that knowledge. He identifies a sequence of how
cognitive knowledge turns into action, which is of particular importance for nonprofit
leaders because they make decisions about organizational resources (action) based on
knowledge.

Figure 2.3. Miller’s Framework for Clinical Assessment. Reprinted from The
assessment of clinical skills/competence/performance, Academic Medicine (1990).
What Miller’s (1990) model provides for the study is a framework that parses out
the different levels of knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the first level is the
“knows” level. Knowing something means that you can recall and articulate specific
elements. For example, if someone knows math, they are able to recall and articulate
mathematical equations, formulas, and so on. The first level of knowing provides the
foundation for the next level, “knows how.”
When someone knows how to do something, they activate knowledge into
competence. For example, the mathematician conveys that they know math by
articulating specific elements and they demonstrate competence by doing the calculations
related to the equations and formulas. Knowing how supports the next level, which is
“shows how.”
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The “shows how” level expresses that performance is a combination of
knowledge and competence. For example, the mathematician would show how and
demonstrate performance by accurately solving said equations and formulas. The shows
level supports the final level, which is “does.”
The final level is the “does” level that expresses action. Miller (1990) describes
action in terms of performing knowledge outside of traditional academic settings, in other
words, with actual patients. So, in looking at the mathematician example, the doing level
is expressed when formulas and equations are accurately calculated are used in a way that
translate into a real-world situation such as engineering.
Study Framework
As illustrated in Figure 2.4 each level of knowledge creation can be applied to the
constructs in the study: Knowledge, Source of Knowledge, and Application of
Knowledge. The first level, the “knows” level, focuses on the first strand of research,
knowledge of fiduciary duties and corresponds to the facet of accountability for what. In
this level, the respondents are asked how familiar they are of each of the fiduciary duties.
This level includes self reported knowledge and actual knowledge described more in the
following methodology section. The results of nonprofit leader knowledge of their
fiduciary duties are presented in chapter three.
The second level, the “knows how” level, focuses on the second strand of
research, the types of sources nonprofit leaders access in order to learn about their
responsibilities and corresponds to second facet of accountability, for how. In this level,
respondents are asked to select from a series of internal and external best practices to
better understand how they learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. The results of the
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sources that nonprofit leaders access when learning about their responsibilities are
presented in chapter four.
The last two levels, “shows how” and “action,” overlap in that they focus on
action and performance. For this study, these two levels are combined by focusing on the
third strand of research, how nonprofit leaders apply their governance knowledge in the
performance of their governance duties that corresponds with the third facet of
accountability, for whom. The results of nonprofit leader application of their fiduciary
duties are presented in chapter five.

4th Level: Does
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance of Duties
3rd Level: Shows How
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance of Duties
2nd Level: Knows How
Chapter 4: Sources of Knowledge
Accountability for how? = Appropriate Knowledge/Best Practices
1st Level: Knows
Chapter 3: Familiarity (self-report) and Actual Knowledge
Accountability for what? = Knowledge of Duties

Figure 2.4. Knowledge and Study Design.
Accountability for What?
What follows is an explanation of how the accountability framework is applied to
the constructs of knowledge, sources of knowledge, and application of knowledge with
regards to this study. Starting with the first facet of the accountability framework used in
this study, the following is a discussion about what nonprofits are accountable for. Given
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that nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of different stakeholders, legal
accountability is the most straightforward. Nonprofits provide a charitable service to
society and their work is subsidized through tax exemption. Because tax exemption is a
function of legislation that is enforced and regulated by the IRS, the fiduciary duties
provide tangible guidelines and expectations for oversight and governance. For example,
it would be relatively simple to determine if a nonprofit leader is fulfilling their duty of
care by asking how often they attend meetings and if they read the materials in advance
of meetings. Therefore, if nonprofit leaders can satisfy the legal accountability
expectations, it could provide a basis to determine if they are fulfilling their fiduciary
responsibilities.
In an effort to help nonprofit leaders understand what nonprofits are accountable
for, Ebrahim (2010) outlines four areas of accountability including, finances, governance,
performance, and mission. Financial accountability focuses on reports such as profit and
loss statements, cash flows, audits, and IRS 990 tax returns provide concrete information
that the public generally understands. For nonprofits to meet financial accountability
demands, they are making decisions that rely on sound financial reporting, budgeting,
and policies. They also focus on revenues and expenses and try to demonstrate that they
use their financial resources to fulfill their mission.
Performance for accountability is about how tools such as logic models and
strategic plans support the mission and centers around the idea as Ebrahim stated that,
“organizations should be held to account for what they deliver” (as cited in Renz, 2010,
p. 106). For nonprofits who meet performance accountability demands, they use
organizational processes and tools as a means to identify metrics of success. Nonprofits
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that focus on metrics and outcomes do so because of pressures by funders and other
actors to demonstrate performance. However, the idea of performance is riddled with
complexity as the literature is still trying to determine what type of specific performance
measures for which nonprofits should be accountable.
Accountability for the mission is similar to performance for accountability in that
nonprofits are asked to account for what they were created to do: their mission.
Nonprofits who meet mission accountability are constantly looking ahead, surveying the
environment for changes that may impact their work. While this kind of behavior seems
logical, the downside of focusing on this mission accountability is that it requires
continual reflection and monitoring which takes time. Ebrahim (2010) suggests that
nonprofits need to internalize the mission and continually monitor performance, but also
identifies the need to allow for continual learning and change.
Governance accountability, according to Ebrahim, focuses on “how the
organization [boards and executives] raises and spends money, follows donor intent, and
whether it is in compliance with the law” (as cited in Renz, 2010, p. 105). This
perspective aligns with the expectations of the fiduciary duties. However, the notion of
basic oversight has evolved into greater demands of the board as Ebrahim (2010) points
out that boards are expected to be accountable for more than just financial oversight, but
also for organizational performance. The broader demands of board members go beyond
basic resource oversight and include strategic planning, engaging with communities,
advocating for the organization, educating about the mission, and providing expertise in
their specialized field. However, as much as this sounds appealing, if a nonprofit leader
does not have the basic understanding of what they are legally responsible for, any
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decisions made about strategy and direction will be made out of ignorance rather than
facts. Accountability for governance, more specifically accountability for legal
responsibilities, is a critical element needed to meet accountability demands.
Accountability for What? Knowledge
Appropriate knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities is how nonprofit leaders can
fulfill what they are accountable for and satisfy legal accountability. By focusing on the
basic oversight perspective, accountability for what is demonstrated by nonprofit leader
knowledge of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Knowledge intersects with the first
level of “knows” and is the first construct that assesses what nonprofit leaders believe
they know (i.e. self-reported) about their fiduciary responsibilities and what they actually
know. Details follow in the methodology section about how knowledge is assessed in the
survey instrument.
Accountability How?
Because nonprofits are accountable to multiple actors for different things Ebrahim
(2010) discusses how accountability actually occurs. He focuses on five types of
mechanisms for accountability including reports and disclosure statements, evaluations
and performance assessments, participation, adaptive learning, and industry selfregulation. Each type of mechanism is identified as a tool or process and as with
accountability for what, these tools and processes have both strength and weaknesses
(Ebrahim, 2010).
Ebrahim (2010) provides a distinction between tools and processes with regards
to how nonprofits meet accountability demands. Tools include those things that can be
used repeatedly, over a period of time. He suggests that disclosure statements and reports
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and evaluation and performance assessments are tools used as a means for accountability.
Processes, on the other hand, are broader and multi-faceted such as overall participation
and adaptive learning that allow nonprofits to focus on the actual work rather than the
end product. Examples of participation and adaptive learning include activities that focus
on relationships and stakeholders such as a strategic plan or assessments that allow for
self reflection and change (Ebrahim, 2010).
Finally, self-regulation is identified as both a process and tool as a mechanism for
accountability. Nonprofits that self-regulate as a means to demonstrate accountability
follow industry standards and other guidelines that ensure compliance. Ebrahim suggests
self-regulation “refers specifically to efforts by nonprofit networks to develop standards
or codes of behavior and performance” (as cited in Renz, 2010, p. 110) often referred to
as best practices. Best practices are standards or codes that nonprofits use for a variety of
nonprofit management functions such as finances, human resources, marketing,
fundraising, and programs. They are developed and typically shared through nonprofit
networks, associations, academic programs, and by funders as a means to standardize
nonprofit behavior. Nonprofits who demonstrate accountability how utilize and access
appropriate best practices in order to gain knowledge about their roles and
responsibilities.
Accountability How? Source of Knowledge
In order for nonprofit leaders to satisfy legal accountability how, nonprofit leaders
must access appropriate sources to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. Miller
(1990) furthers the idea that in order to measure competence and performance, one must
not only measure actual knowledge and how it is used, but also how knowledge is
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acquired. Therefore, the second construct in my study focuses on sources that nonprofit
leaders access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. These sources, or best
practices, are a type of self regulation mechanism that nonprofit leaders use to
demonstrate accountability how. The best practices are discussed as internal and external
sources that nonprofit leaders access to learn about their responsibilities, thereby
intersecting with the second level of “knows how” and competence. Details follow in the
methodology section about how sources of knowledge are assessed in the survey
instrument.
Accountability to Whom?
Nonprofits are legally held accountable to know about their legal responsibilities
(for what). How they demonstrate their accountability is by utilizing appropriate sources
to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities (how). The third leg of the accountability
stool is to whom are nonprofits accountable?
As mentioned previously, nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of different
actors and stakeholders. From the client who receives services to the funder who
financially supports the organization, it is difficult to isolate any one particular “whom”
nonprofits are accountable to. Ebrahim and others (Scott, 2000; Ebrahim, 2010;
Verschuere, et al 2006) suggest that accountability to whom includes an “upward” and
“downward” relationship. Upward accountability refers to external relationships such as
with funders, governments and the public. Conversely, internal accountability focuses
more on internal relationships such as those receiving services and to some extent larger
communities (Ebrahim, 2010). Another perspective was coined by Koppell (2005) as
“multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD)” (p. 95). MAD can be seen in the example of
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a nonprofit membership organization. Membership organizations such the Association of
Fundraising Professionals (AFP) are held accountable by the national chapter to ensure
policies and procedures are followed. Concurrently they are accountable to their local
members, chapter board of directors, and state regulators.
The upward and downward perspective, along with MAD, suggests that nonprofit
leader performance could be a mechanism that nonprofit leaders meet accountability for
whom. As nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary duty knowledge, they demonstrate
accountability to multiple stakeholders via their performance.
Accountability to Whom? Application of Knowledge
In order for nonprofit leaders to satisfy legal accountability to whom, they must
demonstrate competence the results in performance of their fiduciary responsibilities.
Holland and Ritvo (2008) argue that competencies are a combination of “skills,
knowledge, information, and personal characteristics” that must be practiced in order to
be considered useful (p. xvii). They go on to explain that competency is linked to
performance and when appropriate competencies are in place, effectiveness follows
(Holland & Ritvo, 2008). This aligns with Miller (1990) who establishes that knowledge
alone is not an adequate measure of performance, but rather suggests that how knowledge
is actually carried out is a better indicator. Therefore, the third and final construct in my
study focuses on nonprofit leader application of fiduciary knowledge in their governance
activities. This performance of duties intersects with the last two stages of “shows how”
and “does” and demonstrates accountability to whom. The application construct is
assessed by asking about the frequency of application of fiduciary knowledge in
oversight activities related to the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Details follow in
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the methodology section about how specifically the construct is assessed in the survey
instrument.
Assessment and Measurement Rationale
The following section provides the rationale for several aspects of the study
including the assessment tool, the constructs of knowledge (accountability for what),
source of knowledge (accountability how), and application of knowledge (accountability
for whom) as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Specific methods follow this rationale section.

Chapter 3:
For What?
Knowledge

Chapter 4:
For How?
Source of
Knowledge

Chapter 5:
For Whom?
Application of
Knowledge

Legal
Accountability

Figure 2.5. Framework for Legal Accountability.
The Instrument
There are many scholarly and practitioner tools available for nonprofit
organizations to assess governance and oversight for accountability purposes. However,
there is not currently an assessment that focuses solely on the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience. Furthermore, there is not an assessment that asks individual
nonprofit leaders specific questions about knowledge of their fiduciary duties. Therefore,
in order to fulfill the purpose of this study to establish baseline data from individual
nonprofit leaders, an internet-based survey was developed and determined to be the most
appropriate assessment tool.
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This rationale to use a survey is based on the need to gather data from a large
number of individuals in a neutral, comfortable setting. Additionally, a survey approach
provides the opportunity to gather data confidentially. This is important to consider since
the questions in the survey itself ask about behavior and knowledge, which can be
personal or sensitive in nature (Dillman, Smythe, & Christian, 2014). With this concern
in mind, the respondents were notified that all of their responses would be reported in
aggregate and no individual responses will be attributed to any specific individual.
Additional rationale for a survey approach was based on the need to gather data
that can be quantified to compare and deductively analyze. Furthermore, nonprofit
organizations widely use and administer surveys meaning that nonprofit leaders are
accustomed to this type of data collection method. Finally, a survey is a cost-effective
method to gather responses from a large geographical area such as the San Diego County
region (Dillman, 2000).
Knowledge Rationale
In keeping with Miller’s (1990) framework and to focus on legal accountability,
questions developed focused on individual nonprofit leaders’ knowledge of the fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Questions related to the specific aspects of the
duties are presented in Table 2.3. A full list of questions can be found in the actual survey
instrument (see Appendix A).
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Table 2.3
Focus of Questions Related to Knowledge of Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience
Construct and
Definition
Duty of Care:
Engagement,
Attention, Informed
Process of DecisionMaking
Duty of Loyalty:
Procedural Aspects
of Transactions and
Self Interest
Duty of Obedience:
Legal Compliance

Question
Familiarity/overall understanding
Understanding mission
Understanding responsibilities
Legal responsibilities: Regular attendance of board meetings; reviewing
materials; reviewing finances and policies.
Familiarity/overall understanding
Legal responsibilities: Use independent judgment; disclosing conflict of
interest; no personal benefit of organizational resources
Familiarity/overall understanding
Legal responsibilities: compliance with federal/state regulations
Bylaw elements: Board positions, terms and voting; nomination and
election process; executive staff responsibilities

Sources of Knowledge Rationale
In order to determine what types of sources nonprofit leaders access to learn about
their roles and responsibilities and how often, assessment questions were developed that
prompt nonprofit leaders to respond to a series of options based on nonprofit industry
best practices. Internal sources that were provided by the organization and external
sources that are available to the general public were included as illustrated in Table 2.4.
A full list of questions can be found in the actual survey instrument (Appendix #).
Table 2.4
Types of Internal and External Best Practice Sources
Internal Best Practices
Formally scheduled board
member orientation

External Best Practices

Information conversations with
board members and staff

Magazines, Journals,
Books

Educational opportunities
arranged by the organization for
board members

Friends and Family
(network)

Board Manual

Certification/Degree
programs

Websites/Webinars
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Application of Knowledge Rationale
To understand how frequently nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge,
assessment questions were developed that ask how often nonprofit leaders use their
knowledge of the fiduciary duties in their governance role as presented in Table 2.5. As
with the knowledge construct, each question focuses on specific aspects of the duties of
care, loyalty, and obedience. A full list of questions can be found in the actual survey
instrument.
Table 2.5
Questions Related to Frequency of Application of Duty of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience
Construct and
Definition

Questions

Duty of Care:
Engagement,
Attention, Informed
Process of DecisionMaking






Review materials in advance of the board meeting
Pay attention to the organization’s resources (e.g. financial, physical, and
human)
Frequently review the organization’s finances and financial policies
Attend board meetings
Am aware of the executive's performance
Participate in the review, discussion, and/or approval of financial policies
(e.g. annual budget, audit)
Exercise independent judgment

Duty of Loyalty:
Procedural Aspects of
Transactions and Self
Interest






Disclose conflicts of interest
Make decisions that are in the best interest of the organization
Avoid the use of organizational resources/connections for personal gain
Maintain confidentiality of sensitive organizational information

Duty of Obedience:
Legal Compliance



Refer to the mission statement when discussing potential programs and
services
Pay attention to how the organization uses its resources
(financial/physical/human) to fulfill its mission
Board: Understand the Bylaws/Executive: Read the Bylaws
Refer to the organization’s internal policies and procedures when needed
Consider how new and existing programs support our mission
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Methodology
The purpose of this study is to establish baseline data about nonprofit leader
fiduciary knowledge, source of fiduciary knowledge, and application of fiduciary
knowledge. As such, the research methodology was developed by building upon
extensive practitioner work and academic scholarship. Although the study is exploratory,
attention was given to develop an instrument that could be replicated and validated in
other settings to conduct future research. This section outlines the research methods and
procedures used for this descriptive, quantitative study, which includes the following
sections: sample, survey deployment, constructs and measurement, and data analysis. The
assessment tool and forms utilized during the research study can be found in the
appendices.
Sample
The sample for this study was drawn from the population of nonprofit leaders
from 11,234 nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations located in San Diego County, CA at the
time of the survey deployment in January 2018 (Nonprofit Institute, 2018). Participant
eligibility criteria for this study was focused on individuals who were current voting
board members or the most senior executive staff of a San Diego County nonprofit, taxexempt organization. The unit of analysis is the individual nonprofit leader. By law,
California nonprofit organizations are required to have at least three board positions
filled: President, Secretary, and Treasurer (California Attorney General, 2017). Using
three as the minimum number of eligible board participants, the total sample would be, at
a minimum, 33,702.
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For the number of eligible executives, the possible amount would be one per
organization for a total sample of 11,234. Combined, the sample of eligible participants is
44,936. Of the 218 submitted responses, 189 were deemed viable (less than 1% response
rate) and therefore included in this study.
Of the 218 submitted responses, 114 provided either an organization name or
employer identification number. Of the 114 who provided identifying information, eight
organizations had more than one response. As such, 18 responses were removed to allow
for one response, per organization in order to provide descriptive information about the
sample of 96 organizations.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the types of organizations represented by sub-sector. The
most were from arts and culture (22%) and none represented higher education or
hospitals. Hospitals were represented only in the philanthropic sub-sector (i.e.
foundations), but not as organizations with a health mission.
4%
4%

Religion
Environment and Animals

22%

8%
Philanthropic

14%

Health
Education Other

19%
Human Service

14%
International, Public, Societal Benefit

16%

Arts and Culture

Figure 2.6 Sample percentages by sub-sector for organizations that provided identifying
information.
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Table 2.6. presents the averages for revenues and age for those organizations that
provided a means to identify them. On average, the organizations with less revenues were
those that had International, Public, and Societal Benefit purposes, while larger revenues
were represented by Human Service purpose organizations. The youngest organizations
were those that were religious with the oldest as Human Service organizations.
Table 2.6
Sample Age and Revenue
Avg. Age
Low
High
Median
Avg. Revenue
(in years)
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Health (n=13)
26
$11,293,518
$193,845
$63,316,798 $2,940,908
International,
Public, Societal
21
$3,927,012
$84,758
$30,100,526 $1,845,848
Benefit (n=18)
Human Service
37.1
$35,261,337
$229,118
$383,032,435 $5,824,415
(n=15)
Education Other
16.8
$2,591,179
$174,954
$14,177,868
$808,005
(n=13)
Arts and Culture
25.6
$1,600,113
$103,293
$16,334,715
$620,816
(n=21)
Religion (n=1)
0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Philanthropic
24.0
$9,548,373
$385,731
$40,823,220 $2,205,383
(n=8)
Environment and
25.5
$1,288,904
$178,909
$3,628,745 $1,347,960
Animals (n=4)
Note: Tax information was available for only 1 of the four religion organizations and the
one had not filed a tax form yet. Source: Internal Revenue Service Tax Exempt Extract
2017 tax year.
A purposeful, snowball sample approach was utilized by sending the survey out to
the researcher’s more than fifty personal and professional contacts and networks via
email. The contacts represent nonprofit organizations, individuals (nonprofit practitioners
and volunteers), academic institutions, and organizations in the San Diego region. All
contacts were asked to take the survey, provided they met eligibility criteria, and to
forward the survey on to their own professional and personal networks.
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Respondent Demographics
Because of the length of the survey (98 questions) the researcher was concerned
about survey fatigue and as such limited the number of demographic questions to the
respondent’s role, the number of boards respondents served in the last 15 years, if the
respondent was the founder of the organization, and the organization’s name or EIN
number. The demographic question about role was one of the first questions asked (and
was required to move forward) with board service, founder, and organizational EIN/name
asked toward the end of the survey.
Another consideration for the decision to include a minimal number of
demographic questions was based on the availability of other sources of nonprofit data
about nonprofit leaders (e.g. gender, backgrounds, and skills) and organizations (e.g. size,
age, and financial information). Regulatory, practitioner and academic sources such as
the Internal Revenue Service, BoardSource, GuideStar, Foundation Search, the National
Center for Charitable Statistics, the Midwest Center for Nonprofit Leadership at
University of Missouri – Kansas City, and the Lilly Family School of Philanthropy at
Indiana University are well regarded sources of nonprofit demographic data. Finally,
because this was exploratory in nature, more demographics could be included in a future
iteration.
Of the five demographic questions included, only two are used in this study, the
respondent’s role within their organization and the number of boards they have served on
in the last 15 years. The researcher opted not to use the responses for organization EIN
number or name, because only 96 represented unique organizations. For the founder
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question, only 19 respondents indicated that they were also the founder. Therefore, no
analysis by founder or by EIN is included in the study.
Role is the main demographic variable, because the study focuses on nonprofit
leaders and because of the nature of the leadership structure inherent in nonprofit
organizations. Nonprofit organizations are considered corporations and must adhere to
corporate law, and specifically in California, charitable corporate law. This law requires
that all nonprofit boards have at least three members serving as chair/president, treasurer,
and secretary (California Department of Justice, 2017). Therefore, the rationale behind
the roles selected was based on the typical leadership structure of a nonprofit
organization. Most nonprofit organizations also fill the role of vice president, so
combined with the chair, treasurer, and secretary these four positions serve as the
executive board committee.
Other roles included in this study were the executive (i.e. the most senior staff
member), general board members (not serving in an executive committee position),
advisory board, and “other.” Participants were asked to select executive staff if they were
the most senior paid staff for the organization. Two respondents selected “other”, but one
was re-categorized as an executive staff and the other was re-categorized as a board
member, based on how they described their role. Three respondents selected the advisory
or committee member option and are not included in the analysis since these positions do
not have voting power, reducing the total number of viable responses to 186.
For this study, respondents were asked to identify their role for the nonprofit
organization that they chose to focus on when answering the survey questions. In other
words, if a respondent was a board chair for organization X and an executive director for
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organization Y, they could choose either role, but all of their answers must be related to
their capacity in that chosen role for the corresponding tax-exempt organization.
Regarding the role variable, the researcher initially planned on analyzing the data
using three categories: Executive (staff), executive committee (President, Vice President,
Secretary, and Treasurer) and non-executive committee board members. However,
because of the small number of respondents in some of the executive board positions, the
distribution was skewed, therefore the respondents were collapsed into two categories:
Executive and all board members. Using just two categories supported a more robust data
analysis process and is the basis for analysis throughout the remainder of this study.
Figure 2.7 presents both sets of samples, first by the two roles board members
(N=104) and executives (N = 82) followed by the three role configuration, board member
(N = 52), executive committee (N = 52), and executives (N = 82).

Board
Member
(n=104)

44%
56%

28%
44%

Executive
(n=82)

28%

Executive
Committee
(n=52)
Board
Member
(n=52)
Executive
(n=82)

Figure 2.7. Percentages of respondents by two roles (N=184) and three role categories
(N=184).
Figure 2.8 presents the number of respondents by specific board member roles,
board chair (N = 36), executives (N = 82), board members (N = 52), board secretary (N =
4), board treasurer (N = 8), and board vice chair (N = 4).
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19%

Board Chair (n=36)
Board Member (n=52)

44%

Board Secretary (n=4)

Board Treasurer (n=8)
28%

Board Vice Chair (n=4)

Executive (n=82)
2%

4%

2%

Figure 2.8. Percentages of respondents by board role (N=186).
With regards to the variable of board service (number of boards served in the last
15 years), the rationale behind this particular demographic was to better understand how
the length of board experience might relate to fiduciary duty knowledge. Although the
researcher has yet to find any longitudinal research that tracks a nonprofit leaders board
service, she tapped into her nearly 20 years experience as a nonprofit practitioner and
hypothesized that if a nonprofit leader had previous board service, they may have a
greater awareness of fiduciary duties. As presented in Figure 2.9, 49% of the respondents
have served on one to two boards, 31% have served on three to four boards, 11% have
served on five to six boards, and 8% have served on more than six boards. Because of the
skewed distribution, some analysis was performed on a new variable that collapsed the
four board service categories into only two. Notations are made throughout the
dissertation to identify when categories were collapsed.
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8%
11%

1-2 Boards (n=77)
49%

3-4 Boards (n=49)
5-6 Boards (n=18)

31%

6+ Boards (n=13)

Figure 2.9. Number of boards served on in the last 15 years (N=154).
Survey Instrument
The survey instrument was developed using some elements from existing board
assessment tools as well as practitioner and scholarly research related to board
governance (Alliance for Nonprofit Management, 2017; BoardSource, 2017; California
Attorney General, 2017; Corporation for National and Community Service, 2017;
Hopkins, 2009; Jackson & Holland, 2009; Nonprofit Association of Oregon, 2017;
Overton & Frey, 2002; Schwab Foundation for Social Enterprise, n.d.). Specific
questions related to the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience that were not available
otherwise, were developed by the researcher. The survey itself was created in Qualtrics, a
survey software available free of charge to University of San Diego students.
During the testing phase, the researcher estimated that that the survey would take
between ten and 15 minutes. However, after removing 41 responses that were outliers
(less than 5 minutes and more than 30 minutes) the average amount of time it took for
survey respondents was a little over 11 minutes as presented in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7
Average Amount of Time to Take Survey
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max
146
11.27
4.916
5
28.6
Note. Time is presented in minutes. 41 outliers were removed that took less than 5
minutes and greater than 30 minutes to complete the survey.
Constructs and Measurements
The survey instrument was categorized into five main parts, however for this
study, only three were included. The remaining two are intended for future analysis. The
three parts were designed to answer the three constructs: (1) Nonprofit leader familiarity
of fiduciary duties and actual knowledge of duties; (2) What types of external and
internal sources do nonprofit leaders access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities
and; (3) The frequency with which nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge in
the performance of their governance activities.
Knowledge Construct
The first part of the survey focused on nonprofit leader fiduciary duty knowledge.
For this section yes/no/don’t know and four point Likert scale response options from not
at all familiar to very familiar and disagree to agree were used. Questions included in this
section allowed for a subjective measurements of familiarity of the fiduciary duties and
objective measurements of actual knowledge. Respondents were provided with a brief
description of each of the fiduciary duties and asked to rate their level of familiarity with
each using a four point Likert scale of not at all familiar to very familiar. As the survey
progressed, respondents were asked about their level of agreement with specific legal
responsibilities related to the fiduciary duties, their understanding of the mission, and if
they believed they had enough knowledge to carry out the organization’s mission (four
point Likert scale, disagree to agree).
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As mentioned earlier, knowledge questions can be sensitive and some respondents
may inflate their answer to appear more socially desirable (Dillman, 2000). With this in
mind, the researcher included a means to test respondents in order to compare how
familiar nonprofit leaders believed themselves to be with what they actually knew. Ten
questions related to legal responsibilities were displayed as a matrix with yes/no answer
options for a total of ten possible correct answers. Of the ten questions, four were “false”
questions that if they answered incorrectly, were not given a point. More about how these
questions were coded and analyzed is included in chapter three.
Source of Knowledge Construct
The second part of the survey focused on what types of sources nonprofit leaders
accessed to learn about their roles and responsibilities. This section included four point
Likert scale response options from disagree to agree and never to always. Options
included learning opportunities and tools that were provided by the organization
(internal) or those that were available to the general public (external). For example,
internal sources included a board manual or board orientation that a respondent might
access internally within the organization itself. External sources included options such as
websites, webinars, workshops and trainings that focused on nonprofit governance and
oversight. For the internal sources, respondents were given the option to select all that
apply and for external sources, respondents were given a three point Likert scale option,
never, sometimes, and always.
Application of Knowledge Construct
The final part of the survey focused on subjective measurements related to the
frequency with which nonprofit leaders applied their fiduciary knowledge in the
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performance of their governance duties. For example, respondents were asked how often
they review materials in advance of the board meeting to demonstrate their application of
the fiduciary duty of care. Respondents were given four point Likert scale response
options that included disagree to agree and never to always.
Psychometric Properties
Prior to deploying the survey, face validity, meaning that at face value “a measure
appears to make sense” (Vogt, 2005, p. 117), was approached by providing the survey
instrument to seven nonprofit and research evaluation experts (Dillman, 2000). The
experts included current and former nonprofit executive directors and board members,
nonprofit consultants, and academics who provided feedback based on their roles as a
nonprofit practitioner or researcher. Experts were asked to pay attention to survey aspects
such as clarity of question, ease of navigation, relevance of answer options, and if the
questions were focused on the constructs as they beta-tested the instrument prior to
deployment. The face validity approach also supported content validity to ensure that the
items included “accurately represent the thing being measured” (Vogt, 2005, p. 59).
In terms of construct validity, the questions were specifically related to each of
the constructs being measured, knowledge, source, and application of the fiduciary duties
of loyalty, care, and obedience. Each construct included questions developed by using
language and expectations outlined in federal and California state regulations, corporate
and charitable corporate law. Other sources utilized to develop questions were based on
the literature and studies focused on board and organizational performance. The construct
validity approach was helpful in establishing convergent validity as there was overlap
with some of the literature and studies.
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In terms of sensitivity, the survey included multi-item scales and yes/no
responses. Each scale provided face validity in that they corresponded to the duties and
construct that were measured. For example, because one of the purposes of this study was
to assess nonprofit leader actual knowledge of fiduciary duties, some questions were
given a yes or no option as answer options, as if it were an actual test. Additionally, when
asked about the frequency of application of fiduciary knowledge, the researcher opted for
a four point Likert scale, rather than a traditional five or seven, in order to eliminate the
option of a neutral response. Where appropriate, Cronbach’s alpha was computed.
Data Collection
Data were collected using an online survey instrument as previously described.
Prior to deploying the survey, Institutional Review Board approval was acquired from the
University of San Diego (included at the end of this study). Once approved, a hyperlink
for the survey was sent electronically to more than fifty personal and professional
contacts and lists of individuals from San Diego nonprofits that the researcher had either
consulted with or who have attended events where she had led a workshop or
presentation. The email invitation to participate is included as (see Appendix B).
Informed consent was provided to survey participants as the landing page of the survey
and is included in the survey instrument itself (see Appendix A). Those who agreed to
consent moved forward to the survey. Those who did not agree to consent were directed
to a thank you page and were not allowed to take the survey. The survey was in the field
for five weeks. At least three reminders were sent out during the course of the five weeks
to those the researcher personally made contact with. It is unknown if those who found
out about the survey through a second or third party received reminders or not.
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Data Analysis
Data was analyzed using IBM SPSS statistical software and Microsoft Excel.
Descriptive statistics are used to present a summary of data in a way that identifies
frequencies, means, medians, and standard deviation. Pearson Correlation analysis and
Contingency Tables were used to identify relationships between variables.
After closing the survey, the raw data was downloaded from Qualtrics and
cleaned by naming each variable, coding answers, and removing any duplicates and
responses that had no data. During the cleaning process, new variables were added for the
purposes of collapsing or describing variables. For example, after initial analysis, the role
variable was collapsed first into three sub-groups (executive, board committees, and
board members) and then into two sub-groups (executive and board members).
Additional details are included in the proceeding chapters about the data analysis
performed.
Delimitations
Delimitations are purposeful boundaries applied to a research study. As such, the
geographic constraints are considered a delimitation. Nonprofit organizations exist in
nearly every community in the United States, however, the researcher’s nonprofit
experience is primarily in the San Diego County region. Being in the San Diego region,
working and consulting for, volunteering at, and engaging with the nonprofit sector for
nearly 20 years, has allowed the researcher to build a considerable network of nonprofit
practitioners, researchers, and organizations. As a result, a purposeful decision was to
conduct this study in this region in order to begin to build the knowledge in a somewhat
“controlled” environment.
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Another delimitation to this study is that it focuses only on the legal aspects of
accountability as they relate to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.
Nonprofit leaders are expected to fulfill a wide range of roles and responsibilities
intended to support fulfilling the mission. As such, the researcher chose to bound the
study in very narrow terms, in terms of legal accountability, using the fiduciary duties,
which are widely accepted and recognized standards of conduct and behavior by
government, practitioners, and academics. Although it is a small piece of the puzzle, it is
the researcher’s belief that nonprofits who understand their fiduciary responsibilities
make better decisions, which in turn satisfied legal accountability demands.
Limitations
As with all studies there are limitations and this study is no exception. Limitations
are design flaws and potential weaknesses in the study. For this study, limitations revolve
around generalizability and replicability, specifically in terms of the sample and the
survey instrument. The study alone is not enough to determine whether the results would
be similar in other geographic regions. Without additional testing of the survey
instrument, the study can only serve as a starting point for future research that points to,
but not verify, trends or phenomena.
The first limitation worth noting is related to the sample. Given that the survey
was open to any individual that either served as a voting nonprofit board member or as
the executive located in San Diego County, there is no way of knowing how many
potential respondents make up the population or to verify that those who responded fit the
eligibility criteria.
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The second limitation is the survey instrument itself. It was developed for this
study and can be improved upon by changing some of the scales and the wording of
questions. For example, different four point Likert scale options were given for the
fiduciary duty constructs, executives were given disagree to agree, whereas board
members were given never to always. Additionally, self reported data can be problematic
because respondents may want portray themselves in a positive light and not admit what
they do not know. This aspect of social desirability may have either inflated respondents
answers or may have prevented other participants from taking the survey if they felt that
they may not have the appropriate knowledge.
The instrument can be further improved upon by adding actual measures of some
of the theoretical frameworks used in this study such as institutionalism, isomorphism,
and performance that are discussed in chapters four and five. In chapter three, with
regards to the bylaws questions, without any confirmation that the item was actually in
the organization’s bylaws, this set of questions is purely exploratory. Furthermore in
chapter three, for the actual knowledge of the duty of obedience construct, only one
question was included, ensuring that compliance with state and federal regulations is a
legal responsibility. For future iterations of the assessment tool, it may be helpful to
include additional questions related to this construct.
In chapter five, two different types of answer options were used for board
members and executives and as such, the results for both roles could not be compared in
an equal manner. Furthermore, for the duty of obedience construct in chapter five, only
one question was included that focused on disclosing conflict of interest. For future
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iterations of the assessment tool, it may be helpful to include additional questions related
to this construct.
Although bias can be seen as a limitation, it is also a strength. As mentioned
previously, the researcher is a practitioner with knowledge and perspective that is useful
in creating something that benefits practitioners. As such, the study was conducted in a
way that considered how helpful each piece of data would be for an executive or board
member. Yet, a limitation would be that as a new academic, the researcher is still learning
appropriate theories, frameworks, quantitative analysis techniques, and terminology that
will be used in further research.
Finally, given the researcher’s nonprofit experience, special attention was paid
during the design, implementation, or analysis phases of this study to avoid any bias,
another potential limitation. This was carried out by regular check-ins with colleagues
and the dissertation chair. Furthermore, no conflict of interest, such as a reporting
relationship, contract, or any relationship with the researcher was evident that may have
imparted bias on the research study itself.
This is a pilot study, and as such there are several changes that need to be made
prior to another deployment, as mentioned previously and other changes will be made as
practitioners, academics, and regulators are engaged. There is no one single assessment
that can adequately measure knowledge, application, and source of fiduciary duties.
However, what this study does is it begins the conversation about basic responsibilities
and establishes baseline data with which to build on. Many more studies need to happen
that include other methodologies including interviews, observation, and pre and post tests
to name a few.
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CHAPTER 3: KNOWLEDGE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The nature of nonprofit governance is one filled with challenges and tensions,
particularly in terms of legal accountability. For example, federal and state regulations
provide guidelines as to what nonprofit leaders are responsible for in the governance of
tax exempt organizations through the legal standards of the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience, but over time additional expectations have been placed on
nonprofit leaders. Additionally, nonprofit leaders are expected to perform their duties in a
manner that upholds their legal responsibilities, but no standardize process exists that
ensures that they have the basic knowledge of what their responsibilities are.
Furthermore, while legislation is important in that it mandates certain behaviors and
requirements, it is reactive and varies depending on the state and the resources available
for enforcement. Other tensions can be seen in the voluntary nature of nonprofit service.
Nonprofit leaders are volunteers and as such are given a great deal of leeway in the
performance of their duties creating tensions between expectation of service and reality.
Finally, tensions are found in the democratic idea of pluralism that allows people to
create nonprofits to meet a variety of public needs, resulting in the need for more people
to fill governance roles in an ever-expanding nonprofit sector.
Given the many challenges and tensions, the fiduciary duties provide a consistent,
universal set of standards that all tax exempt organizations must fulfill. Regardless of the
mission, size, or location, when accusations or concerns of negligence or wrongdoing
surface, every decision and action nonprofit leaders make will be applied against the
standards as set forth in the fiduciary duties. In essence, the fiduciary duties level the
playing field in terms of legal accountability in the performance of governance duties.
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Ebrahim (2010) suggests that a mechanism of accountability includes knowledge.
What this study provides is a means to assess the legal dimension of nonprofit
accountability at the governance level, specifically nonprofit leader knowledge of
fiduciary responsibilities. The broader purpose of this study is to establish baseline data
about nonprofit leader knowledge of their fiduciary responsibilities and is categorized
into three areas: nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties; the types of sources
nonprofit leaders access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities; and application of
knowledge in nonprofit leaders’ governance activities as illustrated in Figure 3.1.

Chapter 3:
For What?
Knowledge

Chapter 4:
For How?
Source of
Knowledge

Chapter 5:
For Whom?
Application of
Knowledge

Legal
Accountability

Figure 3.1. Framework for Legal Accountability.
In looking at how knowledge will be measured, Miller’s (1990) model of
competence, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 provides a framework. The first level, “knows”,
refers to an individual’s ability to recall specific elements. For this study, knowledge is
assessed by asking respondents about specific elements of each of the fiduciary duties
first what they believe they know (i.e. self-reported) and then they are assessed by what
they actually know.
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4th Level: Does
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance
3rd Level: Shows How
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance
2nd Level: Knows How
Chapter 4: Sources of Knowledge
Accountability for how? = Best Practices
1st Level: Knows
Chapter 3: Familiarity (self-report) and Actual Knowledge
Accountability for what? = Knowledge

Figure 3.2. Constructs and Legal Accountability adapted from Miller’s framework for
clinical assessment model in The assessment of clinical skills/competence/performance,
Academic Medicine, (1990).
This chapter focuses on the first strand of research, nonprofit leader (board
members and executives) knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities as a means to meet
legal accountability. The findings suggest that nonprofit leaders believe they have enough
knowledge to govern, but in reality, may not have correct knowledge of what their
fiduciary duties entail. I begin this chapter reviewing accountability for what that is
followed by a discussion about the nature of the nonprofit sector that includes its
characteristics and the legal roots. Next, a discussion on board governance provides a
background about the evolution of nonprofit governance with a detailed discussion of the
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience to provide context about what regulators
expect of nonprofit leaders. Following the regulation and enforcement aspects, I present
the results of related to nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties. Finally, I offer a
discussion of the results and implications for future research.
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Accountability for What?
In Ebrahim’s (2010) facets of accountability, four areas are important for the
discussion of accountability, finances, governance, performance, and mission. Financial
accountability is typically demonstrated through compliance and disclosure. Submitting
required reports such as the annual tax return, quarterly employment taxes, and allowing
the public access to audited financial statements are examples of compliance and
disclosure. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring that the
organization upholds state and federal laws. As such, organizations that actively comply
with reporting requirements are fulfilling their legal accountability by upholding their
fiduciary duty of obedience.
Performance is another means to meet accountability that focuses on how an
organization goes about fulfilling its mission. Engaging in a strategic planning process,
identifying goals, and establishing metrics for success are useful approaches to
performance. However, performance in and of itself is not an expectation that is outlined
in the fiduciary duties. The exception to this is in the duty of obedience, which holds the
board of directors responsible to evaluate the performance of its chief executive. Because
executives perform the day-to-day operations of the organizations, they are entrusted with
resources. Therefore, boards who regularly evaluate their chief executive meet the duty of
obedience and demonstrate legal accountability by ensuring that resources are used to
fulfill the mission.
Similar to performance, fulfillment of the mission is a means nonprofits
demonstrate accountability. Because nonprofit status is given to organizations that meet
an approved charitable, scientific, educational, or religious purpose, they are provided
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financial benefits in return, in the form of tax incentives. Tax incentives are a product of
U.S. legislation which allows tax deductibility for donations made by the public, for tax
exempt entities classified as c3, and tax free revenues for all tax exempt entities. Because
donations and tax free revenues reduce the amount of money the IRS can collect, tax
exempt entities in essence are subsidized by the U.S. government and the expectation is
that nonprofits use “public” money for public good (i.e. fulfillment of the mission).
Therefore, nonprofits who can demonstrate that they fulfill their mission satisfy legal
accountability.
The final facet of the accountability model is governance which according to
Ebrahim, focuses on “how the organization [boards and executives] raises and spends
money, follows donor intent, and whether it is in compliance with the law” (as cited in
Renz, 2010, p. 105). Each fiduciary duty is geared toward those who oversee and manage
tax exempt entities and provides guidance that nonprofit leaders can use to support their
governance activities. As such, the fiduciary duties provide a useful measurement of
governance.
Of the four facets, finances, mission, and governance are more relevant to what
nonprofit leaders are legally responsible for in terms of their fiduciary duties. Because the
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience focus on how the “owners” of a nonprofit use
resources in order to fulfill the charitable mission performance is less of a consideration.
However, performance of the executive is a legal responsibility for the board to fulfill
their fiduciary duty of obedience, as is discussed later. Although Ebrahim’s (2010) idea
of performance for accountability is focused on more of an organizational performance, it
is relevant to the discussion about nonprofit leaders and how they meet legal
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accountability. As such, nonprofit leaders demonstrate legal accountability by knowing
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience to fulfill their governance
responsibilities.
Nonprofit Characteristics and Legal Roots
Characteristics
What is unique about nonprofits is that they have a great deal of freedom to
engage in a wide variety of issues. Nonprofits provide programs and services such as
those relevant to individuals’ religious, cultural, and professional identities; to groups
affected by certain types of diseases and disorders; to communities in need of
transformation; and to nations in need of aid. Fishman, Schwarz, and Meyer (2015)
attribute this freedom to the idea of pluralism which “allows individuals and groups to
pursue goals that they formulate” (pg. 5). As utopian as pluralism sounds, it has a dark
side. Given the more than 1.5 million tax exempt entities, there is a current debate about
the sheer size of the sector. As more and more ideas turn into new nonprofits,
competition for financial, physical, and human resources increases.
Pluralism impacts nonprofit governance. Given that all tax exempt entities are
required to have directors and officers overseeing the organization, typically without
compensation, the need for people to fill governance roles increases. This might prove
challenging given that in the 10 year period from 2002 to 2012, the number of nonprofit
organizations increased 8.6 percent, more than 125,000 organizations (Worth, 2017, pg.
25). This increase was followed by another jump after the IRS introduced a streamlined,
shorter version of the 1023 Application for Tax Exemption, (1023 EZ), in 2013 creating a
deluge of new requests for tax exempt, nonprofit status. Between July and December of
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2014, on average, the IRS approved 10,000 new applications for tax exemption each
month (Wyland, 2018).
Not only did the 1023 EZ potentially create more demand for board members, it
was also a source of contention. Many nonprofit leaders voiced concerns that the it
lacked transparency, eroded public trust, and allowed the IRS to fail in their “…primary
obligation of preventing ineligible organizations and perhaps bad actors from receiving
and exploiting tax-exempt status for personal gain… with every application processed.”
(Council of Nonprofits, n.d.). This concern was based on the fact that the new application
opened the floodgate allowing any and all groups to become tax exempt without any
explanation as to their governance and oversight processes or assurances against the
misuse of funds (Council of Nonprofits, n.d.).
Legal Roots
At its roots, nonprofits are about people helping people. Throughout history, we
see many examples of charitable work that spans thousands of years and across multiple
continents. In the third century BC, the Hebrew tribe of Levi was supported by their
fellow tribes so that they could perform their priestly duties in the temple (Holy Bible,
1986). Other examples come from ancient Greece and Rome with wealthy citizens
supporting civic life through their subsidizing of city infrastructure and municipal
projects (Robbins, 2006). China enjoyed a long history of charity prior to communism
with its commitment to helping each other as expressed in an ancient Chinese saying, “to
have virtuous citizens who are kind to their neighbors, this is a precious treasure for a
country” (Chan, 2015). Although service to mankind transcends time, culture, religion,
and geography, the legal framework that bounds nonprofit organizations of the 21st
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Century is based more on western traditions of charity and philanthropy, specifically
English charitable law.
In 1601, England passed the Statute of Charitable Uses and the Poor Law which
was a turning point for charitable work in that it articulated the roles and boundaries of
the British government and the Church of England (Fremont-Smith, 2004; Worth, 2017,
pg. 21). Up until this time, property was the primary mode of funding charity work and
with the property owner who had the authority to use it in support of the charitable
purpose they deemed fit (University of Pennsylvania, 1904). Because religious
institutions administered most of the charity work, the concern was that the church would
garner too much power and influence as they acquired more land. As such, the new laws
offered clarity as to the types of acceptable charitable purposes and established the idea
that private charity and the state should work in partnership (Fremont-Smith, 2004). The
new laws also set the tone for accountability with regards to those who were entrusted
with the resources to fulfill charitable purposes, thereby providing the foundation for
nonprofit governance regulations of today.
English law provided the basis for charitable work, but it was the attempted
takeover of Dartmouth University in 1816 which settled the idea that public work should
be governed by the public, not the private or government sectors, as well as established
the role of the state for the oversight in corporate affairs. At the time, English Common
Law was still important to the young republic because of its focus on corporate property
rights since the newly adopted U.S. Constitution made no provisions regarding
corporations. With the lack of legal clarity, coupled with the newfound rights for citizens
to freely assemble, it seemed “reasonable to argue that nonprofits and their boards were
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guardians of citizens’ private rights” (Dobkin Hall, 2003, pg. 11). To settle the issue of
Dartmouth, Chief Justice Marshall decided that a public institution’s mission, or the
purposes for which they were formed, should determine how they are governed thus
protecting charitable institutions from legislative interference in their decision-making
process (Dobkin Hall, 2003). His decision was key in that it framed public policy by
combining English Charitable Law which protected the rights of corporations and the
U.S. Constitution which protected the rights of citizens. Combined, Marshall’s decision
became the basis for nonprofit governance by shaping accountability expectations and
responsibilities of citizens as corporate owners and directors.
Nonprofit Governance
Federal and state regulations require tax exempt organizations to be governed
individuals. Often referred to as boards of directors or trustees, board members are
typically volunteers and are tasked with making decisions on behalf of, and to act in the
best interest of, the organization. Because of the pluralistic nature, nonprofits have the
flexibility to create boards that reflect their missions. For example, nonprofits who work
closely with their community may choose to have a board member who represents the
community or someone who has been a beneficiary of services. Additionally, nonprofits
may select board members who can provide specialized knowledge or skills if the
mission focuses on disease prevention, the environment, or advocacy.
The composition of boards is an interesting area of scholarship that links
organizational performance to board member expertise, training, and professional
background (Andersson & Renz, 2009, Tschirhart, et al. 2009). Although boards are
often made up of accomplished professionals in their fields they may lack experience
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related to the governance aspects of running a nonprofit (Preston & Brown, 2004). Each
nonprofit leader brings to their role varying degrees of knowledge and skills and when
these individuals come together, as the legally responsible oversight body for a nonprofit
organization, the combined knowledge may or may not be adequate enough to make
decisions about resource that fulfill their fiduciary duties.
What creates tension is the requirement for nonprofits to have board members but
without any standardized assessment to certify board members understand their fiduciary
responsibilities. And, it seems that there is little to no scholarship that explores the
fiduciary aspect of governance that either explores nonprofit leader knowledge of
fiduciary duties or how that knowledge may impact their oversight role. Dobkin Hall
(2003) offers that, because what boards are responsible for has never been fully spelled
out, but that they “are often unpleasantly reminded” of their duties (p. 3). These
reminders have materialized over the past several decades with high profile legal cases
and news reports of nonprofit mismanagement. Adding to the tension is the evolution of
board roles and duties over time, contributing to the varying degrees of knowledge.
Boards in the New World
With the discovery of the New World, the earliest U.S. settlers built charitable
institutions such as hospitals, schools, and churches in their new homeland (Fishman,
Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015). As the colonies grew, so did the need for control as was seen
in the creation of the first American board by the Massachusetts Bay Company. What
began as a joint stock trading company created by the English crown to support
colonization in the New World was taken over by religious leaders in 1631 to establish
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the first charitable trust and in the process, established the idea of self-governance and
independence from government (Zeichner, n.d.).
With the example of the Massachusetts Bay Company, other religiously oriented
institutions such as Harvard and Yale were instrumental in the development of the
contemporary nonprofit governance model of today. Harvard’s contribution was
distinguishing “between the persons who might serve as officials of the corporation and
their role as officers” by creating two separate governing bodies: one that was selfperpetuating that focused on the academic issues of the institution and the other made up
of appointed members who answered to the church and state (Dobkin Hall, 2003).
Yale was established in 1723 in reaction to Harvard’s increasing liberalism and
was responsible for creating the collective governing body model. The idea that one body
was responsible for oversight of the entire institution was warranted because of the belief
that trustees would act in good faith was based on their duty to God (Dobkin Hall, 2003).
Although these were significant contributions, there was still the tension of control,
because many board members were either elected officials, ex officios, clergy, or
administrators who had a vested interest in the organization. The question then was “who
should control American culture” (Dobkin Hall, 2003, pg. 17)?
Boards in the New Era
As America became industrious and generated wealth, the idea that charitable
work should be governed by those outside of government, religion or academia was an
impetus for stakeholder representation. Educational institutions were the first to embrace
public representation by adding businessmen and lawyers to their boards in an effort to
woo their financial resources in support of the mission. However, this approach was
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problematic, because of the stark differences in philosophies between the new and old
leadership and differences in loyalties and allegiances. Old leadership focused on
“diffusion of knowledge” whereas business leaders focused on “acquisition of wealth”
(Dobkin Hall, 2003, p. 19).
Beginning in the mid-1920’s, U.S. President Hebert Hoover’s modernization of
government was instrumental in establishing improved governance principles and
practices. For both private for-profit and public charitable entities, attention was given to
developing resources to improve board performance and address “issues as
accountability, conflict of interest, fiduciary prudence, and the duty of loyalty”(Dobkin
Hall, 2003, p. 20). By the 1940’s, the idea of professionalization was introduced as a
dimension of corporate stewardship. The taxation and corporate structure of the
charitable sector began to take shape as well and by the mid-1960’s more than 250,000
charitable organizations were registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Dobkin
Hall, 2003).
With the growth of the charitable sector concerns over the wealthy having
influence over elected officials and legislators began to raise red flags as financial
support for candidates was carried out via their own charitable foundations. The U.S.
Congress had already set limits on lobbying activities by charitable organizations in the
Revenue Act of 1934 in that “no substantial part of its activities shall be used to carry out
propaganda” or “influence legislation”, but Congress enacted even tighter controls with
the Revenue Act of 1954 that added charitable organizations were prohibited from
“publishing or distributing of statements for any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office” (Harris, 2016, p 1). Foundations came under more scrutiny
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when Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 creating specific corporate structure
and governance rules for private foundations (who funded charitable work) and their
trustees that were more stringent than their charitable counterparts (who carried out the
work) (Arnsberger, et al, 2008). More recently, legislation was passed intended to
improve transparency, accountability, and compliance for all tax exempt entities, but
mainly at the state level. In California, the Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 and the
Nonprofit Revitalization Act in New York in 2013 were received with wide support.
Expectations of Nonprofit Leaders
The Fiduciary Duties
Nonprofit law is based in corporate law which is “the body of laws, rules,
regulations, and practices that govern the formation and operation of corporations and
regulates legal entities that exist to conduct business” (Legal Career Path, 2018, p. 1). As
a subsection of corporate law, nonprofit law deals with charitable corporations and
focuses on decision-makers, in this case board members and executives, and their
fulfillment of a charitable mission. Corporate law has identified three comprehensive
duties that directors and managers are responsible for which are also applied to nonprofit
corporations – the duty of care, loyalty, and obedience. In California, tax exempt entities
abide by California Charitable Corporate law which applies the fiduciary duty concepts to
the expectations of officers, either board members or executives, who oversee California
charities. In California officers are considered fiduciaries which requires them to,
“control the corporation in a fair, just, and equitable manner” and “refrain from doing
anything that harms the corporation” (California Department of Justice, 2017, p. 55).
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The three main duties that nonprofit boards of directors are held responsible for
are care, loyalty and obedience as presented in Table 3.1. Combined, these duties provide
guidance related to the expectations of how boards will govern in a manner that ensures
decisions are made for the organization’s best interest and promote transparency and
good stewardship of resources. The duty of care requires board members to be actively
engaged in the organization by attending board meetings regularly, reviewing
organizational documents, and participating in the decision making process. The duty of
loyalty requires board members to put the organization’s interests first by avoiding
conflict of interest and any dealings that may personally benefit a board member. The
duty of obedience requires board members to comply with state and federal regulations as
well as with organizational policies and procedures.
Table 3.1
Nonprofit Leader Fiduciary Duty Responsibilities
Duty of Care: Engagement,
Attention, Informed Process of
Decision-Making
 Attends board meetings
 Reviews information in
advance in preparation for
board meetings and to
inform voting
 Exercises independent
judgment
 Regularly reviews
finances, policies, and
executive performance

Duty of Loyalty: Procedural
Aspects of Transactions and
Self Interest
 Discloses conflict of
interests and potential
self-benefit
 Avoids organization
resources for personal use
 Maintains confidentiality

Duty of obedience: Legal
Compliance





Ensures compliance with
state and federal
requirements
Reviews and
understands corporate
governance documents
including bylaws
Makes decisions that
align with tax exempt
mission

Note. Data is a compilation of Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015; Fremont-Smith, 2004;
Hopkins, 2009.
Duty of care. The duty of care revolves around engagement and according to
Hopkins (2009), requires that a director is informed and “discharge his duties in good
faith, with the care than an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would reasonably
believe appropriate under similar circumstances” (p. 19). For board members and
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executives, fulfilling the duty of care means regularly attending meetings, reviewing
materials prior to meetings, and accessing the right sources of information in order to
make informed decisions.
We see a tension in fulfilling the duty of care in terms of accessing the right
information for organizations with an executive. Both the directors and the executives are
responsible to make informed decisions based on the appropriate information. However,
board members tend to defer to and rely on the executive for information outside the
scope of regular board materials such as financials, minutes, and committee reports.
Therefore, if the executive is providing information to the board, they are held
responsible to ensure that the board receives the appropriate information in a timely
manner and the board is held responsible to ensure that they are receiving the appropriate
information. There have been cases where the executive intentionally withheld
information from the board and ultimately, the executive was found liable (see In Re
Lemington Home for the Aged in Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015, p. 139-142).
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty revolves around conflict of interest and
according to Hopkins (2002) the basic legal principle is that “the director shall not use a
corporate position for individual personal advantage” (p. 29). In order for board members
and executives to fulfill the duty of loyalty they must acknowledge and deal with conflict
of interests and maintain the confidentiality of organizational information. However, the
duty of loyalty can be interpreted to mean more than just financially benefiting from
organizational resources. Jan Masaoka (2010), a widely regarded nonprofit practitioner
offers a multi-dimensionality approach to conflict of interest that goes beyond a board
member who might benefit from a contract for services. Potential conflicts of interest
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could be more subtle such as a board member who also serves on a competitor’s board or
a board member who receives services as a client (Masaoka, 2010). Conflict of interest
and private benefit have been cited in numerous court cases where board members and
executives were found liable (see Alephi v. Diamandopoulus p. 162-168, Church of
Scientology v. California Commissioner, p. 417-423, Nixon v. Lichtenstein, p. 152-155,
Madden v. Commissioner, p. 712-718 in Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015)
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience revolves around compliance of state
and federal laws as well as the policies and procedures adopted by the corporation itself
(Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015). In order for nonprofits leaders to fulfill their duty
of obedience, they must ensure that the organization fulfills its charitable purpose,
submits required reports to state and federal agencies, ensure that taxes are paid (e.g.
employment), and that internal policies and procedures such as the bylaws are followed.
Palmiter (2010) recounts that the duty of obedience was the primary focus for
corporations in their earliest forms, but has received less attention with the rise of
additional corporate reforms and regulations. However, for nonprofits the duty of
obedience is essential in that it requires organizations to focus on their charitable mission,
the very reason they are given the legal tax exempt status. What this means is that
nonprofit leaders must not engage in activities that are “ultra vires”, those that go beyond
the scope of their mission (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015, p. 181). Examples of
ultra vires activity includes nonprofits that add programs and services that may earn
additional revenues, but are not essential in the fulfillment of their missions such as
selling t-shirts or advertising space. This idea of commercialization has been the basis for
several court cases where directors and executives found liable for failure to fulfill the
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duty of obedience, (see Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, p.
537-543 and United States v. American College of Physicians in Fishman, Schwartz &
Mayer, 2015).
The Fiduciaries
For nonprofit organizations, the board of directors and to the same extent the
executive, fills the primary role of governance and are responsible to ensure that all
resources are in place and used to fulfill the mission along with compliance of state and
federal regulations and requirements. Often they are referred to as board members or
officers, but legally they are collectively referred to as fiduciaries. The root meaning of
the term fiduciary is trust and as mentioned earlier, English law used the term trustee to
define the relationship of someone entrusted with the use of property on behalf of a
beneficiary (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015). However, nonprofit leaders of today
are entrusted with a more than just property as they oversee the use of a variety of
resources to fulfill a charitable mission including financial, physical, human, and
intellectual.
There is an assumption that the nonprofit sector can do no wrong and that those
who serve as nonprofit leaders have special qualities. However, Salamon notes that the
nonprofit sector is romanticized with a “myth of pure virtue” (as cited in Gibleman &
Gelman, 2001, p. 63) and that the public places extremely high expectations on nonprofit
leaders. Fremont-Smith (2004) elaborates on this idea with her notion that since the
organization is meant to do good the people will do good while Fishman, Schwartz, and
Mayer (2015) note that “a trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace” (p. 120). Yet, we know that nonprofit leaders are not immune to bad
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behavior as evident in legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress at the turn of the 19th
Century. The Revenue Act of 1909 introduced language prohibiting any individual from
benefitting from organizational resources, i.e. private inurement (Arnsberger, et al, 2008)
which points to the need to curb fraudulent activity of the time that continues to today as
evident in the stories of nonprofit mismanagement.
Boards. In the United States, nonprofit organizations must be incorporated and
registered with both state and federal authorities. As part of the registration process,
nonprofits are required to include the names of the individuals who will serve in the
board roles of president, secretary, treasurer and vice president. This sub-set is referred to
as the executive committee and along with general members are either appointed or
elected as the fiduciary overseers of the organization depending on how the bylaws
prescribe the nomination and election process. Although the United States is known for
its generosity and volunteerism, asking people to spend time to serve on a board of
directors is sometimes a challenge. A recent national survey (BoardSource, 2017) of
more than 4,000 nonprofit board chairs and executives, reports that the average board
size has decreased from 19 in 1994 to 15 in 2017 (pg. 17). The decrease may be
attributed to organizations proactively reducing the number of board members based on
the needs of the organization or it may be reactive as a result to the lack of board
recruitment. However, more than likely, it is a combination of proactive and reactive
reasons along with a variety of others.
Beyond the legal fiduciary responsibilities, boards are asked to perform other
duties such as a fundraiser, community advocate, or industry expert. However, these are
not legally required as the fundamental duty of a board member is to direct the work of
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the organization, not engage in the day-to-day activities. In this oversight capacity, the
primary function of the board is to ensure that the resources are in place and allocated
such resources, so that the organization fulfills its charitable mission. The fiduciary duties
establish a solid foundation for board members to fulfill their oversight roles.
Furthermore, board members who are engaged, understand their legal responsibilities,
and put the interests of the organization above themselves are poised to fill additional
roles to fulfill the mission.
Executives. Executives are considered agents of the organization and are
responsible for the day-to-day management of the organization, which gives them a
considerable amount of influence and responsibility. Executives are appointed or hired,
by the board of directors, report directly to the board, and are relied on by the board for
information about the organization. Typically, executives are paid staff, but in the case of
all volunteer organizations, they may serve in the executive capacity without pay.
Regardless of the compensation arrangement, any individual who has been given
executive responsibilities to manage the day-to-day activities is bound by many of the
same requirements as boards and share in the governing responsibilities (FindLaw, 2016;
Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015).
Because executives have access to resources, the law pays particular attention to
their compensation. Executive compensation must be determined prior to employment
and decided by the board based on comparison of similar organizations, the market,
organizational needs, and capacity (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015). Executive
performance must be evaluated by the board of directors to ensure that governance
decisions are being carried out by the management. However, according to a national
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study reported that only 60% of the organizations surveyed conducted annual board
performance of the chief executive (BoardSource, 2017, p. 52). Conducting performance
and evaluation of the chief executive ensures that compensation is appropriate and the
executive is carrying out the mission of the organization which allows both the executive
and board member to fulfill their fiduciary duties of obedience.
The Regulatory Environment
Liability
Federal and State regulators are aware that nonprofit boards are made up of
volunteers and serve in unpaid positions and understand that if the legal requirements are
too burdensome, no one would want to fill the role. An interesting example of the tension
of the voluntary nature of board service is the case of Pepperdine University. In 1931,
George Pepperdine donated $3 million of his personal fortune to support the
establishment of Pepperdine College in Los Angeles. More than a decade later in 1948,
the college sued its founder when it faced more than $500,000 in debt after a series of bad
investments made by Mr. Pepperdine while he served as the President of the board. The
court ultimately dismissed the case, since it was the states’ responsibility to bring charges
against a charitable entity and because of the lack of evidence that Mr. Pepperdine acted
in an intentional, illegal manner. Although no one was charged, the Pepperdine case set a
precedent of leniency toward nonprofit directors who “are essential volunteers, and
aggressive attempts to enforce their responsibilities are inappropriate and will discourage
individuals from board service” (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, p. 127).
The general expectation is that board members and executives will act on behalf
of the best interest of the organization. However, sometimes board members and
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executives make bad decisions either out of negligence or willful intent. Given that board
members and executives are responsible for organizational resources and serve
voluntarily, they have a certain amount of protection from liability. At the federal level,
board members are covered under The Federal Volunteer Protection Act (FVP) that was
enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1997 to
[l]imit the liability of volunteers if they meet the following criteria: (1) the
volunteer was acting within scope of her responsibilities at the time of the
act or omission: (2) the volunteer was properly licensed, certified, or
authorized by the appropriate authorities for the activities or practice in the
state where the harm occurred: (3) the harm was not caused by willful or
criminal misconduct, gross negligence, or reckless misconduct , or a
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual
harmed by the volunteer: and (4) the harm was not caused by the volunteer
operating a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle for which the
state required an operators license and insurance (Fishman, Schwartz, &
Mayer, 2015, p. 146).
Nonprofit organizations that have the financial resources to do so can purchase
directors and officers insurance (D&O). This type of insurance protects the organization
and provides additional coverage for paid executives. Organizations decide on their own
how much insurance coverage they need and what they can afford. The FVP and D&O
insurance are important because they legally allow the use of financial resources (that
were otherwise intended to support the charitable mission) for indemnification purposes
to protect the directors and executives. Indemnification is the “payment by an
organization of a director’s legal costs, judgments, settlements, and other expenses
arising out of litigation and theoretical legal action from a director’s service to the
corporation” (Fishman, Schwartz, and Mayer, 2015, p. 147).
The FVP is based on the law, which protects volunteers from misconduct and acts
that are not illegal in nature. If a board member is found guilty of committing an illegal
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act, the FVP is invalid. The D&O insurance can be used because is an agreement between
the organization and the insurance company and the organization decides how much
liability they are willing to realize. With the number of high profile cases of
mismanagement, more and more nonprofits are looking at D&O insurance as a means to
protect their organization. The demand is evidenced by Hartford Financial Services
Group’s recent decision to expand its liability coverage for nonprofits (Business Wire,
2017). Although the FVP and D&O insurance cannot protect an organization from a
lawsuit, they are a means to protect and encourage individuals to serve as board members
and executives given the high degree of responsibility.
Federal Regulators
Because nonprofits are corporations, the laws pertaining to their limits and
purposes are decided by state legislative bodies. However, because they afforded
exemption from federal taxes, the federal government plays an important regulatory role.
Fremont-Smith (2004) describes the federal regulation of nonprofits that includes three
components: (1) the U.S. Congress, that “determines the nature and scope of regulation”;
(2) the Treasury Department, that prepares proposals for the “promulgation” of
legislation along with the IRS (a branch of the Treasury) who administers the laws and
regulations; and (3) the federal courts who “interpret the laws and regulations and
determine their constitutionality” and “holds the ultimate power” (p. 377). Together,
these entities work together to ensure that charitable organizations benefit society.
As a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, the IRS is directed by Title 26 of
the U.S. Code in order to fulfill its mission of helping American taxpayers to “understand
and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all
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(IRS, 2016a, p. 1). As such, it is a key player in the regulation of nonprofits as they are
often the first to notice irregularities or are asked to look into specific cases of
mismanagement. All tax exempt entities earning more than $50,000 in annual revenues
are required to annually report their activities through the Form 990 Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax (IRS, 2016b). If the IRS flags inconsistencies or
irregularities in the Form 990, they will investigate. Usually, the irregularities are simple
reporting errors while other times, they are egregious omissions of fact. If the IRS finds
that a tax exempt organization has breached their fiduciary duties and has just cause, it
can impose fines, penalties, and revoke tax exempt status. If the IRS finds criminal or
illegal activities, the case moves to the courts to decide. However, many cases are
resolved before they go to trial.
State Regulators
Each state has their own system to regulate and enforce charitable corporations
and depending on the resources available, the states will take action first. A recent study
mapped the regulatory environment for charitable oversight in the United States. The
study found that the attorney general was the “sole state-level regulator” for 27 U.S.
jurisdictions while the remaining 24 were bifurcated–divided between the attorney
general and another state agency2 (Dietz, et al, 2017). The attorney general is typically
responsible for “ensuring the proper use of charitable funds” through regulations and
enforcement authority (Fremont-Smith, 2004, p. 54). In California, the attorney general is
responsible for charity regulation, enforcement, and compliance.
Because of the sheer number of tax exempt organizations, and the lack of
resources, both the federal and state regulators are unable to investigate all reports of
2

Jurisdictions include the 50 states and the District of Columbia
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mismanagement or wrongdoing. Furthermore, for the IRS and state regulators, charitable
regulation is just a small part of their responsibilities, compared to other areas such as
consumer protection and corporate negligence (Helge, 2009). Furthermore, there are
hundreds of thousands of nonprofit organizations with revenues less than $50,000 that the
federal and state agencies have no way of knowing whether organizations are fulfilling
their fiduciary duties or not. As such, it is difficult to know the extent of negligence and
mismanagement in the nonprofit sector. Yet, despite the lack of resources, both the
federal and state regulators want the same thing: the use of charitable assets to be used for
charitable purposes.
Breach of duties. Although we do not know the full extent of mismanagement
and negligence in the nonprofit sector, there are many examples that provide insight into
the types of issues that nonprofit leaders should take note of. Gibleman and Gelman
(2001) surveyed domestic and international print media for charity fraud cases of less
than $100,000 amongst nonprofit health and human services agencies from 1998 to 2000.
Their search found 10 instances that occurred in the United States, totaling more than
$347 million in theft, embezzlement, or mismanagement and in all cases, they discovered
that, “the ultimate responsibility for the wrongdoing rested with the board” (p. 50). What
is most telling about their study is their conclusion that although these cases were high
profile and documented in the media, they were most likely not isolated events, but rather
an emerging pattern in the sector (Gibleman & Gelman, 2001).
There are other examples of breaches of the fiduciary duties found in legislative
cases involving mismanagement of charitable organizations. One such case was Stern v.
Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses (a.k.a. Sibley Hospital) in
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1974 that revealed breaches in fiduciary duties by both the board and management. The
Sibley Hospital case was a class action suit brought by the patients against the hospital
alleging that finances were mismanaged and used to personally benefit the trustees. The
case revealed that the board treasurer, Donald Ernst, had set up several investment
accounts using hospital funds that he maintained exclusive control over. Although the
board had between 25 and 30 trustees it seemed that most of the decisions were being
made by Ernst and the hospital administrator, John Orem. The case was ultimately
dismissed, but the trustees were held liable for mismanagement, self interest, and conflict
of interest (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015).
Knowledge Results
In terms of measuring knowledge, the study focuses on how familiar nonprofit
leaders are with the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience (self-reported) and an
assessment of their actual knowledge. The questions used in the survey are presented
followed by reliability, then results of nonprofit leader familiarity with fiduciary duties
by role and by number of boards served in the past 15 years (board service), followed by
actual fiduciary duty knowledge by role and by board service and finally, and finally a
comparison of familiarity and actual knowledge by role.
Self Reported Knowledge
Survey questions. In order to assess knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities,
respondents were given a brief description of each of the duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience and were asked to rate their familiarity of each one using a 4-point Likert scale
(Not at All Familiar, Slightly Familiar, Moderately Familiar, and Very Familiar). To get
a sense of overall understanding of their fiduciary roles, respondents were asked two
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additional questions: 1) if they believe they have enough knowledge to carry out their
responsibilities and; 2) if they understood the organization’s mission. For these two
questions, respondents were given a 4-point Likert scale (Disagree, Somewhat Disagree,
Somewhat Agree, and Agree) for answer options.
Reliability. Reliability for the familiarity of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty,
and obedience scale that consisted of three items was performed. The scale was found to
be very reliable (α = .82) with each item in the same direction. Most items appeared to be
worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. Table 3.2 provides
descriptive data for the fiduciary duties.
Table 3.2
Descriptive Data for Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties for All Roles
Fiduciary Duty
Std.
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Care
184
3.8
4
.545
Loyalty
183
3.8
4
.487
Obedience
183
3.7
4
.606

Min.
1
1
1

Max.
4
4
4

Results: Familiarity and Understanding by Role
Respondents were asked questions about how familiar they are with the fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, if they understood their organization’s mission,
and if they had enough knowledge to carry out their responsibilities. First, the results are
presented by role then by board service for how familiar they are with the fiduciary
duties, their understanding of their organization’s mission, then if they have enough
knowledge to carry out their responsibilities.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the means of how familiar nonprofit leaders are about the
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience by role. Descriptive data for the means for
the fiduciary duties for board members is presented in Table 3.3 and for executives in
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Table 3.4. Board members are moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary duties of
care (N = 104, M = 3.7), loyalty (N = 103, M = 3.8), and obedience (N = 103, M = 3.6).
Similarly, executives are moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary duties of care (N
= 82, M = 3.9), loyalty (N = 82, M = 3.9), and obedience (N = 82, M = 3.9).
4.0

3.9

3.9
3.8

3.9

3.8
3.7
3.6

3.6

Board Member
Executive

3.4

3.2

3.0
Care

Loyalty

Obedience

Figure 3.3. Means of nonprofit leader familiarity of fiduciary duties by role.
Table 3.3
Descriptive Data for Means of Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties for Board Members
Fiduciary Duty
Std.
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Min
Care
104
3.7
4
.655
1
Loyalty
103
3.8
4
.536
1
Obedience
103
3.6
4
.733
1

Max
4
4
4

Table 3.4
Descriptive Data for Means of Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties for Executives
Fiduciary Duty
Std.
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Min
Care
82
3.9
4
.333
3
Loyalty
82
3.9
4
.409
1
Obedience
82
3.9
4
.318
3

Max
4
4
4

As presented in Table 3.5, board members somewhat agreed to agreed that they
had enough knowledge to carry out their responsibilities (N = 95, M = 3.6) and
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understood the organization’s mission (N = 94, M = 3.9). Similarly, executives somewhat
agreed and agreed that they had enough knowledge to carry out their responsibilities (N =
82, M = 3.8) and agreed that they understood the organization’s mission (N = 82, M =
3.9).
Table 3.5
Descriptive Data for Overall Understanding of Fiduciary Responsibilities by Board
Members and Executives
Std.
Questions
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Min
“As a board member, I…”
Have enough knowledge to carry
95
3.6
4
.608
1
out my responsibilities
Understand the organization’s
94
3.9
4
.436
1
mission
“As an executive, I…”
Have enough knowledge to carry
82
3.8
4
.404
2
out my responsibilities
Understand the organization’s
82
3.9
4
.191
3
mission

Max
4
4

4
4

Results: Familiarity and Understanding by Board Service
Figure 3.4 presents the means of how familiar nonprofit leaders are about the
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience by board service. Nonprofit leaders who
have served on one to four boards are moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary
duties of care (N = 126, M = 3.8), loyalty, (N = 126, M = 3.8), and obedience (N = 126, M
= 3.7). Similarly, nonprofit leaders who have served on five or more boards are also
moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary duties of care (N = 31, M = 4.0), loyalty,
(N = 31, M = 4.0), and obedience (N = 31, M = 3.9). Descriptive data for nonprofit leader
means of fiduciary duties is presented in Table 3.6.

96
4.0

4.0

3.8

4.0
3.9

3.8

3.8
3.7

3.6
1-4 boards
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Figure 3.4. Means of nonprofit leader familiarity of fiduciary duties by board service.
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category, 1-4
boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ board categories were collapsed into a new category, 56/6+ boards.
Table 3.6
Descriptive Data of Nonprofit Leader Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties by Board Service
Std.
Fiduciary Duties of Care
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Min
Max
1-4 boards
126
3.8
4
.518
1
4
5-6/6+ boards
31
4
4
0
4
4
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
1-4 boards
5-6/6+ boards

126
31

3.8
4

4
4

.510
0

1
4

Fiduciary Duty of Obedience
1-4 boards
126
3.7
4
3.701
1
5-6/6+ boards
31
3.9
4
3.897
3
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category, 1-4
boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ board categories were collapsed into a new category, 56/6+ boards.
Significance by Role
Board members and executives are both legally responsible to uphold the
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. This leads to the following hypothesis:

4
4

4
4
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H1: Board members and executives have the same familiarity about each of the
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.
Table 3.7 presents the results of an independent t test conducted for familiarity of
the duty of care for board members (N = 104, M = 3.7, SD = .599) and executives (N =
82, M = 3.9, SD = .343); for the duty of loyalty for board members (N = 104, M = 3.8, SD
= .534) and executives (N = 82, M = 3.9, SD = .416); and for the duty of obedience for
board members (N = 104, M = 3.6, SD = .731) and executives (N = 82, M = 3.9, SD =
.315) . There was a significant difference in board member and executive means for Care:
t(184) = 16.570, p = .053 and Obedience: t(184) = 51.302, p = .001, but not for or
Loyalty: t(184) = 7.321, p = .146 (at the .05 significance level). Therefore, the hypothesis
is not supported as there is significance between the means for board members and
executives for the duties of care and obedience, but not for the duty of loyalty.
Table 3.7
Independent-sample t-Test Descriptive Data and Analysis for the Familiarity of Duties of
Care, Loyalty, and Obedience by Role
Fiduciary
Role
N
Mean
Std.
F
t
df
P
Duty
Dev.
Care
16.570 -1.950
.000
184
Board
104
3.7
.599
Member
Executive
82
3.9
.343
Loyalty
7.321
-1.462 183.980 .007
Board
103
3.8
.534
Member
Executive
82
3.9
.416
Obedience
51.302 -3.402
.000
184
Board
103
3.6
.731
Member
Executive
82
3.9
.315

Sig. (2
tailed)
.053

.146

.001
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Significance by Board Service
Regardless of the number of boards nonprofit leaders have served on, they are
legally responsible to uphold the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Nonprofit leaders have the same familiarity about each of the fiduciary duties
of care, loyalty, and obedience regardless of the number of boards they have
served on in the past 15 years.
As such an independent samples t test was run to test for any significance between
the nonprofit leaders who have served on four boards or less and those who have served
on five or more boards. Table 3.8 presents the results for familiarity of the fiduciary duty
of care for nonprofit leaders who have served one to four boards (N = 126, M = 3.8, SD =
.515) and those who have served on five or more boards (N = 31, M = 4, SD = .180); for
the fiduciary duty of loyalty for nonprofit leaders who have served one to four boards (N
= 126, M = 3.8, SD = .512) and those who have served on five or more boards (N = 31, M
= 4, SD = .180); and for the fiduciary duty of obedience for nonprofit leaders who have
served one to four boards (N = 126, M = 3.7, SD = .648) and those who have served on
five or more boards (N = 31, M = 3.9, SD = .301). There was a significant difference in
board service for Care: t(155) = 17.887, p = .055, Loyalty: t(155) = 11.354, p = .110, and
Obedience: t(155) = 13.268, p = .089 (at the .05 significance level). Therefore, the
hypothesis is not supported as there is significance between the means for nonprofit
leaders who have served on four boards or less and those who have served on five or
more boards.
Table 3.8
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Independent-sample t-Test Descriptive Data and Analysis for the Familiarity of Duties of
Care, Loyalty, and Obedience by Board Service
Fiduciary
Role
N
Mean
Std.
F
t
df
P
Duty
Dev.
Care
17.887 -1.933
155 .000
1-4 boards
126
3.8
.515
5-6/6+ boards
31
4.0
.180
Loyalty
11.354 -1.606
155 .001
1-4 boards
126
3.8
.512
5-6/6+ boards
31
4.0
.180
Obedience
13.268
155
.089 .000
1-4 boards
126
3.7
.648
5-6/6+ boards
31
3.9
.301
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category - 1-4
boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ board categories were collapsed into a new category - 56/6+ boards.
Actual Knowledge
As explained in the previous section, respondents were asked about their
familiarity of the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and obedience. In this section, results
are presented that illustrate what respondents actually know about their fiduciary
responsibilities.
Survey questions. Respondents were given 19 questions in order to test their
actual knowledge of fiduciary duties. Actual knowledge means demonstrating accurate
knowledge by answering the questions correctly. Eight questions focused on items
typically found in organizational bylaws and 11 questions were focused on specific
aspects of each of the fiduciary duties. Of the 19 questions, eight questions were either
not legal responsibilities or items typically included in bylaws to “test” respondents’
ability to accurately answer. Respondents were given the option to answer “yes”, “no”,
and “don’t know” (for bylaws only). For each correct answer, respondents were given a

Sig.
.055

.110

.089
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“1” and for each incorrect answer, respondents were given a “0”. The highest possible
score is 19.
Respondents were asked eight questions about what items were included their
organization’s bylaws. The items included are those typically found in nonprofit bylaws
with the exception of five that are not. The purpose of asking about bylaws was explore
how many nonprofit leaders may have read their bylaws which is an aspect of fulfilling
the fiduciary duty of obedience, knowing how the organization should conduct its
decision making process. Next, respondents were to asked 11 questions related to legal
responsibilities (required by federal and state law) of nonprofit boards and executives.
Three comprise the duty of care, three comprised the duty of loyalty, and one comprised
the duty of obedience. Of the 11 questions, four of were not legal responsibilities. All
questions are presented in Table 3.10.
By role. Table 3.9 presents the results of board members and executive actual
knowledge of their fiduciary responsibilities. Actual knowledge is a combination of the
11 legal responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions for a total possible score of 19. A
70% standard was applied to determine if respondents passed, since it is considered a
passing grade (i.e. a “C”) for most academic institutions. Overall, 54% nonprofit leaders
scored a passing grade (N = 186). For board members, 41% scored a passing grade (N =
104) while 70% of the executives (N = 82) scored a passing grade.
Table 3.9
Descriptive Data for Passing Score of Actual Knowledge of Legal Responsibility by Role
N
%
Std.
Passed
Mean
Median
Dev.
Min
Max
Board Members
104
41%
15.3
16
1.20
14
19
Executives
82
70%
15.9
15.5
1.28
14
19
All Roles
186
54%
15.6
15.5
1.28
14
19
Note. Passing score based on 70%, 14 out of 19 possible points.
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As presented in Table 3.10, when looking at specific aspects of fiduciary
knowledge, the results show that nonprofit leaders have a range of actual knowledge. For
example, in terms of legal duties, 82% of nonprofit leaders (N = 170) knew that
frequently reviewing the organization’s finances and financial policies was a legal
responsibility; 97% (N = 172) knew that disclosing conflict of interest was a legal
responsibility; and 96% (N = 171) knew that ensuring compliance with state and federal
regulations was a legal responsibility. Conversely, only 30% (N = 171) knew that
reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting was a legal responsibility
and only 51% (N = 171) knew that regular attendance of board meetings was a legal
responsibility.
With regards to the bylaws questions, 99% of nonprofit leaders knew that board
service positions, terms, and voting power (N = 164) were in the bylaws; 76% knew that
executive staff roles and responsibilities were included in the bylaws (N = 159).
Conversely, only 46% (N = 146) knew that financial accounting procedures were not in
the bylaws and only 60% (N = 156) knew that the board’s expected financial commitment
was not included in the bylaws.
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Table 3.10
Questions and Descriptive Data about Legal Responsibilities by All Roles
Questions
N
% Correct
Duty of Care Responsibilities
1. Regular attendance of board meetings
171
51%
2. Reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting
171
30%
3. Frequently reviewing organization’s finances and financial
policies
170
82%
Duty of Loyalty Responsibilities
4. Disclosing potential conflicts of interest
172
97%
5. Using independent judgment when making decisions about
organizational resources
172
65%
Duty of Obedience Responsibilities
6. Ensuring that individual board members, staff, or donors do
not use organizational resources for personal reasons
171
94%
7. Ensuring compliance with state and federal regulators
171
96%
Not a Legal Responsibility
8. Developing a strategic plan
168
78%
9. Managing the day-to-day activities of the organization
170
87%
10. Developing collaborations and partnerships with other
organizations
169
86%
11. Developing performance indicators for program effectiveness
164
78%
Bylaws Items
12. Board service positions, terms, and voting power
164
99%
13. Board nomination and election process
161
94%
14. Executive staff roles and responsibilities
159
76%
Not Bylaw Items
15. Financial accounting procedures
146
46%
16. Donor relations strategy
138
83%
17. Organizational strategic plan
151
68%
18. Board’s expected financial commitment
156
60%
19. Annual operating budget
157
69%
Note. Percentage correct based on the number of respondents that correctly answered
each question.
Table 3.11 presents the specific aspects of fiduciary knowledge results by role.
When analyzed by role, the results show that board members and executives vary in their
actual knowledge. For board members and actual knowledge of their legal
responsibilities, 80% (N = 95) knew that frequently reviewing the organization’s finances
and financial policies was a legal responsibility; 95% (N = 97) knew that disclosing
conflict of interest was a legal responsibility; and 96% (N = 96) knew that ensuring
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compliance with state and federal regulations was a legal responsibility. Conversely, only
34% (N = 96) knew that reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting
was a legal responsibility and 50% (N = 96) knew that regular attendance of board
meetings was a legal responsibility.
With regards to the bylaws questions, 99% of board members (N = 91) knew that
board service positions, terms, and voting power were in the bylaws; 97% knew that the
board nomination and election process was included in the bylaws (N = 88). Conversely,
only 38% (N = 77) knew that financial accounting procedures were not in the bylaws and
52% (N = 85) knew that the board’s expected financial commitment was not included in
the bylaws.
For executives and legal duties, 100% (N = 75) knew that disclosing conflicts of
interest was a legal responsibility and 99% (N = 75) knew that ensuring that individual
board members, staff, or donors do not use organizational resources for personal reasons
was a legal responsibility. Conversely, only 25% (N = 75) knew that reviewing board
meeting materials prior to the board meeting was a legal responsibility and 53% (N = 75)
knew that regular attendance of board meetings was a legal responsibility.
With regards to the bylaws questions, 99% of executives (N = 73) knew that
board service positions, terms, and voting power were in the bylaws; 90% knew that the
board nomination and election process was included in the bylaws (N = 73). Conversely,
only 55% (N = 69) knew that financial accounting procedures were not in the bylaws and
70% (N = 71) knew that the board’s expected financial commitment was not included in
the bylaws.
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Table 3.11
Questions and Descriptive Data about Legal Responsibilities by Role
Questions
Board
Board
Executive
N
% Correct
N
Duty of Care Responsibilities
1 Regular attendance of board meetings
96
50%
75
2 Reviewing board meeting materials prior to the
board meeting
96
34%
75
3 Frequently reviewing organization’s finances
and financial policies
95
80%
75
Duty of Loyalty Responsibilities
4 Disclosing potential conflicts of interest
97
95%
75
5 Using independent judgment when making
decisions about organizational resources
97
65%
75
Duty of Obedience Responsibilities
6 Ensuring that individual board members, staff,
or donors do not use organizational resources
for personal reasons
97
90%
75
7 Ensuring compliance with state and federal
regulators
96
96%
75
Not a Legal Responsibility
8 Developing a strategic plan
94
69%
74
9 Managing the day-to-day activities of the
organization
96
79%
74
10 Developing collaborations and partnerships
with other organizations
95
79%
74
11 Developing performance indicators for
program effectiveness
91
75%
73
Bylaws Items
12 Board service positions, terms, and voting
power
91
99%
73
13 Board nomination and election process
88
97%
73
14 Executive staff roles and responsibilities
88
83%
71
Not Bylaw Items
15 Financial accounting procedures
77
38%
69
16 Donor relations strategy
68
78%
70
17 Organizational strategic plan
80
54%
71
18 Board’s expected financial commitment
85
52%
71
19 Annual operating budget
84
58%
73
Note. Percentage correct based on the number of respondents that correctly answered
each question.

Executive
% Correct
53%
25%
85%
100%
64%

99%
97%
89%
97%
95%
82%

99%
90%
68%
55%
87%
83%
70%
81%
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By board service. Table 3.12 presents the results of nonprofit leaders by board
service actual knowledge of their fiduciary responsibilities. The actual knowledge is a
combination of the 11 legal responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions for a total
possible score of 19. A 70% standard was applied to determine if respondents passed,
since it is considered a passing grade (i.e. a “C”) for most academic institutions. When
analyzed by board service, 56% of those who have served on one to four boards scored a
passing grade (N = 126) and 31% of those who have served on five or more boards
scored a passing grade (N = 31).
Table 3.12
Descriptive data for passing score of actual knowledge of legal responsibility by board
service
N
%
Std.
Passed
Mean
Median
Dev.
Min
Max
1-4 Boards
126
56%
15.7
15.5
1.27
14
19
5-6/6+ Boards
31
31%
15.5
15.5
1.34
14
19
Note. Passing score based on 70%, 14 out of 19 possible points. The 1-2 board and 3-4
board categories were collapsed into a new category - 1-4 boards. The 5-6 board and 6+
board categories were collapsed into a new category - 5-6/6+ boards.
Table 3.13 presents the specific aspects of fiduciary knowledge results by board
service. When analyzed by board service, the results show that actual knowledge of legal
duties decreases the more boards that nonprofit leaders serve on. For example, in terms of
legal duties, 53% of nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards (N = 125)
knew that regularly attending board meetings was a legal requirement compared to 42%
of those who served on more than five boards (N = 31). Ninety nine percent of those who
served on one to four boards (N = 126) knew that disclosing potential conflicts of interest
was a legal requirement compared to 87% of those who have served on five or more
boards (N = 31).
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The opposite occurred in terms of knowing what items were not legal
responsibilities. For example, 76% of the nonprofit leaders who served on one to four
boards (N = 122) knew that developing a strategic plan was not a legal responsibility
compared to 90% of those who served on five or more boards (N = 31) while 85% of
nonprofit leaders who served on one to four boards (N = 123) knew that developing
collaborations and partnerships with other organizations was not a legal responsibility
compared to 97% of those who served on five or more boards (N = 31).
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Table 3.13
Questions and Descriptive Data about Legal Responsibilities by Board Service
Questions
1-4
1-4
5-6/6+
Boards
Boards % Boards
N
Correct
N
Duty of Care Responsibilities
1 Regular attendance of board meetings
125
53%
31
2 Reviewing board meeting materials prior to the
board meeting
125
33%
31
3 Frequently reviewing organization’s finances
and financial policies
124
87%
31
Duty of Loyalty Responsibilities
4 Disclosing potential conflicts of interest
126
99%
31
5 Using independent judgment when making
decisions about organizational resources
126
68%
31
Duty of Obedience Responsibilities
6 Ensuring that individual board members, staff,
or donors do not use organizational resources
for personal reasons
126
94%
31
7 Ensuring compliance with state and federal
regulators
125
97%
31
Not a Legal Responsibility
8 Developing a strategic plan
122
76%
31
9 Managing the day-to-day activities of the
organization
124
86%
31
10 Developing collaborations and partnerships
with other organizations
123
85%
31
11 Developing performance indicators for
program effectiveness
119
77%
30
Bylaws Items
12 Board service positions, terms, and voting
power
116
98%
31
13 Board nomination and election process
115
91%
31
14 Executive staff roles and responsibilities
114
74%
30
Not Bylaw Items
15 Financial accounting procedures
104
45%
31
16 Donor relations strategy
96
85%
30
17 Organizational strategic plan
107
68%
29
18 Board’s expected financial commitment
113
57%
30
19 Annual operating budget
111
71%
31
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category - 1-4
boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ board categories were collapsed into a new category - 56/6+ boards.

5-6/6+
Boards
% Correct
42%
23%
71%
87%
55%

87%
97%
90%
94%
97%
87%

100%
100%
80%
45%
83%
72%
73%
65%
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Actual Knowledge of Each Duty
By role. Table 3.14 presents and Figure 3.5 illustrate the results of nonprofit
leaders with a passing score of actual knowledge of each of the duties of care, loyalty,
and obedience by role. A passing score was given if they answered each question in each
duty construct correctly (see Table 3.11 for list of questions in each construct by role).
For board members, 59% (N = 104) passed the duty of care, 25% (N = 104) passed the
duty of loyalty, and 90% (N = 97) passed the duty of obedience. For the executives, 59%
(N = 82) passed the duty of care, 18% (N = 82) passed the duty of loyalty, and 99% (N =
75) passed the duty of obedience
Table 3.14
Percentage of Actual Knowledge of Fiduciary Duties by role
Role
N
% Passed
Board Members
Care
104
59%
Loyalty
104
25%
Obedience
97
90%
Executives
Care
82
59%
Loyalty
82
18%
Obedience
75
99%
Note. Passing score based on answering each question in each construct correctly.
100%

90%

90%

99%

80%
70%
60%

59% 59%
Board

50%

Executive

40%
25%

30%

18%

20%
10%
Care

Loyalty

Obedience

Figure 3.5. Percentage of nonprofit leader actual knowledge of fiduciary care, loyalty,
and obedience by board service
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Board service. Table 3.15 presents and Figure 3.6 illustrates the results of
nonprofit leaders with a passing score of actual knowledge of each of the duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience by board service. A passing score was given if they answered each
question in each duty construct correctly (see Table 3.13 for list of questions in each
construct by board service). For nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards,
25% (N = 126) passed the duty of care, 67% (N = 126) passed the duty of loyalty, and
94% (N = 126) passed the duty of obedience. For those who have served on five or more
boards, 23% (N = 31) passed the duty of care, 52% (N = 31) passed the duty of loyalty,
and 87% (N = 31) passed the duty of obedience
Table 3.15
Percentage of Actual Knowledge of Fiduciary Duty by board service
N
% Passed
1-4 boards
Care
126
25%
Loyalty
126
67%
Obedience
126
94%
5-6/6+ boards
Care
31
23%
Loyalty
31
52%
Obedience
31
87%
Note. Passing score based on answering each question in each construct correctly.
94%

100%

87%

90%
80%
67%

70%
60%

52%

1-4 boards

50%

5-6/6+ boards

40%
30%

25% 23%

20%
10%
Care

Loyalty

Obedience

Figure 3.6. Percentage of nonprofit leader actual knowledge of fiduciary care, loyalty,
and obedience by board service
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Familiarity vs. Actual Knowledge
Figure 3.7 illustrates presents the comparison of how familiar nonprofit leaders
say they are with the fiduciary duties and their actual knowledge of specific aspects of the
fiduciary duties for board members and Figure 3.8 illustrates the comparison of how
familiar nonprofit leaders say they are with the fiduciary duties and their actual
knowledge of specific aspects of the fiduciary duties for executives. Familiarity is
presented by the means based on a 4-point Likert scale (Not at All Familiar, Slightly
Familiar, Moderately Familiar, Very Familiar) and the actual knowledge score is based
on the percentage who received a passing score of at least 70% for the 11 legal
responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions. Overall, 41% of board members and 70%
of the executives received a passing score for actual knowledge.

4

3.7

3.8

Care

Loyalty

3.6

3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
Obedience

41%

Figure 3.7. Means of familiarity of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for
board members.
Note. The dotted line represents the percentage (41%) of board members (care N = 104,
loyalty, N = 103, and obedience, N = 97) who received a passing score of 70% or better
for the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for chart plotting
was determined by calculating the proportion of 41% of 4 (the maximum mean score),
which is 1.6.
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3.5
3
2.5
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1.5
1
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Figure 3.8. Means of familiarity of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for
executives.
Note. The dotted line represents the overall percentage (70%) of executives (care N = 82,
loyalty, N = 82, and obedience, N = 75) who received a passing score of 70% or better for
the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for chart plotting was
determined by calculating the proportion of 70% of 4 (the maximum mean score) which
is 2.8.
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Discussion
In this study, when nonprofit leaders were asked how familiar they were with the
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, the results indicate that they were moderately to
very familiar. However, when they were tested for their actual knowledge of the legal
responsibilities, only 41% of the board members and 70% of the executives received a
passing score. What follows is a discussion about the gaps between familiarity and actual
knowledge, first by the executives, then by the board members, and lastly by board
service.
The Gaps: Familiarity with Duties and Actual Knowledge
Executives
In terms of understanding their organization’s mission and having enough
knowledge to carry out their responsibilities and overall familiarity with the duties of care
(M = 3.9), loyalty (M = 3.9), and obedience (M = 3.9), executives responded with a great
deal of familiarity. And, although it was expected that executives would be more familiar
with the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience than board members, the hypothesis was
partially supported for the duty of loyalty (even though it was found to not be statistically
significant) and for the duty of obedience, but not for the duty of care. For the duty of
care, the results for the executives and board members were the same (M = 3.9).
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring
that the mission is fulfilled. Because executives are in charge of the day-to-day
management of the organization, these results are not surprising. Most executives are
aware of, and often responsible for carrying out, annual reporting requirements such as
the Form 990 annual tax return as well as work with the bookkeeper, auditor, and board
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to ensure items are submitted in a timely manner. Additionally, executives are intimately
involved with the financial aspects of the organization and are responsible for providing
information to the board. This explanation is supported by the specific legal
responsibility results. Ninety nine percent of the executives knew that their legal
responsibility was to ensure that staff, donors, and board members not use organizational
resources for personal reasons while 97% of executives knew that compliance with state
and federal regulators was a legal responsibility.
Bylaws. Bylaws are related to the duty of obedience in terms of compliance.
Bylaws outline how the organization will conduct its business and once adopted, bylaws
are legally binding. Nearly all of the executives correctly identified that board service
positions, terms, and voting power (99%) and board nomination and election processes
(90%) were included in their organization’s bylaws. These results are not surprising,
given that boards utilize bylaws particularly for the nomination process. Executives are
usually asked to serve on the nominating committee to provide technical guidance to
committee members. And, conversely executives may want to serve on the nominating
committee to get a sense of who may be a potential board member, in other words, who
their next boss might be.
Only 68% of the executives correctly identified that executive staff roles and
responsibilities were included in the bylaws. This is surprising given that the bylaws
outline overall authority of the executive related to signing contracts, finances, and bank
access. For executives, it would be imperative to know how much formal authority they
have and how their relationship with the board is legally defined.
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Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention and being engaged by
making informed decisions. What is surprising with the results is the lack of actual
knowledge that executives have about the legal responsibilities related to the duty of care.
Only 53% of the executives correctly identified regular attendance of board meetings as a
legal responsibility and only 25% correctly identified reviewing board meeting materials
prior to the board meeting as a legal responsibility. These are relatively low percentage.
However, 85% of the executives correctly identified frequently reviewing the
organization’s finances and financial policies as a legal responsibility. Although this
number is greater than the other two, there is room for improvement.
It is not surprising to see that executives are more knowledgeable about their
financial responsibilities given that more executives correctly identified reviewing
financial materials as a legal responsibility. However, what is surprising is how little they
understand the legal basis for board engagement. It would seem that if executives
understood that regular attendance of board members in board meetings and reviewing
materials prior to the board meeting were actual legal responsibilities, they may see
increased board engagement. However, the gap is that the executives do not seem to
understand themselves that these are legal responsibilities.
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. While it seems that all
of the executives (100%) correctly identified disclosing potential conflicts of interest as a
legal responsibility, only 64% correctly identified the need to use independent judgment
when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal responsibility. The
conflict of interest results are not surprising, because conflict of interest is a widely
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discussed topic in the nonprofit sector and there are many practical tools available to
address. However, what is surprising is the low percentage of executives who do not
know that independent judgment is a legal responsibility. This may be explained by the
executives’ assumption that focusing more on conflict of interest deters board members
putting their personal interest above the organization. Or, it may be explained by the
nature of board service. Given that board members are volunteers, executives may have
an assumption that board members have altruistic intentions for service. In either case, it
is important for the executive to know that conflict of interest is a means to ensure that
the duty of loyalty is fulfilled, however, board intentions, which are followed by actions,
are also subject to legal standards.
Board
In terms of understanding their organization’s mission and having enough
knowledge to carry out their responsibilities and overall familiarity with the duties of care
(M = 3.7), loyalty (M = 3.8), and obedience (M = 3.6), for the most part, board members
were familiar. In terms of actual knowledge, overall 41% of the board members surveyed
received a passing score for their actual knowledge of their legal responsibilities. The
duty of obedience received the highest score (90%), followed by the duty of care (59%),
then the duty of loyalty (25%). To explore the gap between the familiarity with the
fiduciary duties and actual knowledge, what follows are specific aspects of each of the
duty of care, loyalty, and obedience constructs that are worth exploring.
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring
that the mission is fulfilled. Although the duty of obedience was the least familiar duty
amongst board members, in terms of legal responsibilities, it was the most correct. Ninety
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percent of the board members knew that their legal responsibility was to ensure that staff,
donors, and board members not use organizational resources for personal reasons while
96% of board members knew that compliance with state and federal regulators was a
legal responsibility. A possible explanation for this is that board members know that they
have to file tax returns, pay payroll taxes, and submit annual reports, but they may not
understand these as actual legal responsibilities. Furthermore, they may not refer to these
activities as related to the duty of obedience.
Bylaws. Bylaws are related to the duty of obedience in terms of compliance.
Bylaws outline how the organization will conduct its business and once adopted, bylaws
are legally binding. Nearly all of the board members correctly identified that board
service positions, terms, and voting power (99%) and board nomination and election
processes (97%) were included in their organization’s bylaws. These results are not
surprising, given that boards utilize nominating committees for board succession. The
majority of nominating committees are made up of board members and it is common
practice to refer to the bylaws to ensure that they are following the appropriate steps in
nominating new board members.
Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention to the work and being
engaged by making informed decisions. What is surprising with these results is the lack
of actual knowledge that board members have about the legal responsibilities related to
the duty of care. Only 50% correctly identified regular attendance of board meetings as a
legal responsibility and only 34% correctly identified reviewing board meeting materials
prior to the board meeting as a legal responsibility. These are relatively low percentages.
However, 80% correctly identified frequently reviewing the organization’s finances and
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financial policies as a legal responsibility. Although this number is greater than the other
two, there is room for improvement.
It is not surprising to see that board members are more knowledgeable about their
legal financial responsibilities given that financial reports are a primary agenda item at
board meetings. However, what is surprising is how little they understand that attending
board meetings is a legal responsibility, but that it is necessary in order to engage in the
decision making process, another legal responsibility. When decisions cannot be made,
because of a lack of quorum, the organization suffers. When the work of the organization
suffers, board members can be found liable for a breach of their fiduciary duty of care
and obedience.
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. While it seems that
most of the board members (95%) correctly identified disclosing potential conflicts of
interest as a legal responsibility, only 65% correctly identified the need to use
independent judgment when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal
responsibility. The conflict of interest results are not surprising, because conflict of
interest is a widely discussed topic in the nonprofit sector and there are many practical
tools available to address. However, what is surprising is the low percentage of board
members who do not know that independent judgment is a legal responsibility. This
might be explained by the assumption that board members have the best interests of the
organization as a priority, but may lack the awareness that this is based in their legal
responsibilities. Or, it may be explained by the executive’s role of informing the board
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and making recommendations about organizational direction resulting in reliance on, and
deference to, the executive.
By Board Service
Overall, nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards had a high
degree of familiarity with the duty of care (M = 3.8), loyalty (M = 3.8), and obedience (M
= 3.7). Similarly, nonprofit leaders who have served on five or more boards also had a
high degree of familiarity of the duty of care (M = 4.0), loyalty (M = 4.0), and obedience
(M = 3.9), partially supporting the hypothesis that familiarity with fiduciary duties
increases as board service increases based on the differences between the means of the
familiarity of the duty of obedience between nonprofit leaders who serve on more boards
as statistically significant.
However, for nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards, 25%
received a passing score for their actual knowledge of the duty of care, 67% for duty of
loyalty, and 94% for the duty of obedience. For those who have served on five or more
boards, 23% received a passing score for the duty of care, 52% for the duty of loyalty,
and 87% for the duty of obedience. To explore the gap between the familiarity with the
fiduciary duties and actual knowledge, what follows are specific aspects of each of the
duty of care, loyalty, and obedience constructs that are worth exploring.
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring
that the mission is fulfilled. The results show that as board service increases, actual
knowledge decreases. This is supported by the results of nonprofit leader actual
knowledge of legal responsibilities when analyzed by board service. For nonprofit leaders
who have served on one to four boards, 94% correctly identified that not using
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organizational resources for personal benefit was a legal responsibility compared to those
who have served on five or more boards (87%). Yet when ensuring compliance with state
and federal regulations, the percentages of nonprofit leaders who correctly identified
ensuring compliance with state and federal regulations was legal responsibility was the
same, regardless of board service (97%). This is a curious result because it is assumed
that an increase in board service, translates into an increase of knowledge. However, what
may be happening is that nonprofit leaders may be concurrently serving on multiple
boards, thus diluting their ability to absorb new knowledge. A 2016 study of 2,300 U.S.
nonprofit board members revealed that for those who sit on more than one board, on
average, they serve on four additional boards (Russell Reynolds Associates, 2016).
Bylaws. Bylaws are related to the duty of obedience in terms of compliance.
Bylaws outline how the organization will conduct its business and once adopted, bylaws
are legally binding. There were slight increases in actual knowledge as board service
increased. Nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards correctly identified
that board service positions, terms, and voting power (98%); board nomination and
election processes (91%); and executive staff roles and responsibilities (74%) were
included in their organization’s bylaws. Compared to the nonprofit leaders who have
served on five or more boards 100% correctly identified that board service positions,
terms, and voting power; 100% correctly identified board nomination and election
processes; and 80% correctly identified that executive staff roles and responsibilities
were included in their organization’s bylaws. These results are not surprising based on
the possible explanations described previously.
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Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention to the work and being
engaged by making informed decisions. What is surprising with these results is the
decrease in actual knowledge as board service increases. For nonprofit leaders who have
served on one to four boards, 53% correctly identified regular attendance of board
meetings as a legal responsibility compared to 42% of those who have served on five or
more boards. Thirty three percent of nonprofit leaders who served on one to four boards
correctly identified reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting as a
legal responsibility compared to 23% of those who have served on five or more boards. It
is difficult to explain these results, because it is expected that more board service would
translate into greater understanding of legal responsibilities. However, if nonprofit
leaders are not given the opportunity to fully understand their responsibilities they bring
their lack of knowledge with them to other boards they serve on.
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. Again, when analyzed
by board service, we see a decrease in knowledge as board service increases. For
nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards 99% correctly identified
disclosing potential conflicts of interest as a legal responsibility compared to 87% of
those who have served on five or more boards. And, 68% of the nonprofit leaders who
have served on one to four boards correctly identified the need to use independent
judgment when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal responsibility
compared to 55% of those who have served on five or more boards.
The conflict of interest results are surprising, because on the one hand, conflict of
interest is a widely discussed topic in the nonprofit sector and there are many practical
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tools available to address. And, on the other we would expect this percentage to be
similar for those who have more board service, not decrease. Again, the decrease in
knowing that independent judgment is a legal responsibility as board service increases is
perplexing. More research is needed to better explore this area.
Implications
This study highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary responsibility
knowledge and competence amongst nonprofit leaders. Overall, nonprofit leaders can use
the results of this study to identify areas where greater awareness and knowledge is
needed to support governance. Specifically the duty of care is an area that both
executives and board members need to understand better. Showing up to meetings is the
first step in fulfilling the legal responsibilities as a board member and executive.
However, based on the results, many board members and executives do not understand
that this is a legal responsibility and as such, most likely do not make attendance a
priority. As board members attend meetings, they become more engaged in their
oversight role and better informed about the organization’s needs. Greater engagement
strengthens their governance function and by default will meet legal accountability in
fulfillment of the organization’s mission.
The results of this study can also impact legislators and regulators. Given that
legislators outline the expectations of nonprofit governance, they can use the results to
understand gaps in what is expected and what is enforced. Because the fiduciary duties of
care, loyalty, and obedience are expectations for all nonprofit leaders, regardless of
organizational size, purpose, or location, they can be used as a basis to develop a
standardized process that assesses a nonprofit leader’s readiness for service. In turn, the
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assessment can be used during the orientation process to ensure that their board is made
up of leaders that know their legal responsibilities. Furthermore, an assessment would
help organizations use their resources to address specific gaps to deter mismanagement
and wrong doing, whether negligent or willful.
Finally, the results of this study can impact those who consult with and provide
professional services to nonprofits such as lawyers. Consultants are often hired to help
with technical and systemic issues that nonprofits face. For governance issues,
consultants can use the results of this study to support their recommendations as based on
legal responsibilities for legitimacy. Furthermore, lawyers who may provide legal counsel
can use the results of this study to address the basic legal responsibilities in a manner that
nonprofit leaders can understand.
Future Research
This chapter reveals a gap between self reported and actual knowledge amongst
nonprofit leaders both by role and board service. While this study is exploratory, in that it
pilots an assessment tool and seeks to establish baseline data for future research, it
highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary responsibility knowledge and
competence. Additional empirical use of the assessment tool developed for this study will
add not only to the nonprofit literature but also to the nonprofit law literature.
Additionally, future qualitative research may help to uncover the underlying reasons why
the level of knowledge varies amongst board members and executives and by board
service.
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CHAPTER 4: SOURCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY KNOWLEDGE
Nonprofit regulations hold nonprofit leaders responsible for the oversight of tax
exempt organization resources. However, apart from these guidelines, there are no
standardized systems to determine if leaders have the appropriate knowledge nor to
assess whether the source of their knowledge is credible. Therefore, it is not surprising
that many board members and executives lack the appropriate knowledge about their
fiduciary responsibilities (see chapter three). The broader purpose of this study is to
establish baseline data about nonprofit leader knowledge of their fiduciary
responsibilities, sources of knowledge, and application of knowledge in the performance
of their fiduciary responsibilities. The purpose of this chapter is to inductively establish
what internal and external sources (or best practices) nonprofit leaders (board members
and executives) access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. The results provide
key insights into how to address the knowledge gap.
How Nonprofit Leaders Learn About Their Fiduciary Duties
Nonprofits utilize many of the widely-accepted industry standard best practices to
learn about their fiduciary responsibilities including accounting, marketing, program
delivery, and fundraising resources and tools. For example, accounting best practices
support financial management while fundraising best practices provide guidance about
how to build a donor base. Yet, with the numerous standards available, what this study
reveals is that nonprofit leaders prefer to access informal, socialized learning
opportunities more than other formalized sources.
With regards to internal sources that are provided by their own nonprofit
organizations, the sources nonprofit leaders utilize most, in order to learn about their
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fiduciary responsibilities, are informal conversations with board members and staff rather
than formal board trainings, educational opportunities, or a board manual. The high
reliance on informal sources of learning is the same when analyzed by role and board
service. With regards to external sources nonprofit leaders access to learn about their
fiduciary responsibilities, the findings show some differences between board members
and executives in the type of external resources that are utilized. When analyzed by role,
board members tend to utilize webinars, websites, print media and academic and
certification programs more than executives. However, when analyzed by board service,
there is a slight increase in reliance on websites for nonprofit leaders who have served on
six or more boards in the past 15 years. These results contribute to the development of
nonprofit leader trainings that suggest a more interactive, personable approach may be
what is needed in order to ensure that nonprofit leaders have the necessary knowledge to
fulfill their fiduciary duties.
In chapter three, results were presented about nonprofit leader knowledge of their
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience as a means to meet legal accountability
for what. What the results revealed is that nonprofit leaders think they know more than
they actually do. After comparing how familiar board members reported they were with
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, only 41% of the respondents received
a passing grade of “C” or better compared to executives at 70%. This chapter builds on
chapter three by focusing on the source of knowledge as a means to satisfy legal
accountability how as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

125

Chapter 3 For What:
Knowledge

Chapter 4 For How:
Source of
Knowledge

Chapter 5 For Whom:
Application of
Knowledge

Legal
Accountability

Figure 4.1. Framework for Legal Accountability.
Additionally, this chapter focuses on the second level of Miller’s model of knowledge
assessment (1990), the “knows how” level, and the second construct of this study—the
types of sources nonprofit leaders access in order to learn about their responsibilities, as
illustrated in Figure 4.2.

4th Level: Does
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance
3rd Level: Shows How
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance
2nd Level: Knows How
Chapter 4: Sources of Knowledge
Accountability for how? = Best Practices
1st Level: Knows
Chapter 3: Familiarity (self-report) and Actual Knowledge
Accountability for what? = Knowledge

Figure 4.2. Constructs and Legal Accountability.
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Following is a discussion about the external dynamics, pressures, and demands
that nonprofit leaders face by applying theoretical framework of institutionalism and
isomorphism with some focus on effectiveness and performance. Next, is the idea of best
practices as widely accepted sources that nonprofit leaders access to learn about their
fiduciary responsibilities. After discussing best practices, the results of the types of
sources, both internal and external to the organization that nonprofit leaders use to learn
about their fiduciary roles are presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion
about the results and future research.
External Dynamics, Demands, and Pressures
Theories of the nonprofit sector identify external dynamics that compel nonprofit
leaders to demonstrate legal accountability that include funders, governments, and the
public.
Institutionalism
Looking at nonprofit governance through an institutionalist lens provides insight
into how nonprofit leaders behave. For clarification, the theory allows for a broad
definition of institutions that includes any entity that has been formally created, either
socially constructed or legally formed, that has a certain degree of legitimacy. For the
purposes of this study, I am focusing on nonprofit organizations as an institution and
more specifically, nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) within nonprofit
organizations.
Institutionalism emerged as an alternative to rational theories that focused on
technical aspects of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). By the mid-20th century, it
became a popular framework for political scientists and sociologists as a means to
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understand the changing environments that organizations were faced with by focusing on
how organizations respond to their environments for legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Scott, 2008). A variation of institutionalism, neoinstitutionalism, gained traction as
more attention was given to decision-making, practices, and structures that institutions
adopted for legitimacy (Scott, 2008). Today, many contemporary scholars apply
neoinstitutionalism and according to Jepperson, neoinstutionalism is “one of the most
empirically developed forms of institutional analysis” (as cited in Berger & Zelditch,
2002, p. 229).
Institutionalism posits that institutions are diverse social structures that operate
within, and are influenced by, three connected, yet separate, “pillars”, regulative,
normative, and cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2008). The regulative pillar relates to legal
standards and restrictions that institutions must pay attention to. The normative pillar
underscores the role of values and norms that society expects institutions to operate
within. Finally, the cultural-cognitive pillar focuses on the socially constructed meaning
that institutions provide. Together, these pillars provide a framework that helps us
understand how institutions contribute to a sense of meaning and purpose to society and
in return institutions gain legitimacy.
For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the regulative pillar to align with
legal accountability as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) offered that “the existence of a
common legal environment affects many aspects of an organization’s behavior and
structure” (p. 150). Externally, tax exempt organizations are regulated by federal and
state governments and are bound by requirements, that if not adhered to, could result in
fines, penalties, and potentially tax revocation.
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Institutional Isomorphism
An example of a neoinstitutionalist approach comes from organizational and
management scholars Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983). The pair identified the
paradox of growth differentiation and moved away from institutionalism’s focus on
heterogeneity and added an isomorphic lens of similarity. They concluded that rather than
trying to understand what makes organizations different, it is better to look at what makes
them the same and what environmental factors contribute to their increased similarities
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This aspect of institutionalism was coined institutional
isomorphism, which has become a widely accepted framework with which to study
nonprofits (Ashworth, et al., 2007; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Verbruggen, et al.,
2011).
Institutional isomorphism draws on classical institutionalism in that it focuses on
how organizations respond to their environments in order to gain legitimacy. Coupled
with the isomorphic element that identifies how organizational processes or structures
increasingly converge, isomorphism explains that as organizations respond to external
pressures, rules, norms, and sanctions they become more similar over time (Bromley &
Meyer, 2017; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Van Puyvelde, 2016). Therefore, nonprofit
organizations behave in a manner that aligns with isomorphism when they adopt
procedures, structures, and policies that are used by their colleagues, which provides a
certain degree of legitimacy (Miller-Millesen, 2003).
Within isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discussed three specific
distinct, yet interrelated, mechanisms that work together: coercive, mimetic, and
normative. Similar to the regulatory pillar in institutionalism mentioned earlier, coercive
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isomorphism focuses on consequences and sanctions resulting from unmet expectations,
real or perceived (Miller-Millesen, 2003). These expectations are particularly important
when looking at how nonprofits address funding and legal pressures. Examples of
nonprofits behaving in a coercive isomorphism manner are found when organizations
give their large donors preferential treatment (e.g. VIP seating at events, exclusive
recognition, a seat on the board, etc.) for fear of losing funding. Other examples of
coercive isomorphism include organizations giving the public access to audited
statements and tax returns on their websites to promote transparency. Another example of
coercive isomorphism can be found in Miller-Millesen’s (2003) example of local
chapters or affiliates who are expected to behave according to their national charters and,
if not adhered to, may result in the local chapter dissolving or bifurcating from the
national entity thus losing legitimacy.
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when there is a level of uncertainty that an
organization might not know how to face (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This type of
uncertainty could be related to market fluctuations, changing client needs, or the loss of
resources (financial, physical, human, or intellectual). When uncertainty occurs,
organizations look to other organizations that they perceive are more successful and
adopt similar processes, policies, and structures as their own (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Miller-Millesen, 2003). Although this may seem like a perfectly good approach, the
problem is that often organizations are reactive in the face of uncertainty and adopt
practices and policies without regard as to how relevant or useful they might be for their
own particular organization. This is an example of decoupling; when the adaptations
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contradict internal efficiency needs to gain legitimacy, which will be discussed in more
detail later in the results section (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017).
I have seen decoupling in action as a nonprofit consultant, particularly in my work
with boards. One particular example comes to mind when I was working with an animal
rescue organization who was applying for tax exempt status. When we discussed how
their programs would operate, they insisted on implementing an identical program that
another animal rescue organization was offering, because they thought that it would
generate the same type of funding. What they failed to consider was how different their
organization was and how to develop a program that suited their situation. Even after I
encouraged them to take the time necessary to ensure a successful program, they chose to
move forward with their original plan. This is similar to Zucker’s conclusion that “actions
are taken in a specific way just because they have become an accepted way of
accomplishing them” (as cited in Miller-Millesen, 2003, p. 536), which resonates with
mimetic isomorphism behavior.
Normative isomorphism typically occurs when there is the need for
professionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Miller-Millesen, 2003). An example of
normative isomorphism pressures can be found in the growth of the nonprofit academic
programs over the past few decades (Carpenter, 2011; Mirabella, 2007). The need for
professionalization, fueled by donor demands for transparency and accountability in the
face of scandals and misappropriations, and the overall increased demands for programs
and services, has warranted the need for skilled leaders and staff.
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The Role of Best Practices
In building on the previous discussion of the external dynamics, demands, and
pressures that impact legitimacy, I offer that isomorphism helps to explain how best
practices support nonprofit leader accountability by understanding their fiduciary roles
and responsibilities. Holland (2002) sums up the tension of accountability by suggesting
that the literature’s definitions of accountability overlap and the issue is not just about
how to define it, but also how to uphold or meet. Because of the lack of a standardized
system that assesses organizational effectiveness, accountability, or performance not
much is known about the inner-workings of nonprofit governance. As such, Ebrahim
(2010) offers that in a mechanism nonprofits use to meet the accountability demands is
self-regulation—or best practices since best practices tend to be practitioner or industrybased in that they are developed to meet the immediate, practical needs of an
organization.
Examples of best practices can be found in for profit and nonprofit literature as a
means to support performance, accountability, and effectiveness (Ebrahim, 2010; O’dell
& Grayson, 1998). Herman and Renz (2000) offered that the “prescriptive literature
suggests that boards using a greater number of recommended board practices will be
more effective” (p. 156). However, Ebrahim (in Renz, 2010) offered that although there
has been an increase in industry-wide standards developed over the past few decades,
there is limited empirical evidence that they actually work.
The term best practice is commonplace in the nonprofit sector. As a means to help
leaders and organizations meet the expectations of the wide variety of stakeholders from
governments, funders, and the public, best practices are in ample supply. Nationally
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recognized organizations including BoardSource, GuideStar, and Foundation Center
along with state attorney generals, the IRS, and national nonprofit associations have all
developed best practices for a myriad of organizational uses. Examples of best practices
can be seen in all aspects of nonprofit management. Financial best practices can be seen
in the use of policies and procedures that support efficient accounting such as balance
sheets, cash flow statements, and profit and loss statements. Commonly used fundraising
best practices are gift acceptance policies and capital campaigns. Other operational areas
such as marketing, technology, program service delivery, and human resource
management also have a variety of best practices that organizations utilize. Herman and
Renz (2008) referred to Keehley, Medlin, Longmire, and McBride’s seven criteria to
determine if an approach or process is a best practice. The criteria includes, “be
successful over time, show quantifiable gains, be innovative, be recognized for positive
results, be replicable, have relevance to the adopting organization and not be linked to
unique organizational characteristics” (p. 405), however, Herman and Renz (2008) note
that they had not found any best practices that remotely meets this criteria.
Holland’s (2002) observation of how best practices are created resonates with
Herman and Renz (2000; 2008) who discussed the nuances related to studying nonprofit
organizations. Because of the myriad of theoretical frameworks applied to nonprofits,
Herman and Renz (2000; 2008) offered that the most useful way to look at nonprofits is
through a social constructionist lens, which is used in institutionalism and isomorphism.
Using this perspective, social constructivism may explain how best practices are the
means by which organizations satisfy legal accountability how. The social constructivist
perspective offers that discovery is less about finding what works and more about
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inventing something that works (Herman & Renz, 2000). Therefore, best practices are
socially constructed tools and guidelines developed by nonprofit practitioners, academics,
and regulators as a means to support legal accountability and gain legitimacy.
However, a social constructivist lens of best practices poses a dilemma. On the
one hand, Miller (2002) concludes that, despite the differences amongst nonprofit boards,
there is a widely accepted set of best practices that when used, “converge on a set of
board roles and responsibilities characteristic of good governance” (p. 430). On the other
side, because of a wide range of best practices available, for example in governance,
Holland (2002) offered that the lack of standardized measures makes it difficult to
determine if a board is effective (i.e. legitimate) in their oversight role because the impact
is hard to measure. To address this dilemma and in support of the neoinstitutionalist
perspective, Bromley and Meyer (2017) suggested that what allows common practices to
become standardized is that they are based in the society’s norms—or “codes of conduct”
(p. 946). These codes are ingrained in the cultural model that focuses more on the public
good rather than in production efficiencies or formalized expectations by external actors
(Bromley & Meyer, 2017). As such, best practices have become socially constructed
proxies in lieu of standardized assessments in the nonprofit sector.
Accessing Knowledge to Meet Demands and Pressures
Coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphic pressures were not measured in this
study. Rather, institutionalism and isomorphism is used as a framework where coercive,
mimetic, and normative pressures coalesce in explaining how nonprofit leaders accessing
sources of fiduciary knowledge is a means to gain legitimacy, particularly when meeting
legal accountability. What is being measured, however, are the types of sources that
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nonprofit leaders access when learning about their fiduciary responsibilities and how the
sources may be coercive, mimetic, normative, or a combination of all three.
Sources of Fiduciary Knowledge - Results
In looking at external demands for legitimacy and to satisfy legal accountability,
the use of best practices is useful. For nonprofit leaders, governance best practices focus
on all aspects of organizational oversight including fiduciary responsibilities. Nonprofit
leaders were asked which best practices they accessed in order to learn about their
responsibilities, specifically internal and external sources as presented in Table 4.1.
Typically, nonprofit leaders have access to a wide variety of opportunities both at
no cost and for a fee, in a variety of settings, for a variety of governance topics. The list
of options in was developed after a review of practitioner, academic, and industry
resources as well as from personal experience as a nonprofit executive and board member
(Brown, 2007; Herman & Renz, 2000; Independent Sector, 2017; Nonprofit Association
of Oregon, 2016; Schwab Foundation for Social Enterprise, 2012). For example, Brown
(2007) highlighted that one particular best practice, a board orientation, seemed to
prepare leaders to address change and meet governance pressures. Informal conversations
with colleagues as an internal best practice and externally with networks does not
necessarily align with any of the isomorphic pressures, however it is included because of
the basic premise that nonprofits are made up of people and people naturally engage with
one another.
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Table 4.1
Internal and External Best Practices Resources
Internal Best Practices External Best
Practices
Formally scheduled
Websites/Webinars
board member
orientation
Informal conversations Magazines, Journals,
with board members
Books
and staff
Educational
opportunities arranged
by the organization for
board members
Internal Best Practices
Board Manual

Friends and Family
(network)

External Best
Practices
Certification/Degree
programs

Internal Sources of Knowledge
The following presents the results of the types of internal sources nonprofit
leaders access in order to learn about their responsibilities. First, the results are presented
by role then by board service.
By role. When asked about what internal sources nonprofit leaders used to help
them learn about their roles and responsibilities, respondents were asked to check all that
applied from the four options listed (see Table 4.1). The results, presented in Table 4.2,
show that all of the resources were accessed, however, 79% of board members and 80%
of the executives relied more on informal conversations than any other internal resource.
Following informal conversations, board members (N = 104) accessed board manuals
(56%), educational opportunities (38%), and orientations (48%); while executives (N =
82) accessed board manuals (48%), orientations (42%), and educational opportunities
(48%).
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Data for Percentages of Types of Internal Sources Nonprofit Leader Access
by Role
Role
N
Orientation
Informal
Educational
Board
Conversations Opportunities Manual
Board Member
104
48%
79%
38%
56%
Executive
82
42%
80%
48%
48%
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive percentages were calculated by dividing the
number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for each role.
By board service. The results are similar when analyzed for board service as
shown in Table 4.3. Regardless of the number of boards served on in the past 15 years
informal conversations is the source of knowledge most accessed for each category of
board service (1-2 boards: N = 79, 86%; 3-4 boards; N = 48, 94%; 5-6 boards N = 16,
100%; and 6+ boards N = 14, 93%). However, there are some differences worth noting.
Nonprofit leaders who have served on six or more boards (N = 14) rely more on board
orientations (79%) and educational opportunities (64%) than those who have served on
fewer than six boards (N = 143). While those who have served on one to two boards (N =
79) in the past 15 years tended to access the board manual more (59%) than the board
orientation (44%). These results show that although informal conversations are relied on
the most regardless of the number of boards served on, those who have served on six or
more boards (N = 14) access more formal best practices (board orientation = 79%;
educational opportunities = 64%; and board manual = 57%) the most.
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Table 4.3
Descriptive Data for Percentages of Type of Internal Sources Nonprofit Leader Access by
Number of Boards Served
Number of
N
Orientation
Informal
Educational
Board
Boards
Conversations Opportunities
Manual
1-2
79
44%
86%
42%
59%
3-4
48
58%
94%
56%
63%
5-6
16
44%
100%
38%
50%
6+
14
79%
93%
64%
57%
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive. Percentages were calculated by dividing
the number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for number of
boards served.
External Sources of Knowledge
The following presents the results of the types of external sources nonprofit
leaders access in order to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. First, the results are
present by all roles and all boards served, then by role, and finally by board service (the
number of boards served in the past 15 years).
As mentioned previously, for the internal source questions respondents were
given the option to check that all apply. In hindsight, a multi-item scale for each internal
source should have been used instead. For the external sources, a three-point Likert
option (Never, Sometimes, and Always) was provided, which allowed Cronbach’s alpha
for reliability. The external source scale consisted of five items and was found to be
moderately reliable (α = .65) with each item in the same direction. Most items appeared
to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted, except for two
items: networks and academic/certificate programs. Deleting networks would increase the
alpha to α = .722 and deleting academic/certificate programs would decrease the alpha to
α = .622. Descriptive data for the Cronbach’s alpha analysis is presented in Table 4.4
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Table 4.4
Descriptive Data for External Sources for Fiduciary Duty Knowledge for All
Respondents
Std.
External Sources
N
Mean
Dev.
Min.
Max.
Websites
154
2.2
2
.946
1
Webinars
154
1.7
2
.800
1
Print
154
1.8
2
.852
1
Network
154
1.8
2
.852
1
Programs
154
1.6
2
.891
1

All roles and all board service. Table 4.5 presents the results by all roles and
Table 4.6 presents the results by board service. Figure 4.3 illustrates that although all of
the resources were accessed similarly, nonprofit leaders accessed websites the most
regardless of role (N = 154, M = 2.2, SD = .946) or number of boards served (N = 155, M
= 2.0, SD = .587) than other external resources. Websites are followed by print media,
such as magazines and journals (Role: N = 154, M = 1.8, SD = .852; Boards Served: N =
114, M = 1.8); then networks (i.e. friends and family; Role: N = 154, M = 1.8; Boards
Served: N = 150, M = 1.7); then webinars (Role: N = 154, M = 1.7; Boards Served: N =
153, M= 1.7); and finally programs (e.g. certification and degree; Role: N = 154, M = 1.6;
Boards Served N = 152: M = 1.5). However, webinars are the same for role and board
service.
Table 4.5
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Sources to Learn about Fiduciary
Responsibilities by All Roles
External
Source
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Websites
154
2.2
2
.946
1
3
Webinars
154
1.7
2
.800
1
3
Print
154
1.8
2
.852
1
3
Network
154
1.8
2
.852
1
3
Programs
154
1.6
2
.891
1
3

139
Table 4.6
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Types of Sources to Learn about
Fiduciary Responsibilities by Board Service
External
Source
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Websites
155
2.0
2
.587
1
3
Webinars
153
1.7
2
.616
1
3
Print
114
1.8
2
.626
1
3
Network
150
1.7
2
.636
1
3
Programs
152
1.5
1
.664
1
3
2.5

2.2
2.0

2.0

1.8

1.8

1.8

1.7

1.7 1.7

1.6 1.5

1.5
Role
Boards Served

1.0

0.5

0.0
Websites

Print

Network

Webinars

Programs

Figure 4.3. Means for Frequency of Access of External Sources Types of Sources to
Learn about Fiduciary Responsibilities by All Role and All Boards Served.
By role. When analyzed by role, Table 4.7 presents and Figure 4.4 illustrates the
results that board members accessed websites the most (N = 90, M = 1.9, SD = .589)
followed by their networks (i.e. friends and family; N = 89, M = 1.8, SD = .691); then
print media, such as magazines and journals, (N = 89, M = 1.6, SD = .562); then webinars
(N = 89, M = 1.5, SD = .586). Academic and certificate programs are the least accessed
by board members (N = 89, M = 1.4, SD = .615). For executives, they too accessed
websites the most (N = 72, M = 2.2, SD = .537). However, the second most accessed
external source for executives was print media (N = 72, M = 2.0, SD = .617) followed by
webinars (N = 69, M = 1.9, SD = .601), then academic and certificate degree programs (N
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= 69, M = 1.7, SD = .696), and finally networks (N = 68, M = 1.6, SD = .547) accessed
the least.
Table 4.7
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Sources to Learn about Fiduciary
Responsibilities by Roles
External
Source
Role
N
Mean
Median Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Websites
Board
90
1.9
2
.589
1
3
Executive
72
2.2
2
.537
1
3
Webinars
Board
89
1.5
2
.586
1
3
Executive
69
1.9
1
.601
1
3
Print
Board
89
1.6
2
.562
1
3
Executive
72
2.0
2
.617
1
3
Network
Board
89
1.8
2
.691
1
3
Executive
68
1.6
2
.547
1
3
Programs
Board
89
1.4
2
.615
1
3
Executive
69
1.7
1
.696
1
3
2.5
2.2
2.0

1.9

2.0

1.9
1.5

1.8
1.6

1.7

1.6
1.4

1.5

Board Members (n=89)
1.0

Executives (n=65)

0.5
0.0
Websites

Webinars

Print Media

Network

Cert/Deg.
Programs

Figure 4.4. Means for Frequency of Access of External Sources Types of Sources to
Learn about Fiduciary Responsibilities by All Role.
By board service. Table 4.8 presents and Figure 4.5 illustrates the results when
analyzed by the number of boards served, those who have served on six or more boards
access websites the most (N = 14, M = 2.2, SD = .579) compared to those who have
served on one to two boards (N = 77, M = 1.9, SD = .579)—a mean difference of .3. Print
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media, such as journals and magazines, are accessed the same by those who have served
on three or more boards (3-4 Boards: N = 8, M = 1.9, SD = .652; 5-6 Boards: N = 16. M =
1.9, SD = .500; and 6+ Boards: N = 14, M = 1.9, SD = .663) with slightly less than those
who have only served on one to two boards (N = 76, M = 1.7, SD = .620). Webinars seem
to be accessed the most as board service increases (1-2 Boards: N = 75, M = 1.6, SD =
.620; 3-4 Boards: N = 48, M = 1.7, SD = .651; 5-6 Boards: N = 16, M = 1.8, SD = .577;
and 6+ Boards: N = 14, M = 1.9, SD = .535) for a mean difference of .4 between 1-2
boards and 6 or more boards.
Table 4.8
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Types of Sources to Learn about
Fiduciary Responsibilities by Number of Boards
External
Number
Source
of
Boards
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Websites
1-2
77
1.9
2
.579
1
3
3-4
48
2.1
2
.606
1
3
5-6
16
2.1
2
.574
1
3
6+
14
2.2
2
.579
1
3
Webinars

1-2
3-4
5-6
6+

75
48
16
14

1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9

1
2
2
2

.620
.651
.577
.535

1
1
1
1

3
3
3
3

Print

1-2
3-4
5-6
6+
1-2
3-4
5-6
6+
1-2
3-4
5-6
6+

76
8
16
14
74
47
15
14
75
48
16
13

1.7
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.7
1.6
1.7

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2

.620
.652
.500
.663
.677
.623
.561
.646
.605
.724
.629
.630

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Network

Programs
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2.5
2.0

1.9

2.1 2.1

2.2
1.7 1.8

1.9 1.9 1.9

1.9

1.6

1.7

1.7 1.7

1.8

1.7

1.6

1.6

1.7

1.4

1.5

1-2
3-4

1.0

5-6
6+

0.5
0.0
Websites

Webinars

Print Media

Network

Cert/Deg.
Programs

Figure 4.5. Means of Frequency of Access of External Types of Sources to Learn about
Fiduciary Responsibilities by Number of Boards.
External source and number of boards served and role. To analyze the
patterns of the type of external sources accessed by number of boards served, the
following are contingency tables for each of the five external sources (websites,
webinars, networks, print media, and degree/certificate programs). While controlling for
board service, the following includes my hypothesis for each external source and the
results.
Websites. Given the normative pressures to professionalize, nonprofit leaders who
have more board service experience would be encouraged to professionalize. This
pressure might expose them to a wider variety of training opportunities and therefore
know more about websites that focus on governance. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H1: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that board
member and executive consultation of external websites to learn about fiduciary
responsibilities, increases as board service increases.
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As presented in Table 4.9, when looking at how often board members and
executives access external websites, board members increase their access of external
websites the more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: N = 46, 61%; 3-4 boards: N = 28,
61%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 13, 62%). Executives also increase their use of external
websites, however, there is a slight dip once they serve on 3-4 boards (1-2 boards: N =
28, 50%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 43%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 15, 62%).
Based on these results, board members and executives consult external websites
to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as board service increases and,
therefore, supports the hypothesis.
Table 4.9
Percentage External Website Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency
1-2 Boards
3-4 Boards
5-6/6+Boards
Board
Board
Board
Executive
Executive
Executive
Member
Member
Member
Never
39%
50%
39%
37%
38%
38%
Sometimes/
61%
50%
61%
63%
62%
62%
Always
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
46
28
28
19
13
13
Note. Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to
reduce instability issues with data.
Webinars. Similar to websites, given the normative pressures to professionalize,
nonprofit leaders who have more board service experience would be encouraged to
professionalize. This pressure might expose them to a wider variety of training
opportunities and as such have a greater awareness of webinars available about
governance. This leads to the following hypothesis:
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H2: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that board
member and executive consultation of external webinars to learn about fiduciary
responsibilities, increases as board service increases.
As presented in Table 4.10, when looking at how often board members and
executives access external webinars, board members increase their access of external
websites the more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: N = 45, 38%; 3-4 boards: N = 29,
52%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 14, 57%). Executives also increase their use of external
resources the more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: N = 30, 67%; 3-4 boards: N = 19,
74%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 15, 87%).
Based on these results, board members and executives consult external webinars
to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as board service increases and,
therefore supports the hypothesis.
Table 4.10
Percentage External Webinar Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency
1-2 Boards
3-4 Boards
5-6/6+Boards
Board
Board
Board
Member Executive Member Executive Member Executive
Never
62%
33%
48%
26%
43%
13%
Sometimes/
Always
38%
67%
52%
74%
57%
87%
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
45
30
29
19
14
15
Note. Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to
reduce instability issues with data.
Print media. Given the normative pressures for professionalization, it is expected
that executives would access external print media more than board members. As
executives gain more knowledge and experience in their roles they become more familiar
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with the journals, magazines, and other print media relevant to their field and mission.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that
executives consult external print media to learn about fiduciary responsibilities at
a higher rate than board members at all levels of number of boards served on.
As presented in Table 4.11, when looking at the rate that executives access
external print media compared to board members, executives access external print media
at a higher rate (1-2 boards: N = 31, 83%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 84%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N
= 15, 80%) than board members. Board members access external print media at a lower
rate than executives (1-2 boards: N = 45, 40%; 3-4 boards: N = 29, 62%; and 5-6/6+
boards: N = 14, 78%).
Based on these results, executives consult external print media sources to learn
about their fiduciary responsibilities at a higher rate than board members and, therefore
supports the hypothesis.
Table 4.11
Percentage External Print Media Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency
1-2 Boards
3-4 Boards
5-6/6+Boards
Board
Board
Board
Member Executive Member Executive Member Executive
Never
60%
17%
38%
16%
21%
20%
Sometimes/
Always
40%
83%
62%
84%
79%
80%
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
45
31
29
19
14
15
Note. Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to
reduce instability issues with data.
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Networks. While there are no isomorphic pressures to base the hypothesis on, it is
my personal experience newer board members consult their friends and family in order to
learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. Therefore, the hypothesis is:
H4: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that board
members who have served on 1-2 boards consult their external networks at a
higher rate than board members who have served on three or more boards in order
to learn about fiduciary responsibilities.
As presented in Table 4.12, when looking at the rate that board members who
have served on 1-2 boards access external networks compared to board members who
have served on three or more boards, they consult their networks about the same (1-2
boards: N = 46, 61%; 3-4 boards: N = 28, 61%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 14, 64%).
Based on these results, board members who have served on 1-2 boards consult
their external networks to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities at the same rate as
those who have served on 3-4 boards, but less than those who have served on 5-6/6+
boards, and therefore does not support the hypothesis.
Table 4.12
Percentage External Networks Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency
1-2 Boards
3-4 Boards
5-6/6+Boards
Board
Board
Board
Member
Executive Member Executive Member Executive
Never
39%
50%
39%
37%
36%
36%
Sometimes/
Always
61%
50%
61%
63%
64%
64%
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
46
28
28
19
14
14
Note. Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to
reduce instability issues with data.
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Certificate and degree programs. Similar to websites and webinars, given the
normative pressures to professionalize, nonprofit leaders who have more board service
experience would be encouraged to professionalize. This pressure might expose them to a
wider variety of training opportunities and may lead them to access long-term trainings
such as certificate and degree programs. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H5: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that
executive consultation of external certificate and degree programs to learn about
fiduciary responsibilities, increases as their board service increases.
As presented in Table 4.13, when looking at how often executives access external
certificate and degree programs, the rate increases the number of boards they serve on (12 boards: N = 30, 40%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 63%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 14, 71%).
Based on these results, executives consultation of external certificate and degree
programs to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as their board service
increases and, therefore, supports the hypothesis.
Table 4.13
Percentage External Certificate and Degree Programs Source by Number of Boards
Served and Frequency
1-2 Boards
3-4 Boards
5-6/6+Boards
Board
Board
Board
Member Executive Member Executive Member Executive
Never
78%
60%
55%
37%
57%
29%
Sometimes/
Always
22%
40%
45%
63%
43%
71%
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
N
45
30
29
19
14
14
Note. Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to
reduce instability issues with data.
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Sources and Actual Knowledge
Using the results from chapter three, nonprofit leaders whose actual knowledge of
fiduciary duties that received a passing grade was analyzed with the frequency they
accessed internal sources. The following are the results.
Internal sources. When analyzed by role, Table 4.14 presents and Figure 4.6
illustrates the results for internal sources that nonprofit leaders whose actual fiduciary
knowledge score was a “C” or better accessed to learn about their fiduciary
responsibilities. Board members (N = 73), accessed board orientations (59%), followed
by board manuals (56%), then informal conversations (54%), and finally educational
opportunities (51%). For the executives, whose actual fiduciary knowledge was a “C” or
better (N = 61), they accessed educational opportunities (49%) the most followed by
informal conversations (46%), then board manuals (46%), and lastly orientations (41%).
Table 4.14
Descriptive Data for Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and the
Type of Internal Sources Access by Role
Role
N
Orientation
Informal
Educational
Board
Conversations Opportunities
Manual
Board
73
59%
54%
51%
56%
Member
Executive
61
41%
46%
49%
46%
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive. Percentages were calculated by dividing
the number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for each role.
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70%
60%

59%

56%

54%
46%

50%

51% 49%

46%

41%
40%
Board Member

30%

Executive
20%
10%
0%
Orientation

Informal
Conversations

Educational
Opportunities

Board Manual

Figure 4.6. Percentage of Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and the
Type of Internal Sources Access by Role. Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive.
Percentages were calculated by dividing the number of responses for each option by the
total number of responses for each role.
When analyzed by number of boards served, Table 4.15 presents and Figure 4.7
illustrates the results for internal sources that nonprofit leaders whose actual fiduciary
knowledge score was a “C” or better accessed to learn about their fiduciary
responsibilities. Informal conversations are the most accessed for all categories of board
service (1-2 boards: N = 79, 86%; 3-4 boards: N = 48, 94%; 5-6 boards: N = 16, 100%;
and more than six boards: N = 14, 93%). Educational opportunities are the least accessed
source for nearly all of the categories board service, except for those serving on more
than six boards (1-2 boards: N = 79, 42%; 3-4 boards: N = 48, 56%; 5-6 boards: N = 16,
38%; and more than six boards: N = 14, 64%).
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Table 4.15
Descriptive Data for Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and the
Type of Internal Sources Access by Board Service
Number of
N
Orientation
Informal
Educational
Board
Boards
Conversations Opportunities
Manual
1-2
79
44%
86%
42%
59%
3-4
48
58%
94%
56%
63%
5-6
16
44%
100%
38%
50%
6+
14
79%
93%
64%
57%
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive percentage were calculated by dividing the
number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for each category
of board service.
100%
94%
93%
86%

100%
79%

80%

64%
60%

58%

56%

44% 44%

42%

40%

63%
59%
57%
50%

38%

1-2 Boards (n=79)
3-4 Boards (n=48)
5-6 Boards (n=16)
6+ Boards (n=14)

20%

0%
Orientation

Informal

Educational

Manual

Figure 4.7. Percentages for Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and
the Type of Internal Sources Access by Board Service. Note. Categories were not
mutually exclusive. Percentages were calculated by dividing the number of responses for
each option by the total number of responses for each category of board service.
Discussion
This chapter presented the results of what types of internal and external sources
(best practices) nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) access to learn about
their fiduciary roles and responsibilities to demonstrate legal accountability. While this
study is exploratory in that it pilots an assessment tool and seeks to establish baseline
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data for future research, it highlights the need for a greater awareness of fiduciary
responsibility knowledge.
Internal Sources
Despite their role or the numbers of boards they have served on the past 15 years,
nonprofit leaders relied more on informal conversations to learn about their fiduciary
duties more than any other internal best practice. The results resonate with a small-scale
study by Castor and Jiter (2013). The authors interviewed twenty six board members with
a variety of board service backgrounds to better understand board member roles and
responsibilities via socialization. The majority of those interviewed shared that they
learned about their roles and responsibilities informally, through observation and
“osmosis”. One member went so far to say that they learned by “the seat of their pants”
highlighting the informal nature of board training (Castor & Jiter, 2013, p. 88).
Because of the social nature of nonprofits, in that most of the services and
programs provided involve interacting with people, it should not come as a surprise that a
“mirroring” effect could occur in the organization itself. As organizations interact with
their clients, providing programs, services, and education, the behavior of its leaders also
requires a certain level of personal engagement as well as transfer of knowledge and best
practices amongst themselves. More research is needed to further explore this idea,
however, recognizing the social nature of nonprofit leadership may help support trainings
that focus on mentoring such as “board buddies” and orientation workshops that are more
interactive and less procedural and formal in nature.
After informal conversations with colleagues, board members and executives
accessed board manuals similarly. After manuals, board members accessed educational
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opportunities then board orientations; while executives, particularly those who have
served on more than six boards in the past 15 years, accessed board orientations then
educational opportunities. However, executives who have served on one to two boards
accessed the board manual over the board orientation. One possible explanation for these
results could be that nonprofit leaders with more board tenure might prefer attending an
orientation to ask specific questions about an organization that might not be otherwise be
included in a board manual. Conversely, nonprofit leaders with less board tenure seem to
rely on the board manual more than orientation, which may be attributed to convenience,
reviewing a board manual can be done on their own time rather than attending a board
orientation. Or, it could be that nonprofit leaders who are new to board service believe
that the board manual is more important because it is a more detailed version of an
orientation.
The use of more formalized best practices is also the case for nonprofit leaders
who scored a “C” or better in terms of their actual fiduciary knowledge, regardless of
their role. The use of a board orientation was discussed when Brown (2007) found that
although the orientation process was moderately utilized (2.8 out of 5-point Likert scale)
after applying a structural equation model, he found a strong relationship between board
orientation and board performance. However, when analyzed by number of boards
served, nonprofit leaders who scored a “C” or better for their actual fiduciary knowledge
accessed informal sources the most. This is puzzling, because one might expect that those
with more accurate knowledge would use more formalized best practices. However, in
this study this does not seem to be the case.
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These results raise important questions about the quality of fiduciary knowledge.
The informal nature that nonprofit leaders access to acquire their knowledge may be
inferior to other more established best practices such as a board orientation, board
manual, or educational opportunities provided by the organization. This might indicate
that the behavior is decoupled from how the leaders meet external demands for
accountability and legitimacy. De-coupling is the proposition that organizations decouple
(separate) when they say one thing and do another (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). So,
although organizations can demonstrate to external stakeholders, such as regulators, that
they have best practices available, what this study found is that nonprofit leaders do not
access the more established best practices. From a legal accountability perspective, if
nonprofit leaders are relying on informal conversations with one another, how can the
accuracy of the information be verified?
External Sources
Regardless of the role or number of boards served, overall nonprofit leaders
accessed external websites the most to learn about their fiduciary duties. Following
websites are print media, networks, and certificate and degree programs. Without any
previous studies to build on, these differences may be attributed to the availability (e.g.
online access to webinar providers or print media subscriptions) or awareness of the
available sources. In looking at the isomorphic pressures that may compel nonprofit
leaders to access certain resources, what follows is a discussion about the hypothesis and
findings of analyzing external sources and controlling for board service.
Websites. My hypothesis, that board members and executives consult external
websites to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as board service increases
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was supported. Based on the normative pressures to professionalize, nonprofit leaders
who have a great deal of board service experience would be encouraged to
professionalize. As noted in the results, although executives overall increased their access
of external websites the more board service they gained, there was a slight dip once they
serve on three to four boards. One possible explanation for this is that after a few boards
under their belt, executives may feel that they have enough knowledge to fulfill their
responsibilities. Once they go beyond four boards, they may serve on an entirely new
organization and learn that they have more to learn. However, without more research, this
is just a theory.
Webinars. The hypothesis, it is expected that board member and executive
consultation of external webinars to learn about fiduciary responsibilities, increases as
board service increases was supported. Based on normative pressures to professionalize,
it was hypothesized that the more board service results in a greater awareness of the
webinar resources available that focused on governance training. Executives consistently
increased their access of webinars the more boards they serve on. For board members,
there is a noticeable increase in access of webinars after serving on at least two boards.
Board members who serve on three to four boards, they access webinars 14% more than
those who have served on less than three boards. More research is needed to understand
why this is.
Print media. The hypothesis, it is expected that executives consult external print
media to learn about fiduciary responsibilities at a higher rate than board members at all
levels of number of boards served on was supported. The mimetic pressures that cause
nonprofits to adopt similar practices that other nonprofits utilize can be seen in the types
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of resources nonprofit leaders utilize. As executives interact with their colleagues on a
regular basis, they become more familiar with the journals, magazines, and other print
media relevant to their field and mission.
What is interesting to note about these results is that although executives accessed
external print media at a higher rate than board members, executive access decreased the
more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: 83%; 3-4 boards: 84%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 80%),
whereas board members increased their access with increased board service (1-2 boards:
40%; 3-4 boards: 62%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 79%). These results may point to board
members experiencing the same normative pressures that executives do. And, the results
may suggest a saturation point that executives reach in terms of how much print media
might be available. However, further research is needed.
Networks. The hypothesis, it is expected that board members who have served on
1-2 board consult their external networks at a higher rate than board members who have
served on three or more boards was not supported. This hypothesis was harder to
categorize in any of the isomorphic pressures and was meant to be purely exploratory in
nature. The reasoning was that newer board members might be shy to ask their
organizations for more information and would feel more comfortable with their peers.
However, the results show the opposite: the more experience board members (1-2 boards:
61%; 3-4 boards: 61%; 5-6/6+ boards: 64%) and executives (1-2 boards: 50%; 3-4
boards: 63%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 64%) have, the more they consult their external
networks. These results may be explained by the informal, social nature that nonprofit
leaders learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. As presented earlier in this chapter,
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nonprofit leaders tend to rely more on conversations with their colleagues rather than
formal governance best practices. However, more research is needed to fully explore.
Certificate and degree programs. The hypothesis, it is expected that executive
consultation of external certificate and degree programs to learn about fiduciary
responsibilities, increases as their board service increases, was supported. The normative
pressures to professionalize was the basis for this hypothesis given that executives who
want more legitimacy would be most likely to pursue some sort of academic or certificate
program to demonstrate competency and skill.
What is interesting to note about these findings is that board members rate of
accessing external certificate and degree programs also increases as board service
increases (1-2 boards: 22%; 3-4 boards: 45%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 43%). The amount
nearly doubles from 1-2 boards (22%) to 5-6/6+ boards (43%). This could be because
nonprofit leaders who serve on more boards are exposed to the many faces of nonprofit
management and leadership, therefore, would be interested in learning more about how
best to govern and monitor the organizations they serve as a board member for. Again,
more research is needed to better understand why.
Implications
The results contribute to the need for a standardize process of accountability by
developing nonprofit leader trainings using established best practices. The study
highlights the need for more interactive, personable approaches to best practices to ensure
that nonprofit leaders have the necessary and appropriate knowledge to fulfill their
fiduciary duties. Along with the suggestions mentioned previously, opportunities abound
for regulators to work in partnership with nationally recognized nonprofit organizations
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such as BoardSource, National Council of Nonprofits, and state nonprofit associations
such as California Association of Nonprofits and the Minnesota Council of Nonprofits to
develop best practices that assist nonprofit leaders fulfill the fiduciary duties.
Other opportunities to increase fiduciary awareness and knowledge for nonprofit
leaders include funders. Funders have the ability to support trainings and workshops to
strengthen their grantees by providing incentives and additional grant money as part of
grant programs. An example of this is found in a partnership between the City of San
Diego and the Nonprofit Institute at the University of San Diego. Using community and
business development funds, the City of San Diego funds a two-day intensive Nonprofit
Academy, free of charge, to any tax exempt organization located in the City of San
Diego. The academy includes sessions related to the various aspects of leading and
managing a nonprofit organization including governance (City of San Diego, n.d.).
Finally, nonprofit leaders can use the results of this study to develop best practices
that board members and executives will access more frequently. Given the informal
nature of the types of best practices nonprofit leaders access more frequently, means to
learn about fiduciary responsibilities should have a personal element included. As
mentioned before, the idea of board buddies may support nonprofit fiduciary knowledge
development. However, it is important to ensure that the board buddy has the appropriate
knowledge to begin with.
Future Research
This study highlights the need for more research around the contextual nature of
best practices and how they support legal demands for accountability and pressures for
legitimacy. Additional usage of the assessment tool developed for this study can develop
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empirical evidence related to accountability, fiduciary knowledge, and individual
nonprofit leaders. Furthermore, continued use of the assessment would strengthen the
empirical research around institutionalism and nonprofit governance.
Qualitative research would be a logical next step to this study. Asking nonprofit
leaders more in depth questions about the types of best practices they use and why may
provide additional insight into the contextual nature of nonprofits and other best practices
that may be accessed that are yet to be discovered. And, finally, there is the opportunity
to perform additional quantitative analysis, such as regression and more correlation tests
with the data collected for this study. Looking at the data in multiple ways may reveal
new results.
The following chapter builds on these findings by presenting results about how
frequently nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge in their governance
activities.
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CHAPTER 5: APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY KNOWLEDGE
Nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of stakeholders. In terms of legal
accountability, nonprofit leaders are responsible to perform their governance oversight
duties in a manner that upholds federal and state expectations. As such, nonprofits are
legally held accountable to know what their legal responsibilities are (what). How they
fulfill accountability is by accessing appropriate sources, or best practices, to learn about
their fiduciary responsibilities (how). The third leg of the accountability stool is
demonstrated when nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance
of their governance activities to meet legal accountability demands (whom).
A national survey of nonprofit leaders reported that 71% of the executives and
74% of the board chairs agreed or strongly agreed that the majority of their board was
actively engaged in overseeing and governing the organization (BoardSource, 2017, p.
20). The results of this study found that board members and executives indicated that
they applied their fiduciary knowledge frequently in the performance of their duties
meaning that they are more engaged than the national statistics. Yet, the results of this
study highlight a gap between nonprofit leader performance of their duties and their
actual knowledge of what those duties entail. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that
according to Stanford (2017) 56% of the organizations surveyed rated board governance
as the most challenging area of strategic leadership.
In this study, when nonprofit leaders were asked about the frequency with which
they applied their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their duties, the results
indicate a high frequency in that they most of the time or always (for board members) or
somewhat agree and agree (for executives). However, when they were tested for their
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actual knowledge of the legal responsibilities, only 41% of the board members and 70%
of the executives received a passing score. These results point to two issues: 1) what
knowledge are nonprofit leaders using in the performance of their duties and; 2) if they
lack the appropriate knowledge, how might their decisions be impacted?
This chapter focuses on nonprofit leader application of fiduciary knowledge in the
performance of their governance activities as a means to meet the legal accountability for
whom, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Chapter 3:
For What?
Knowledge

Chapter 4:
For How?
Source of
Knowledge

Chapter 5:
For Whom?
Application of
Knowledge

Legal
Accountability

Figure 5.1. Framework for Legal Accountability.
In order for nonprofit leaders to meet demands for accountability by regulators,
they must demonstrate competence in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities.
Holland and Ritvo (2008) argued that competencies are a combination of “skills,
knowledge, information, and personal characteristics” (p. xvii) that must be practiced in
order to be considered useful. They go on to explain that competency is linked to
performance and when appropriate competencies are in place, effectiveness follows
(Holland & Ritvo, 2008). The idea of competency aligns with the last two levels of
Miller’s model of knowledge assessment (1990), the “shows how” and “action” levels,
which emphasizes the performance or action as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Miller (1990)
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establishes that knowledge alone is not an adequate measure of performance, but rather
suggests how knowledge is performed is a better indicator.

4th Level: Does
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance
3rd Level: Shows How
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge
Accountability for whom? = Performance
2nd Level: Knows How
Chapter 4: Sources of Knowledge
Accountability for how? = Best Practices
1st Level: Knows
Chapter 3: Familiarity (self-report) and Actual Knowledge
Accountability for what? = Knowledge

Figure 5.2. Constructs and Legal Accountability.
The premise of this chapter is that legal accountability is demonstrated when
nonprofit leaders fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities in the performance of their
governance duties. The chapter begins with a discussion about to whom nonprofit leaders
(board members and executives) are accountable to, specifically state and federal
regulators. After the discussion about accountability to whom, performance,
effectiveness, and efficiency are explained followed by ownership and role ambiguity.
Then, the results of how frequently nonprofit leaders apply their knowledge of their
fiduciary responsibilities in the performance of their governance activities is presented.
The chapter ends with a discussion about the results and future research.
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What is Accountability?
As prevalent as the idea is, accountability is a complex, multi-dimensional
concept that means different things to different people. Koppell (2005) offers that where
someone is situated impacts how accountability is defined and suggests that
accountability should be based on the expectations of the relationship itself.
Accountability used in a more popular view, focuses on the public’s expectations of
“organizational performance, responsiveness, and even morality” (Kearns, 1996, p. 9). To
further define to whom are nonprofits accountable, Kearns suggests that an element of
accountability involves answering to a “higher authority” (1996, p. 7), which results in
compliance in reaction to requirements or obligations (Ebrahim, 2010; Holland & Ritvo,
2008; Kearns, 1996).
Accountability can also be described as proactively responding to the needs of its
constituents (Renz, 2010) and, given the multi-dimensionality, each constituent has
differing expectations for what accountability looks like. Ebrahim (2010) discusses
accountability in terms of internal dimension and external dimensions. The internal
dimension focuses on motivation or responsibility whereas the external dimension is
more about obligation (Ebrahim, 2010). Given the many explanations of accountability,
Koppell (2005) cautions that “layering every imagined meaning of accountability into a
single definition would render the concept meaningless” (p. 95).
Accountability to Whom?
Because nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of stakeholders, Ebrahim
(2010) and others (Scott, 2000; Verschuere, et al., 2006) suggest that in order to tease out
to whom nonprofits are accountable, an upward and downward perspective is useful.
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Upward accountability refers to external relationships with funders, governments, and the
public whereas downward accountability focuses on internal relationships with clients,
staff, and volunteers (Ebrahim, 2010). In a nonprofit context, upward and downward
relationships identify the many different stakeholders and the varying degrees of
accountability demands they face.
For example, when using a legal or regulatory perspective, nonprofits have an
upward relationship with state and federal agencies and are accountable to fulfill their
fiduciary responsibilities, but a downward relationship would focus on having the
appropriate human resource policies in place for staff. However, other stakeholder
perspectives may not be as cut and dry. The public, for example encompasses both an
upwards and downwards relationship. Upwardly, the public, (i.e. the general population)
has an expectation that nonprofits use donations for the missions. In a downward
relationship, the public (i.e. individuals) expects nonprofit to carry out their mission, but
are more personally invested since they rely on the programs and services that meet their
specific needs.
Similar to Ebrahim’s (2010) upward and downward idea, Kearns (1996), offered
two ways that nonprofits perform for accountability, explicit and implicit. Explicit
accountability focuses on how nonprofits perform their work in order to meet legal,
regulatory, or contractual standards (Kearns, 1996). Implicit standards are harder to
define, because they relate to societal norms and beliefs about public interest and trust
(Kearns, 1996). The upward and downward perspective takes into account the multiple
demands for accountability, while the explicit and implicit idea adds a performance
element to how accountability is actually carried out.
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Koppell (2005) identified how multiple stakeholders add levels of complexity in
his “multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD)” (p. 95). MAD acknowledges that
although there are many stakeholders to consider, they must be considered
simultaneously. An example of MAD can be seen in Ronald McDonald House Charities
(RMHC), a nonprofit organization with chapters around the United States and around the
world whose mission is to provide a “home away from home” for families with critically
ill children. The national headquarters holds each of the local chapters accountable to
ensure that policies, procedures, McDonald’s corporate licensing and branding, as well as
program protocols are followed. However, concurrently, the local chapter is accountable
to their local funders, partner hospitals, and city and state regulators.
Ebrahim (2010) suggested that multi-dimensionality creates challenges for
nonprofit leaders in deciding not only what they should be accountable for, but also to
whom. Holland (2002) echoes this challenge by adding that not much is known about
how nonprofit leaders really “deal with accountability” (p. 412). Therefore, parsing out to
whom nonprofit are accountable is no easy task. However, the upward and downward
perspective, along with MAD, suggests that how nonprofit leaders perform their
governance duties could be a mechanism that helps to meet multiple accountability
demands from multiple stakeholders. As such, legal accountability can be demonstrated
through the performance of the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, because these
duties provide a legal basis for what is expected of nonprofit leader oversight.
Additionally, the duties are based in United States case law are the “legal standards by
which all actions taken by directors are judged” (Hopkins, 2009, p. 13) which become the
standard by which all tax-exempt organizations will be judged, if necessary. What this
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means for nonprofits is that in order to satisfy legal accountability, they must be both
responsive in meeting the demands of the public, using public resources for a public
benefit and responsible for following the rules, their fiduciary duties). Therefore, in
looking at legal accountability through a fiduciary, legal lens, nonprofits are required to
perform their duties in a manner that fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities.
Performance as Accountability
Performance is an area that has gained considerable attention in the nonprofit
literature over the past few decades. As with accountability, performance is also complex
and multi-dimensional. Although there are varying perspectives of what performance
means, scholarship has come to an agreement that, at some level, demonstrating
accountability and meeting performance demands impacts effectiveness (Berman, 2006;
Light, 2004; Preston & Brown, 2004; Renz, 2010; Salamon, 2012). The following section
discusses performance as a means to address legal accountability to whom and
establishes nonprofit leaders as “owners” or “stewards’ of their organizations. As
stewards, they are held accountable for upholding their fiduciary responsibilities as they
perform their governance duties.
Knowing what the fiduciary responsibilities are is critical for any nonprofit leader,
because most of the decisions nonprofit leaders make in their governance activities
should be based in the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Jackson and Holland (1998)
developed an assessment tool to measure board performance that included six dimensions
(contextual, educational, interpersonal, analytical, political, and strategic), which they
identified as having a positive impact on board performance. The educational dimension,
how well boards were informed about their responsibilities, was considered to be one of
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the strongest dimensions with which to assess board performance (Jackson & Holland,
1998). Chapter three provides insight into the gap between nonprofit leaders familiarity
with the fiduciary duties compared to their actual fiduciary knowledge, which can affect
nonprofit leaders’ performance of their fiduciary duties. However, having a level of
knowledge or competency is just the first step to fulfilling fiduciary duties, because
applying that knowledge in the performance of governance activities is a critical next
step.
What is Performance?
Performance is traditionally discussed in the literature as a means for
effectiveness and efficiency. It is a broad term that connotes meeting a standard either
real or perceived. This study does not measure performance, effectiveness, or efficiency,
but rather uses nonprofit leader performance of their governance duties as a means to
measure their legal accountability. As such, this study looks at how nonprofit leaders
apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their fiduciary duties. But, before
further explanation of how performance is applied in this study, a little bit about how
performance and accountability intersect follows.
Using Ebrahim’s (2010) framework of internal and external demands for
accountability, as mentioned previously, helps in explaining how accountability intersects
with performance. Given that the external dimension of accountability is more about
obligation whereas the internal dimension focuses on motivation or responsibility
externally, it could be said that nonprofits are obligated to the media, state and federal
regulators, as well as the public. These external actors have a great deal of influence on a
nonprofit’s reputation, for better or worse, and have a captive audience with which to
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highlight nonprofits who veer away from expectations as seen in recent examples of
nonprofit mismanagement as mentioned earlier, Wounded Warrior Project, Central Asia
Institute, and United Way. Examples of other external actors monitoring nonprofit
performance are charity watchdogs such as Charity Navigator, Guidestar, Better Business
Bureau, and the National Center for Charitable Statistics. These watchdogs give scores to
nonprofits, usually around financial, transparency, and governance data collected from
annual IRS 990 tax returns. The ratings are intended to provide a stamp of approval and
are available to the public. However, each watchdog varies as to how they calculate their
ratings (Smith, 2014; Worth, 2017) contributing to the contextual nature of accountability
and performance.
Looking at the internal dimensions of accountability board members and
executives come to mind as those who in theory, would be motivated by responsibility.
As the primary governance body, responsible for oversight and management of the
organization, it is the board and the executive who bear the brunt of mismanagement and
wrongdoing. Given the earlier examples of nonprofit mismanagement, the common
thread in each of the scandals was the governance and executive bodies’ lack of fiduciary
care and oversight of human, physical, or financial resources. Once the stories went
public, the organizations suffered from tarnished reputations resulting in decrease in
donations and public trust. Furthermore, it was the external legal stakeholders, the IRS,
the State Attorney Generals, and the U.S. Congress, that stepped in to hold nonprofit
leaders held accountable for how they failed in the performance of their fiduciary duties.
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Performance for Legal Accountability
Hatry suggests that the primary use of performance measurements are “to
establish accountability” (as cited in Positer, 2008, p. 13). Poister (2008) offered that the
regulatory accountability mandates from the past few decades are the foundation for
much of the performance discussions of today. The federal government began the push
for performance and accountability when in 1993 the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) was passed requiring government agencies to develop goals and
objectives to demonstrate performance (Positer, 2008, p. 17). In 2010, the GPRA was
revised, resulting in the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act
(GPRAMA) that added new goal-setting and performance measurement processes
applicable to multiple agencies, increased internet reporting measures, and more
accountability for goals (Positer, 2008; Brass, 2012). Because many nonprofits have
contracts for service with government agencies, particularly health and human service
organizations, it is no surprise that we now see performance measurement and
effectiveness permeated throughout the nonprofit sector.
In a for-profit context, the shareholders and government are constantly engaged
with each other to ensure accountability either through quarterly reports, consumer
complaints, or via other agencies such as the Occupational Safety Health and
Administration (OSHA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. We have seen the swift response to breaches of trust in the
for-profit sector in the corporate malfeasance in the 1990’s (e.g. Enron, Tyco,
WorldCom). In 2002, the U.S. Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley to demand greater
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corporate transparency and accountability as well as an increase of performance
expectations in an effort to curtail corporate corruption.
Conversely, nonprofits can go for many years under the radar without any
indication of mismanagement or wrongdoing. Only in the past decade or so has attention
been given to reforming nonprofits. The most recent examples are the Nonprofit Integrity
Act of California in 2004 and the Nonprofit Revitalization Act instituted in New York in
2013. Both pieces of legislation were intended to increase transparency and
accountability in the charitable sector by requiring organizations to adopt and implement
specific processes and policies. In a sense, the new legislation could be considered
negative accountability, a mechanism to show lack of performance by highlighting
breaches in fiduciary duties when reporting activities in the annual 990 tax return
(Swords, 1997).
Performance as Ownership
In the nonprofit sector, the term “ownership” is a foreign term. However, as
foreign as the term may be, ownership is an important concept that intersects with
accountability and performance when discussing governance. There is a large body of
literature related to corporate and nonprofit board governance as ownership based in
economic, political, and sociological theories, with a focus on for-profit theories around
control, ownership, and wealth creation (Coule, 2015; Forbes & Milliken, 1998). As
such, ownership is used in this study as a means to show how accountability begins with
those who have the most “ownership” of an organization as discussed by nonprofit
scholars (Carver in Kearns, 1998; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Renz, 2004). In other
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words, those who have a responsibility for and who make decisions on behalf of the
organization itself are expected to perform their responsibilities.
According to Renz (2004) a board of directors is a structure with which the
activity of governance takes place. Nearly all formalized organizations have structures in
place where governance activities occur. In for profit corporations, owners are typically
the individuals who serve on the board of directors or who are stockholders
(shareholders) that have decision-making authority on behalf of the organization. Board
members can be shareholders, executives, or even founders who have a common
material, or financial, interest in organizational performance (i.e. maximizing profits). As
such, it is clear that for profit boards and shareholders are the owners.
For nonprofit organizations, ownership cannot be defined solely by who
financially benefits based on the nondistribution constraint as developed by Hansmann
(1980). The nondistribution constraint explains that nonprofits do not distribute earnings
in a manner that financially benefits an individual, but rather their earnings benefit
society as a whole through its “output” (i.e. mission). Similar to for-profit corporations,
nonprofit corporations have boards of directors and executives who are given authority to
make decisions about organizational resources. It is within this structure that nonprofit
boards are held accountable for their performance as they make decisions that affect the
overall performance of an organization. Therefore, one might say that boards are in fact a
type of “owner” since their decisions impact fulfillment of the mission, organizational
performance, and accountability. Using this line of thought for this study, nonprofit
leaders are the owners. This is primarily because they have the most decision-making
authority and, by default, function as the most likely legal accountability mechanism.
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Role Ambiguity and Governance
Nonprofit leaders are the individuals who are collectively held legally responsible
for how organizational resources are used. These leaders include board members and
executives who make decisions about how best to use organizational resources in order to
fulfill a tax-exempt mission. Together, they work to accomplish goals and fulfill the
mission of the organization in complementary ways: Board members meet broader
governance needs by ensuring that the organization has the appropriate resources in place
that executives then use in the management of the day-to-day operations.
Renz (2010) sums up the scholarly and practitioner literature related to what
board members are responsible for with regards to governance and oversight functions as
presented in Table 5.1. However, it is important to note that not all of the recommended
functions are tied to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. For example,
although it may be helpful for boards to engage with constituents, technically they are not
legally responsible for this specific activity. The duties that are not legal ones have been
identified by the researcher and are italicized.
Table 5.1
Prescribed Board Responsibilities Related to Fiduciary Duties
Prescribed Board Responsibility
Addressed in Fiduciary Duties
To lead the organization
No
Establish policy
Yes
Secure essential resources
Yes
Ensure effective resource use
Yes
Lead and manage the chief executive
Yes
Engage with constituents
No
Ensure and enable accountability
Yes
Assess board effectiveness
No
Note. Prescribed board responsibilities reprinted from Nonprofit Leadership and
Management, Renz (2010) p. 131-134.

172
Given the wide variety of expectations for board members to fulfill, Wright and
Millesen (2008) explore the idea of how nonprofit board role ambiguity affects
organizational performance. Their study, which surveyed 447 executive directors and 249
board members, suggested that when board members do not have a clear sense of their
role, ambiguity occurs (Wright & Millesen, 2008). Their study also suggested that “board
members often think they understand their roles, even when the chief executives do not
[think that boards understand their own roles]” (Wright & Millesen, 2008, p. 330).
The sense of ambiguity was also evident in a study by Doherty and Hoye (2011)
that focused on nonprofit sports organizations. Their study builds on previous research
that suggested board members are faced with conflicting expectations, which may
contribute to ambiguity or a lack of understanding of what their roles entail (Doherty &
Hoye, 2011). Although the authors acknowledged the multi-dimensional nature of
gauging board performance in that each organizational context has underlying dynamics,
they found that “…the significant association between role ambiguity and board member
performance warrants attention to individuals’ degree of understanding of their
responsibilities” in a nonprofit context (Doherty & Hoye, 2011, p. 120).
This ambiguity points to a greater problem in nonprofit leaders’ inability to
perform their fiduciary responsibilities. Miller (2002), who interviewed 58 board
members to learn about how boards perform their monitoring function, found that
“although board members clearly recognized their fiduciary responsibility to oversee the
organizations financial picture, many had no idea how to execute this function” (p. 441).
This suggests that not only is there ambiguity about what their roles are, but also
ambiguity exists about how to carry out their duties. Therefore, the application of
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knowledge impacts performance. But, how might ambiguity affect board members and
executives differently? The following provides a brief overview of what we know about
nonprofit leader performance at the board and executive levels.
What We Know About Nonprofit Leaders
The level of engagement is typically the dividing line between board members
and executives. Boards maintain oversight of the entire organization at a broader, more
strategic level, whereas executives are responsible to manage the day-to-day operations
and support the board with information and guidance. Despite the differences, all
nonprofit leader responsibilities are founded in the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience of which they are legally accountable to the state and federal regulators. What
this means is that the fiduciary duties are the basis for accountability and are related to
overall performance since the duties are connected to the use of organizational resources
(financial, human, physical, and intellectual) in fulfilling the mission.
Boards. Some scholars have attributed composition of the board as a predictor of
organizational performance that includes demographics such as age, gender, and ethnicity
as well as professional and educational background (Bradshaw, et al., 1992; Herman &
Renz, 2000; 2006; Jackson & Holland, 1998). Brown (2007) suggests that having “highly
capable board members should coincide with better overall board performance” (p. 306).
Given the variety of skills and backgrounds that board members may bring to the table,
there is no consensus as to what matters most, again because of the contextual nature of
nonprofits. Although it might be helpful to have a sense of what may work in certain
contexts, focusing only on the technical features of the board does not provide enough
insight into what other factors may impact an organization’s ability to perform or meet
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accountability such as geographic location, group dynamics, resources, and even donor
relations. Finally, it does not matter if board members are “highly capable” or have the
“right” background because the traditional demographics have little to do with fiduciary
knowledge.
Holland (2002), who interviewed 169 board members to explore board
performance and accountability, highlighted the tension of boards knowing what they are
responsible for but that the lack of accountability undermines their effectiveness. This
resonates with Miller (2004) who found that in her study of 58 board members some
respondents felt that they were accountable only to themselves, because they could not
identify other stakeholders to whom they were accountable. Miller (2004) also found that
although board members had a very good understanding of their fiduciary
responsibilities, what they did not understand how to actually execute or perform their
fiduciary function. Given the gap between knowledge and application (as presented in
chapter three), inherent challenges exist that may prevent board members from fulfilling
their ownership role and meeting not only legal accountability demands, but also in
performing their governance duties effectively.
Executives. Although board members are often thought of as the primary
governing body, in truth, they operate in tandem with the most senior executive. Even
though both board members and executives are held accountable for organizational
oversight, executives have different ideas than board members when it comes to what
matters for organizational performance. Some research shows that executives often rate
board performance much lower than board members rate their own performance
(BoardSource, 2017; Bradshaw, et al., 1992; Brown, 2007; Brudney & Murray, 1998;
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Heimovics & Herman, 1999; Herman & Renz, 2000; 2008, Stanford, 2017). Yet,
referring back to Miller’s study (2004) of 58 board members, for the most part, board
members deferred to the chief executive with regards to oversight, bestowing a great deal
of trust to the chief executive by the board. So, although the executive feels that their
boards are low performers, it is the executive that is relied upon by the board. So, one
might question… is performance is a reflection of the executive? In the same vein,
Holland (2002) offered that, “even when the nonprofit board addresses accountability, it
seems to focus attention on the executive, seldom on the board itself” (p. 412).
BoardSource (2017) and Stanford (2017) have been conducting longitudinal
studies for the past few decades of more than 4,000 board members and executives across
the nation. These studies provide some insight into the differences between board
member and executive perceptions of organizational performance and each other.
BoardSource (2017) reported that overwhelmingly both the chief executives and the
board members agree that the board has an impact on organizational performance,
particularly in knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. Eighty percent of executives
and 73% of board chairs believed that understanding roles and responsibilities has a
positive impact on organizational performance (BoardSource, 2017, p. 46).
In contrast however, understanding roles and responsibilities was found to have a
weak relationship between perception of board impact on organizational performance by
both executives and board chairs; Executives ranked understanding roles and
responsibilities as the fifth most important and board chairs ranked it fourth (out of five)
(BoardSource, 2017, p. 45). Furthermore, the report (BoardSource, 2017) showed that
while executives emphasize positive board culture, the board chairs emphasize the
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board’s functional roles as the basis for performance. In terms of specific fiduciary duty
performance, both the executives and the board chairs agreed that board preparation for
meetings is lacking, which is a function of the performance of the duty of care that
focuses on active participation and engagement of the governing body (BoardSource,
2017).
Fishman, Schwarz, and Mayer (2015) made a distinction between having the
appropriate governance structures and practices in place and actually engaging in those
practices for the oversight and management of nonprofits. If engagement was measured
in terms of satisfaction, most nonprofits would be in a sorry state. The Stanford Survey
(2017) reported that only 55% of the executives and 57% of the board members who
responded were satisfied or very satisfied with the way their organization is managed
day-to-day (p. 45). Because managing the day-to-day is typically the responsibility of the
executive (unless the organization is run by a working board where all board members
manage the day-today operations) these results are interesting given that most executives
typically score themselves higher than their boards.
The dissatisfaction could be related to the finding that just over half of the
executives and board members are satisfied or very satisfied with the overall performance
and significant impact of the organization (Stanford, 2017). If the nonprofit leaders as a
whole are dissatisfied in the day-to-day operations, which is the executive responsibility,
this might point to both the executives and board members inability to perform their duty
of care. An aspect of the duty of care focuses on the board’s responsibility to review the
performance of the chief executive.
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Application of Knowledge Results
Jackson and Holland (1998) concluded, “if nonprofit boards are to fulfill their
fiduciary and leadership responsibilities, boards must be able to assess the effectiveness
of their performance” (p. 159). What this study provides is a means to assess how
nonprofit leaders fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities in the performance of their
governance activities. The following presents the results of how nonprofit leaders apply
their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties, as a means to
fulfill accountability to whom. In terms of measuring performance, the study focuses on
how frequently nonprofit leaders carry out their fiduciary duties during their governance
activities, specifically focused on the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. First, the
questions used in the survey are presented then reliability where appropriate, followed by
the results by all roles.
Survey Questions
Respondents were given a four-point Likert scale option for answering. Because
of the use of skip logic in the survey and the questions were organized, executives were
given the option to answer “disagree to agree” and board members were given “never to
always.” However, to get at application, all questions began with the stem, “as a board
member I…” or “as an executive I…”. The questions were developed to align with the
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience constructs and are provided in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2
List of Survey Questions Categorized by Duty and Measurement
Fiduciary Duty
“As a Board Member, I…”
“As an Executive, I…”
4-point Likert: Never to Always
4-point Likert: Disagree to Agree
 Review materials in advance of the
 Exercise Independent Judgment
Care:
Engagement,
board meeting
 Pay attention to how the
Attention,
 Pay attention to the organization’s
organization’s programs and
Informed Process
resources (e.g. financial, physical,
activities fulfill its mission.
of Decisionand human)
Making
 Exercise independent judgment (i.e.
comparing, evaluating, and
considering possible outcomes and
possibilities)
 Frequently review the organization’s
finances and financial policies
 Attend board meetings
 Am aware of the executive's
performance
 Participate in the review, discussion,
and/or approval of financial policies
(e.g. annual budget, audit)
Loyalty:
Procedural
Aspects of
Transactions and
Self Interest

 Make decisions that are in the best

Obedience:
Legal
Compliance

 Pay attention to how the

 Disclose conflicts of interest

interest of the organization
 Disclose conflicts of interest
 Avoid the use of organizational
resources/connections for personal
gain
 Maintain confidentiality of sensitive
organizational information








organization uses its resources
(financial/physical/human) to fulfill
its mission
Understand the Bylaws
Refer to the organization’s internal
policies and procedures when
needed
Refer to the mission statement when
discussing potential programs and
services
Consider how new and existing
programs support our mission

 Refer to the mission statement

when discussing potential
programs and services
 Pay attention to how the
organization uses its resources
(financial/physical/human) to
fulfill its mission
 Read the bylaws
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Reliability
Boards. A four-point Likert option for board member responses was given
(Never, Sometimes, Most of the Time, and Always) to understand the frequency with
which knowledge of the fiduciary duties was applied in the performance of governance
duties, which allowed for Cronbach’s alpha to test reliability. The duty of care scale
consisted of eight items and was found to be very reliable (α = .88) with each item in the
same direction. The duty of loyalty scale consisted of four items and was found to be
moderately reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of .514 (α = .51) with each item in the same
direction. The duty of obedience scale consisted of five items and was found to be very
reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of .794 (α = .79) with each item in the same direction.
Table 5.3 presents descriptive data for the application of each fiduciary duty for board
members used for Cronbach’s alpha analysis.
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Table 5.3
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Duty of Care for Board Members
Std.
Duty Questions
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Care
Pay attention to how the organization’s
activities (e.g. programs and services)
96
3.7
4
.509
fulfill its mission
Review materials in advance of the board
96
3.4
4
.723
meeting
Pay attention to the organization’s
resources (e.g. financial, physical, and
96
3.5
4
.665
human)
Exercise independent judgment (i.e.
comparing, evaluating, and considering
96
3.8
4
.543
possible outcomes and possibilities)
Frequently review the organization’s
96
3.4
4
.837
finances and financial policies
Attend board meetings
96
3.7
4
.513
Am aware of the executive's performance
93
3.4
3
.616
Participate in the review, discussion, and/or
approval of financial policies (e.g. annual
93
3.7
4
.592
budget, audit)
Loyalty
Make decisions that are in the best interest
91
3.9
4
.360
of the organization
Disclose conflict of interest
92
3.9
4
.370
Avoid the use of organizational
93
3.9
4
.368
resources/connections for personal gain
Maintain confidentiality of sensitive
92
3.9
4
.305
organizational information
Obedience
Pay attention to how the organization uses
its resources (e.g. financial, physical, and
96
3.7
4
.567
human) to fulfill its mission
Understand the bylaws
96
3.1
3
.796
Refer to the organization’s internal policies
96
3
3
.917
and procedures when needed
Refer to the mission statement when
96
3.3
4
.874
discussing potential programs and services
Consider how new and existing programs
93
3.7
4
.551
support our mission

Min

Max

1

4

1

4

1

4

2

4

1

4

2
1

4
4

1

4

2

4

1

4

1

4

2

4

1

4

1

4

1

4

1

4

1

4
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Executives. Because of the small number of items included in the executive’s
application of the duties, Cronbach’s alpha was not deemed fit. Table 5.4 presents the
descriptive data for the fiduciary duties for executives.
Table 5.4
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Fiduciary Duties for Executives
Std.
Duty Questions
N
Mean
Median
Dev.
Care
Exercise independent judgment
82
3.9
4
.241
Pay attention to how the organization’s
programs and activities fulfill its mission
82
4
4
.268
Loyalty
Disclose conflict of interest
82
3.9
4
.404
Obedience
Pay attention to how the organization uses
its resources (e.g. financial, physical, and
human) to fulfill its mission
82
3.9
4
.287
Read the bylaws
81
3.9
4
.494
Refer to the mission statement when
discussing potential programs and services
82
3.9
4
.500

Min

Max

3

4

2

4

1

4

2
1

4
4

1

4

Application Results
By role. Board members and executives were asked about how frequently they
fulfilled the fiduciary duties in the performance of their governance responsibilities using
a four-point Likert scale. Board members were given never, sometimes, most of the time,
and always while executives were given disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree,
and agree. The results for board members are presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 for
executives.
Board members applied their fiduciary knowledge to the duties of care, loyalty,
and obedience most of the time or always (Care: N = 96, M = 3.6, SD = .473; Loyalty: N
= 93, M = 3.9, SD = .370; Obedience: N = 96, M = 3.3, SD = .552). Executives somewhat
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agree or agree that they perform their fiduciary duties (N = 82, Care: M = 7.9, SD = .385;
Loyalty: N = 82, M = 3.9, SD = .404; Obedience: N = 82, M = 11.6, SD = 1.074).
Table 5.5
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience
for the Board
Application of Duty
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Care (8 questions)
96
3.6
3.8
.473
1.6
4
Loyalty (4 questions)
93
3.9
4.0
.370
1.2
4
Obedience (3 questions) 96
3.3
3.4
.552
1.4
4
Note. Questions were 4 Point Likert scale options of Never to Always.
Table 5.6
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience
for Executives
Application of Duty
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Care (2 questions)
82
7.9
8
.385
6
8
Loyalty (1 question)
82
3.9
4
.404
1
4
Obedience (3 questions) 82
11.6
12
1.074
5
12
Note. Questions were 4 Point Likert scale options of Disagree to Agree.
Application of Duties and Actual Knowledge
Pearson’s r correlation. Using knowledge data from chapter three, a Pearson r
correlation was performed to explore any relationship with the frequency of application
of duties of care, loyalty, and obedience by those who were assessed as having a passing
score of fiduciary knowledge (see chapter three). The results show that actual knowledge
is not correlated with nonprofit leader application of any of the fiduciary duties (care: r=
.076, p = ..450, loyalty: r= .001, p =.991; obedience: r= .117, p = .247) in the
performance of fiduciary responsibilities as presented in Table 5.7. Further results
indicate that application of care, loyalty, and obedience are moderately correlated with
each other (care and loyalty: r= .665, p = .000; care and obedience: r= ..622, p =.000;
obedience and loyalty: r= .554, p = .000).
Table 5.7
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Summary of Pearson’s r Correlation for Nonprofit Leaders with Passing Fiduciary
Knowledge and the Application of the Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience
Actual
Application Application of Application
Knowledge
of Care
Loyalty
of Obedience
Actual
Pearson
1
.076
.001
.117
Knowledge
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.450
.991
.247
N
100
100
100
100
**
Application of
Pearson
.076
1
.665
.622**
Care
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.450
.000
.000
N
100
186
186
186
**
Application of
Pearson
.001
.665
1
.544**
Loyalty
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.991
.000
.000
N
100
186
186
186
**
**
Application of
Pearson
.117
.622
.544
1
Obedience
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.247
.000
.000
N
100
186
186
186
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Passing score based on 70%,
14 out of 19 possible points.
Application of Duties and Actual Knowledge
Figure 5.3 illustrates the comparison of the frequency with which nonprofit
leaders say they apply their fiduciary knowledge and their actual knowledge of specific
aspects of the fiduciary duties for board members and Figure 5.4 presents the comparison
the frequency with which nonprofit leaders say they apply their fiduciary knowledge and
their actual knowledge of specific aspects of the fiduciary duties for executives.
Familiarity of each duty is presented by the means based on a 4-point Likert scale (Not at
All Familiar, Slightly Familiar, Moderately Familiar, Very Familiar) and the actual
knowledge score is based on the percentage who received a passing score of at least 70%
for the 11 legal responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions. Overall, For board
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members and the duty of care, %, loyalty, and obedience received a passing score For the
executives received a passing score for actual knowledge.
30

28.5

25
20

15.4

16.7

App Loyalty

App Obedience

15
10
5
0
App Care

Figure 5.3. Means of application of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for
board members.
Note: The dotted line represents the percentage (41%) of board members (care N = 96,
loyalty, N = 93, and obedience, N = 96) who received a passing score of 70% or better for
the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for plotting was
determined by calculating the proportion of 41% with each duty maximum mean (care:
32 = 13.12, loyalty: 16 = 6.56, and obedience: 20 = 8.2).
12.0
11.0
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0

11.6
7.9

3.9

App Care

App Loyalty

App Obedience

Figure 5.4. Means of application of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for
executives.
Note: The dotted line represents the overall percentage (70%) of executives (care N=82,
loyalty, N=82, and obedience, N=82) who received a passing score of 70% or better for
the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for plotting was
determined by calculating the proportion of 70% with each duty maximum mean (care: 8
= 5.6, loyalty: 4 = 2.8, and obedience: 12 = 8.4).
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Discussion
This chapter presents the results of frequency with which nonprofit leaders apply
their knowledge in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities to demonstrate legal
accountability. The study highlights the need for a greater awareness of fiduciary
responsibility knowledge. What follows is a discussion about the gaps between
application of fiduciary knowledge and actual knowledge, first by the executives then by
the board members.
The Gaps: Application of Duties and Actual Knowledge
Executives. For the executives, they somewhat agreed or agreed that they apply
their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties of care (N = 82,
M = 7.9), loyalty (N = 82, M = 3.9), and obedience (N = 82, M = 11.6). In terms of actual
knowledge, overall 70% of executives surveyed received a passing score for their actual
knowledge of their legal responsibilities. Overall, these results support a sense of
ownership and the executive’s ability to satisfy legal accountability. But, the results about
specific aspects of each duty may tell a different story.
Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention and being engaged by
making informed decisions. Regarding individual questions in the duty of care construct,
we see that executives agreed they exercise independent judgment (N = 82, M = 3.9) and
all of the executives pay attention to the how the organization’s programs and activities
fulfill its mission (N = 82, M = 4.0). These results are not surprising given that executives
play a critical role in governance by monitoring the day-to-day operations of the
organization. Likewise, because most of their work informs the board, they develop
program strategy usually in isolation or with other senior staff if the organization is large
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enough. This process requires that they make decisions based on their own best
judgment.
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. Executives nearly
always agreed they disclose conflict of interest (N = 82, M = 3.9). This result is not
surprising given that as the chief executive they are under more scrutiny than the board.
Because they are in the community as the face of the organization, they may have a
greater awareness of how their actions impact those they serve.
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring
that the mission is fulfilled. Again, we see that nearly all of the executives agreed that
they apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance activities by
paying attention to how the organization uses its resources to fulfill the organization’s
mission (N = 82, M = 3.9), reading the bylaws (N = 81, M = 3.9), and referring to the
mission statement when discussing potential programs and services (N = 82, M = 3.9).
Again, these results are not surprising given that most of the day-to-day decisions that
executives make are related to the organization’s programs and services and that they
bylaws are an important governance document.
However, only 68% of the executives correctly identified that executive staff roles
and responsibilities were included in the bylaws based on the results of chapter three.
This is surprising given that the bylaws outline overall authority of the executive related
to signing contracts, finances, and bank access. For executives, it would be imperative to
know how much formal authority they have and how their relationship with the board is
legally defined in the performance of their fiduciary duties.
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Boards. For board members, they agreed that they apply their fiduciary
knowledge in the performance of their governance duties of care (N = 96, M = 3.6),
loyalty (N = 93, M = 3.9), and obedience (N = 96, M = 3.3). In terms of actual
knowledge, overall 41% of board members surveyed received a passing score for their
actual knowledge of their legal responsibilities. Overall, these results support a sense of
ownership and the executive’s ability to satisfy legal accountability.
Something interesting to note with regards to the board results is that they scored
lower than the executives in terms of applying their fiduciary knowledge in the
performance of the duties of care and obedience. These results build on previous studies
that note executives typically score themselves higher than their boards (BoardSource,
2017; Stanford, 2017).
Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention to the work and being
engaged by making informed decisions. Board members indicated that they apply their
fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their responsibilities most frequently when
exercising independent judgment (i.e. comparing, evaluating, and considering possible
outcomes and possibilities) (N = 96, M = 3.8) and least frequently in reviewing materials
in advance of the board meeting (N = 96, M = 3.4) and in reviewing the organization’s
finances and financial policies (N = 96, M = 3.4).
It is not surprising to find that preparation for board meetings is lacking given the
results of a national survey (BoardSource, 2017) that reported both the executives and the
board chairs agreed that preparation for board meetings is lacking (p. 49). Additionally,
based on results from chapter three only 50% of the board members correctly identified
regular attendance of board meetings as a legal responsibility and only 34% correctly
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identified reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting as a legal
responsibility. What this means is that board members may not take as much ownership
in the actual decision making process as they need to be, because they need to be more
informed about the organization’s resources. This would indicate that they are not
fulfilling their duty of care.
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. Board members
indicated that they apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their
responsibilities nearly always in all areas of the duty of loyalty. These results are
surprising given that board members assessed themselves with such a high degree of
frequency when only 65% of the board members correctly identified the need to use
independent judgment when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal
responsibility as presented in chapter three. This would point to role ambiguity and a
potential breach of duty of loyalty if board members are swayed by influential
stakeholders such as funders, the executive, or dominant board personalities.
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring
that the mission is fulfilled. Board members indicated that they apply their fiduciary
knowledge in the performance of their responsibilities most frequently when paying
attention to how the organization uses its resources (N = 96, M = 3.7) and when
considering how new and existing programs support the organization’s mission (N = 93,
M = 3.7), but least frequently in understanding bylaws (N = 96, M = 3.1) and referring to
the organization’s internal policies and procedures when needed (N = 96, M = 3.0). These
results were surprising given that board members scored very high in their actual
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knowledge of specific aspects of the duty of obedience as presented in chapter three. The
bylaws are a critical piece in governance and if bylaws are not read, board members make
decisions about organizational resources without knowledge of how the organization
itself has decided how it will make decisions. Thus, board members would be in breach
of the duty of obedience and not satisfy legal accountability if they do not have
knowledge of their organization’s bylaws.
Implications
Holland (2002) sums up nonprofit accountability as “practices and processes of
clarifying expectations agreeing on goals and criteria for assessing progress toward them,
and the providing information by which to assess performance” (p. 426). My study
supports not only clarifying legal expectations, but the development of an assessment tool
with which to assess legal aspects of governance, bounded by the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience. Although there is no scholarly consensus as to what performance
measurements are the most useful, I offer that we must continue to dig deeper into how
boards actually behave to establish more generalizeable data. As nonprofit leaders
improve their performance, by default they will improve organizational effectiveness and
accountability.
This study highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary knowledge in the
performance of governance duties amongst nonprofit leaders. Overall, nonprofit leaders
can use these results to identify areas that may impact board members’ and executives’
performance of their fiduciary duties. As such, my results contribute to the development
of nonprofit leader trainings that frequent board service may negatively impact
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performance and that additional research needs to be done to better understand the
discrepancies between board and executive application of knowledge.
The results of this study can be used to significantly impact the area of
performance and effectiveness. Although I used the concepts slightly different than the
literature does, there is something about nonprofit leaders being able to perform their
duties with the appropriate fiduciary knowledge. As indicated in chapter three, because
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience are expectations for all nonprofit
leaders, regardless of organizational size, purpose, or location, they can be used as a basis
to develop a standardized process that assesses a nonprofit leader’s readiness for service.
In turn, the assessment can be used during the orientation process to ensure that their
board is made up of leaders that know their legal responsibilities. Furthermore, an
assessment would help organizations use their resources to address specific gaps to deter
mismanagement and wrong doing, whether negligent or willful.
Future Research
This chapter reveals a gap between how frequently nonprofit leaders apply their
fiduciary knowledge and their actual knowledge. While this study is exploratory, in that it
pilots an assessment tool and seeks to establish baseline data for future research, it
highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary responsibility knowledge and
competence. Additional empirical use of the assessment tool developed for this study will
add not only to the nonprofit literature but also to the nonprofit law literature.
Additionally, future qualitative research may help to uncover the underlying reasons why
the level of knowledge varies amongst nonprofit leaders.
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Furthermore, there is a need for research that explores individual nonprofit leaders
as the unit of analysis, rather than the board as a whole. Specifically, my study builds on
the idea that individual nonprofit leader knowledge is important for organizational
performance in by addressing legal accountability as a means to dispel role ambiguity
and to encourage ownership and solid decision-making grounded in the fiduciary
responsibilities.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Collectively, this dissertation addresses the issue of accountability and nonprofit
governance by focusing on legal accountability. Separately, each article explores the
means by which nonprofit leaders satisfy the different facets of legal accountability as
they relate to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.
The study began by setting the stage and describing how over time, nonprofit
governance has evolved. With increased competition for resources and demand for
services, nonprofit leaders are being asked to fill additional responsibilities that go
beyond the basic fiduciary duties. Nonprofit leaders of today are expected to engage at
greater levels than their predecessors as highlighted by the tensions of the voluntary
nature of board service, the need for professionalization, and the need to meet the
accountability demands of multiple stakeholders. Using an accountability framework that
focuses on what, how, and to whom (Ebrahim, 2010), this study establishes that what
nonprofit leaders are legally accountable for is knowledge of their fiduciary duties, how
they meet legal accountability by accessing appropriate sources to learn about their
fiduciary duties, and to whom they are legally accountable to is the regulators by
demonstrating application of their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their
governance duties.
Knowledge
The first study focused on what nonprofit leaders were accountable for:
knowledge of their fiduciary duties. In assessing nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary
duties, the majority agreed that they were very familiar. However, when tested for actual
knowledge, only 41% of board members and 70% of executives passed the test. When
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analyzed by the number of boards served, 56% of nonprofit leaders who have served on
one to four boards and 71% of those who have served on five or more boards passed.
Although nonprofit leaders believe they understand their fiduciary responsibilities, in
reality they do not, suggesting that they may be stretched too thin. Because nonprofit
leaders are asked to fill multiple roles, they lack the knowledge of their basic
responsibility: to oversee organizational resources so that they are used in a manner that
fulfills the mission.
When looking at these results through a legal accountability lens, it is glaringly
evident that nonprofit leaders cannot demonstrate accountability because they do not
understand their basic responsibilities. Without the proper knowledge of what is required
nonprofit leaders are at a disadvantage when making important decisions related to how
resources will be used to fulfill the mission. If nonprofit leaders lack understanding that,
for example, reading materials and making informed decisions is based on the fiduciary
duty of care, they may govern in a haphazard manner. Furthermore, this study highlights
that nonprofit leaders are unaware that they “don’t know that they don’t know” given that
such a high percentage of respondents scored with a high degree of familiarity and
understanding.
Source of Knowledge
The second study focused on how nonprofit leaders demonstrate legal
accountability: accessing appropriate sources to learn about their fiduciary duties. This
strand of research was theoretical in that it applied institutionalism in order to explain
why nonprofit leaders would want to be informed about their legal responsibilities,
specifically in response to isomorphic coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. In
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order to explore what sources nonprofit leaders accessed to learn about their fiduciary
duties, best practices were used as socially constructed proxies in the absence of widely
accepted standardized assessments.
When looking at the results through a legal accountability lens, nonprofit leaders
utilized a variety of best practices available to them both internal and external to the
organization, to learn about their legal responsibilities. Despite the availability of
formalized internal sources, such as a board manual or orientation, nonprofit leaders
accessed informal means the most regardless of role or board service. Thus, nonprofit
leaders are learning about their fiduciary responsibilities from other board members or
executive directors. However, this knowledge may or may not be accurate. Building on
the first study, many nonprofit leaders did not pass the test in their actual knowledge.
Therefore, it can be said that bad knowledge is being passed on from leader to leader and
from board to board.
In terms of external sources, nonprofit leaders rely most on websites, regardless of
role or board service. Rather than relying on more formalized sources such as
professional publications or certification and degree programs, nonprofit leaders look to
the world wide web, a socially constructed source of knowledge. And, similar to informal
means, there is no way of ensuring that the information is credible, legitimate, or truthful.
This study did not measure institutionalist pressures, but the results do suggest
some link with best practices and mimetic mechanisms. What is interesting is that most
nonprofit organizations behave in a mimetic fashion with the use of the same types of
best practices intended to help nonprofit leaders understand the organization and their
roles, such as board manuals, board orientations, and educational opportunities. Yet, how
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might isomorphism explain the use of informal means of learning? More research would
help to understand this better.
Application of Knowledge
The third study focused on to whom nonprofit leaders demonstrate legal
accountability: the application of fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their
governance duties. This strand of research was conceptual in that it applied performance
in a non-traditional way. Rather than relying on the usual performance metrics such as
organization size, age, board composition and backgrounds, performance was discussed
in terms of ownership. In offering nonprofit leaders as owners, legal accountability is
demonstrated as they apply fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance
duties. This strand of research included the idea of role ambiguity and the confusion that
nonprofit leaders have about what they are supposed to do in their roles.
When looking at the results through a legal accountability lens, we see similar
results as in the first study as nonprofit leaders frequently apply their fiduciary
knowledge in the performance of their governance duties. However, given the low levels
of actual knowledge, it is evident that nonprofit leaders perform their governance duties
based on a lack of understanding of their legal responsibilities. What this means is that
although nonprofit leaders may believe that they are engaged in their role, they do not
fully understand what that role actually is, pointing to role ambiguity. As “owners”,
nonprofit leaders are making decisions based on ignorance, which may hinder success.
Furthermore, these results open up the possibility that the traditional measures of
performance, such as organizational age, revenue types, board composition and
background are less important when it comes to fulfilling the mission. I would offer that

196
nonprofit leaders who have an understanding of their basic fiduciary duties are more
engaged and therefore have more investment in the performance of the organization.
However, more research is needed to explore this.
The “So What?”
So, how does this dissertation contribute? As a whole, it reveals the gap in what
nonprofit leaders believe they know and how they carry out their fiduciary duties based
on lack of fiduciary knowledge. Separately, each study highlights the need for awareness,
understanding, and performance of fiduciary duties in order to meet legal accountability
demands.
The current legal accountability structure is woefully inadequate and for the most
part, is non-existent. Enforcement is reactive and when negligence or wrongdoing is
suspected, depending on the resources available at the state and federal levels,
investigation is minimal. Furthermore, there is no incentive for nonprofit organizations to
ensure that their leaders have accurate fiduciary knowledge and an understanding of what
their role is and what it is not. Finally, even when nonprofits are found lacking in the
performance of their fiduciary duties, they face little to no consequences because of the
voluntary nature of nonprofits.
As a consultant I have met with numerous nonprofit leaders who are not familiar
with the term “the fiduciary duties”, so it is not surprising to learn that many board
members and some executives do not get a passing score. And, as a consultant, I have
helped several nonprofits regain their tax exempt status after being revoked for lack of
knowledge of their fiduciary duties. In all cases, most nonprofit leaders were unaware of
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their responsibilities and they were eager to learn what their responsibilities were in order
to avoid future breaches.
This study is relevant to funders, regulators, and nonprofit organizations
themselves since they are all interested in the success of nonprofits. This study provides
actual data that stakeholders can use to work together in order to strengthen nonprofit
governance. Funders could provide resources for trainings and regulators can work with
national and state nonprofit associations and coalitions to create standards to assess
fiduciary knowledge. Organizations can address the need for qualified board members
and executives by ensuring that any person responsible for making decisions about
organizational resources understands that it is a legal responsibility, not just a fun hobby.
As much as these ideas have potential for success, the real challenge is the
contextual nature of nonprofits. What works for one organization may not work for
another. And, given the voluntary nature of board service and the pluralistic aspect of
nonprofits, the nonprofit sector has adopted a “come one, come all” mantra which may be
sacrificing quality for quantity. However, at the end of the day, when an organization is
suspected of wrongdoing, they will be measured against how they went about their
governance activities according to the standards outlines in the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience. So, although nonprofits come in many different shapes, sizes, and
colors, they are all held to the same standard of governance: did they use organizational
resources to fulfill the mission and did they go about their decision-making process with
the best interest of the organization in mind, not their own.
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The “Now What?”
So, what’s next? As an academic, there are several ways I can move my research
forward. Additionally, as a practitioner, I have ideas about how to turn my research into
practical, relevant tools for those working in the sector on a daily basis. In both cases, I
see opportunities to add to the literature in empirical and applied ways. My plan is to use
this dissertation by developing each of the three strands of research into stand-alone
submissions for academic and practitioner publications and share the collective data with
students, nonprofit organizations, and funders.
Connecting Research to Practice
With regards to nonprofit academics, some may have experience volunteering for
a nonprofit, but very few have worked in a nonprofit. Given the lack of “on the ground”
experience, much of their research relies on publicly available data, unless they are
fortunate enough to have funding for a study that allows them to engage with nonprofit
organizations. What this means is that most people who research nonprofits do not
interact with the nonprofit. In fact, their interaction is non-existent, because they rely on
data from other sources. While data is helpful in that it points to trends, it is just one
dimension of an organization that focuses on the numbers. What it lacks is insight about
the people doing the work. This really hit home for me when I attended a workshop about
nonprofit governance at one of the premiere nonprofit research conferences. After the
presenters shared the results of their studies, they answered questions from the audience.
As the question and answer period came to a close, one of the presenters concluded with,
“we really don’t know what goes on in these boardrooms”. If we are to understand those
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who govern nonprofits, we must be where they are: in the boardrooms and in the
organizations.
Another reason to “get inside the boardrooms” is to engage and bridge the divide
between research and practice. This is particularly true for sharing data and research.
Only a small portion of the research on nonprofit organizations is accessible to nonprofit
practitioners. Journal publications require subscriptions that are too costly for the
majority of nonprofits around the country and based on the results of this study, many do
not even access those that are readily available. Furthermore, when studies are
completed, researchers are already on to the next study and do not share findings with the
participating organizations.
I say all of this with the hope that I use my study as a means to encourage fellow
researchers to interact with the organizations they wish to study and for practitioners to
invite researchers into their organizations.
Challenges and Opportunities
Over the years, I have seen many challenges and opportunities in my travels in the
nonprofit sector. It seems that the biggest challenge I have witnessed is the relationship
between the board and the executive. Boards do not understand or appreciate the
executive and the executive looks at their board as a burden. And, over the years, I have
found that the executives and boards who do work well together understand their
individual roles and responsibilities. This leads me to focus on the fiduciary duties as a
critical piece in leading and managing nonprofit organizations. The duties provide
guidelines for both boards and executives that when followed, strengthen leadership and
eases tension.
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Another challenge in the sector is the mindset of quantity, not quality. The fact is
some people will join boards without any intention of doing the work and organizations
accept these “dead weights” because they need to fill board vacancies (and sometimes the
executive position). Yet, in satisfying quotas, organizations find that they spend the
majority of their time trying to get board members to do their jobs and to engage which
negatively impacts the mission. There is an opportunity for organizations to set the bar
high for the requirements for board service and the executive. When expectations are
outlined up front, performance will follow. When board members and executives know
what their legal responsibilities are, they will be more inclined to carry out their roles in
an intentional manner. Furthermore, when potential board members and executives know
what they are legally responsible for, those who do not want to commit to the work are
weeded out, saving the organization from troubles later on.
I am a practitioner at heart, having spent more than 20 years as a professional in
the nonprofit sector. And, because of my positionality, I can see how this study could
make an impact. Because of my position as a practitioner, and now as an academic, my
goal is to be a bridge to connect academics with practitioners to address the critical issues
in a way that provides practical use. As such, I am committed to sharing the findings with
nonprofits and using the assessment tool further.
In my work as a consultant I have the opportunity to bring organizations back to
the basics, their legal responsibilities, as a means to get everyone on the same page that
asks: Why are they there and what are they required to do? As I continue to use the
survey, my hope is that it can become a standardized assessment that nonprofits can use
in their on-boarding and orientation process to ensure that their leaders are making
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decisions based on their legal responsibilities. My dream would be to work with
regulators to create a standardized process that includes best practices and an assessment
that eventually could be a requirement for board service.
Final Thoughts
In many ways this study is the pinnacle of more than 20 years of practice. It has
been a scholarly and personal journey that has changed me in many ways. What has not
changed, is my passion and belief in the nonprofit sector and my belief that organizations
who thrive are those who focus on good governance.
The 40th President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, was quoted as
saying, “Trust, but verify”. For me, I hope that we can not only trust nonprofit leaders to
be accountable for their performance, but also that we can verify that they are fulfilling
their fiduciary duties. Whether through standardized assessment, trainings or resources,
nonprofit leaders have the opportunity to access the right knowledge to use at the right
time so that they are positioned to support their organizations to carry out their missions
for years to come.
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Appendices
Appendix A Survey Instrument

For information about the survey instrument, please contact the author at
crystaltrull@sandiego.edu.
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Appendix B Email Invitation to Participate in Study
Dear Nonprofit Leader,
My name is Crystal Trull and I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego as
well as a long-time San Diego nonprofit practitioner and consultant. In my work in the
nonprofit sector, I meet boards of all shapes and sizes that want to do their jobs well, but
are often confronted with an uncertainty as to what their actual duties are. As I ventured
into the world of academia, I found that that there is an amazing opportunity to strengthen
nonprofit boards and executives using academic research that would be relevant and
useful for nonprofit organizations. In response, I am embarking on an ambitious, groundbreaking study for my doctoral dissertation and I would be honored to have your
participation.
The purpose of the study is to understand how much nonprofit board members and
executives know about their fiduciary responsibilities and how they apply that knowledge
to their governance activities. My hope is that this study will not only provide useful data
that nonprofit leaders can use to strengthen their boards, but that also informs funders,
academics, and governments to engage their support of board development and training.
This study is intended for two types of nonprofit leaders who govern nonprofit
organizations that are located in San Diego County: 1) Individuals who serve as a
voting member of a board of directors and 2) the most senior executive staff (e.g.
Executive Director, Chief Operating Officers, Chief Development Officer, etc.). If none
of this criteria fits you, please forward this request to someone in your organization, or
others in your networks, who might meet the criteria. If you are one of the leaders that
meet the criteria, then please let me know if you would be willing to participate in this
study by emailing me at ### or by calling/texting me at ###.
The survey will take about 15 minutes and you can exit at any time. All of your answers
are confidential and will only be reported in aggregate. At the end of this survey, you
will be asked for your name and email just in case I need to follow up with you for
clarification or if you would like to receive the results of this study.
Your participation is vital to better equip nonprofit leaders. Should you have any
questions, I can be reached via email or cell/text as indicated above. I will follow up with
you in week or so, if you haven’t responded, to confirm that you received this request and
if you are interested in participating.
Many thanks in advance for your participation.
Sincerely,
Crystal Trull, M.A.
Institutional Review Board #2018-181
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